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The underlying thesis of this Article is that while smaller-sized particles and separate nano-
sized carriers of known agents are clearly covered by the CWC, nanomimics are not as squarely
within the relevant provisions. The bulk of this Article deals with that question. Despite the invita-
tion to woolgather, this Article is limited to the tightest possible analytical approach. Part I begins
with definitions of chemical and biological agents within existing treaties, and of nanoproducts,
including those existing beyond presently-known technical capabilities, but which are at least rea-
sonably conceivable (“nanobots”). Part II provides an overview of treaty law that is potentially
applicable to nanobots. It first examines current treaties that are facially applicable to nanoprod-
ucts. Because of the possibility that the “all analogous . . . devices” language of the 1925 Geneva
Protocol bans nanobots, the Article examines very closely the origin, application, and meaning
of that language. A close inspection necessarily involves considerable discussion of pre-1914
treaties, as well as the battles, weapons, tactics, and legal analyses in World War I, and the mass
reaction to them, which resulted in a series of treaties implicating chemical weapons after the war
ended. Part II then looks briefly at other treaties, conventions, and doctrines of international law
that may impact the use of nanobots. Part III briefly examines current theories regarding good faith
treaty interpretation and their implications for the utilization of antique (but not necessarily anti-
quated) doctrines and documents to interpret current law. Part IV then applies the current treaties
to nanoproducts, both existing and potential, in light of the preceding discussion, and then turns





A TINY PROBLEM WITH HUGE IMPLICATIONS—
NANOTECH AGENTS AS ENABLERS OR 
SUBSTITUTES FOR BANNED CHEMICAL 
WEAPONS: IS A NEW TREATY NEEDED? 
Evan J. Wallach* 
 
“[T]he Law of Nations . . . allows not the taking the Life of an Enemy, 
by Poison; which Custom was established for a general Benefit, lest 
Dangers should be increased too much. . . . Humanity, and the Interests 
of [the] Parties, equally require it; since Wars are so frequent and . . . 
the Mind of Man, ingenious in inventing Means to do hurt . . . .” 
—Hugo Grotius1 
INTRODUCTION 
In 2005, the U.S. Army’s Environmental Policy Institute 
(“AEPI”) posed a scenario and a question. The AEPI offered this 
provocative picture of future combat: 
Consider this scenario: A column of soldiers moves 
through the close confines of a city. Because of the potential 
for hostilities, the soldiers are maintaining a MOPP2 level 2 
 
*  Judge, United States Court of International Trade; Adjunct Professor of Law, 
New York Law School; Adjunct Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School; Visiting 
Professor of Law, University of Munster; Honorary Fellow, Hughes Hall College, 
University of Cambridge. The views expressed herein are solely the Author’s and do not 
represent those of any entity or institution with which he is affiliated. This Article was 
prepared with research assistance from Bebhinn Dunne, N.Y.U. Law School, LL.M 2009; 
Alexandra Folie, N.Y.U. Law School, LL.M 2009; Nancy Hull, N.Y.U. Law School, J.D. 
2009; Donna Lyons, N.Y.U. Law School, LL.M 2009; Alexander Marmar, Columbia Law 
School, J.D., 2010; and Kamal Siddhu, Columbia Law School, J.D. 2010. Particular credit 
is due to David H.P. Lee, University of Michigan, J.D. 2011, for a full summer of research 
on Post-World War I treaty making and politics. The Author wishes to especially thank 
Neysa Call and the staff of U.S. Senator Harry Reid for extraordinary assistance in 
nanotechnology research. 
1. 3 HUGO GROTIUS, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE 567, 567 n.XV(1) (Jean 
Barbeyrac ed., Lawbook Exchange, Ltd. 2004) (1625). 
2. Mission-oriented protective posture, or “MOPP” as it is commonly referred, is a 
military acronym that is used to specify different levels of protective gear that personnel 
wear in toxic environments. See U.S. ARMY, THE WARRIOR ETHOS AND SOLDIER COMBAT 
SKILLS 13-10, § 13-26, Field Manual No. 3-21.75(FM21-75) (Jan. 28, 2008), available at 
  
2010] NANOTECH AGENTS 859 
posture and chemical detectors are deployed in the column. 
Suddenly from the surrounding rooftops, there are gunshots 
and a number of canisters are hurled off the roof tops. 
Within moments, portions of the column are enveloped in 
hazy cloud and within a minute or so the soldiers closest to 
the canisters are twitching and salivating uncontrollably and 
even those soldiers who were able to don their protective 
masks and gloves are showing the same symptoms. Soldiers 
from the rear of the column move forward having easily 
cleared the roof tops with automatic weapons fire in an effort 
to aid their comrades. Although the chemical agent 
detectors show no evidence of conventional chemical agents, 
they administer nerve agent antidotes in accordance with 
their training, but the victims worsen and quickly die. Within 
a few minutes, even the fully garbed soldiers find themselves 
salivating beyond control and trembling. Soon, they too are 
dead; the chemical agent detectors remain silent. 
What happened here is but one possible result of 
nanotechnology harnessed to do the will of terrorists. 
Traditional chemical agents are largely prohibited by treaty 
or agreement and the precursors of traditional agents can be 
tracked. As nanotechnology advances, it will be possible to 
design materials that act like chemical agents, in this case a 
cholinesterase blocking agent, but are not classed as chemical 
agents under any existing protocol, do not trigger existing 
chemical agent detectors and in any case do not respond to 
known nerve agent antidotes and, because of their small size, 
can penetrate protective fabrics and even mask filters.3 
 
https://rdl.train.army.mil/soldierPortal/atia/adlsc/view/public/24572-1/fm/3-21.75/
fm3_21x75.pdf. The MOPP system designates four levels of increasing protection that 
are designed to be commensurate with the environmental risk. For a graphical 
representation of the different levels, see U.S. AIR FORCE, MISSION-ORIENTED 
PROTECTIVE POSTURES (MOPP), No. AFVA32-4012 (Feb. 1, 1998), available at 
http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/usa/doctrine/usaf/32401200.pdf. 
3. JOHN P. MCGUINNESS, ARMY ENVTL. POLICY INSTIT., NANOTECHNOLOGY: THE 
NEXT INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION—MILITARY AND SOCIETAL IMPLICATIONS 20 (2005), 
available at http://www.aepi.army.mil/internet/nanotech-industrial-revolution.pdf 
(emphasis added). The United States Army’s Environmental Policy Institute’s (“AEPI”) 
assumption here appears to be that the nanomaterials used in the scenario are 
something other than the chemical agents and their precursors listed in the Chemical 
Weapons Convention (“CWC”). See discussion infra Part I. Rather, they “act like” 
chemical agents. The AEPI seems to be describing only one potential type of 
nanoweapon—a device which mimics the effects of chemicals on the human body by 
means other than a direct chemical reaction. These devices are what the AEPI calls 
“nanomachines” in its recommendations section. See id. at 27. 
  
860 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 33:858 
In short, the AEPI posited that nanomaterials which mimic 
banned chemical agents (“nanomimics”)4 might be developed 
and used in combat. The Institute recommended that someone 
should determine “if nanomachines are chemical weapons under 
the provisions of the Chemical Weapons Convention.”5 This 
Article attempts to do exactly that.6 The results are interesting 
and, in most instances, very clear. Existing treaties certainly cover 
both nanoparticles of banned chemical weapon materials and 
 
4. This Article uses the word “nanomimic” to refer to devices that causes the same 
result as a banned poison, toxin or other chemical substance. In biology, mimicry occurs 
when one species imitates another. See WOLFGANG WICKLER, MIMICRY IN PLANTS AND 
ANIMALS 8 (R.D. Martin trans., 1968). Batesian mimicry, 
is thought to occur when a rare harmless species evolves to resemble closely an 
abundant noxious model. It gains protection from its predators which cannot 
tell the difference between model and mimic, and since they tend to 
encounter models rather than mimics when searching for food, they associate 
the colour pattern of the model with the nasty experience, and tend to avoid it 
in future. 
FRANCIS GILBERT, THE EVOLUTION OF IMPERFECT MIMICRY IN HOVERFLIES 1 (2004), 
available at http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/96/1/ImperfectMimicry.pdf. Hoverflies 
that resemble bees or wasps are an example. See id. at 4–5. In Mullerian mimicry, 
“several noxious species evolve to resemble each other, and hence all benefit by a 
reduction in predation.” Id. at 1. 
5. MCGUINNESS, supra note 3, at 27. 
6. In a broad sense, the question was raised even earlier by a professor of 
engineering at West Point: 
The importance of ethics and professional responsibility in engineering design 
cannot be overemphasized when weapons of mass destruction can be 
inexpensively and straightforwardly created by anyone with modest specialized 
knowledge and equipment. Arms control style agreements offer one option for 
halting the spread of dangerous technology applications, but these agreements 
will not include non-state terrorist and radical militant groups. However, arms 
control treaties would still be important tools to restrain the dark side of 
emerging technologies, and the Army could provide the prime forces for 
verification of compliance with international treaties and agreements. In the 
case of non-state sponsored militant groups, the Army could find itself a major 
Homeland Defense Force team member, working closely with intelligence 
organizations to enforce United Nations sanctioned ethical standards and 
controls on research into unmistakably dangerous technologies; including 
infectious biotechnology products, malicious information technology viruses, 
and other nefarious weapons. 
Col. Kip Nygren, Emerging Technologies and the Army, AMPTIAC Q., Spring 2002, at 15. As 
described by the U.S. government, “[t]he Advanced Materials, Manufacturing, and 
Testing Information Analysis Center (AMMTIAC) is the [U.S. Department of Defense’s] 
Center of Excellence responsible for acquiring, archiving, analyzing, synthesizing, and 
disseminating scientific and technical information related to advanced materials, 
manufacturing, and testing.” Advanced Materials, Manufacturing, and Testing 
Information Analysis Center, http://ammtiac.alionscience.com/about/ (last visited Apr. 
3, 2010). 
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nano-sized devices designed to carry such particles.7 Because, 
however, answers regarding potential development of 
nanomimics are not entirely clear,8 the recommendation of this 
Article is that states parties9 may wish to amend the 1993 
Chemical Weapons Convention (“CWC”)10 to clearly cover as yet 
undeveloped nanomachines.11 
Nanotechnology is a relatively new field of knowledge 
studying and applying the development and application of very 
small particles of matter.12 While it has implications across a wide 
range of science including chemistry, physics, and biology,13 it is 
 
7. As will be discussed below, chemical carriers will certainly be duel use; they are 
currently being publicly developed and deployed for medical treatment, particularly in 
oncology. See infra Part I.C. 
8. Although, as this Article demonstrates, a legal argument for noncoverage of 
nanomimics by existing treaties requires an interpretation of the law at least at the edge 
of bad faith. 
9. This Article is directed to whether states are bound under international law, and 
whether certain conduct by them might constitute war crimes. Several of the scenarios 
and discussions cited mention the possibility of using chemical weapons by terrorists. 
This Article does not deal directly with actions by terrorists, but since, in any definition, 
terrorists are nonstate actors, and generally commit what would be war crimes if 
committed by a state, the analysis is perfectly applicable, albeit in a multistep fashion. 
See, e.g., International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, 
Dec. 9, 1999, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 106-49 (2000), 2178 U.N.T.S. 229; International 
Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, Dec. 15, 1997, S. TREATY DOC. 
NO. 106-6 (1999), 2149 U.N.T.S. 256; Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of 
Terrorism, Nov. 16, 1937, 19 L.N.O.J. 23; Declaration on Measures to Eliminate 
International Terrorism, G.A. Res. 49/60, Annex, U.N. Doc. A/RES/49/60 (Feb. 17, 
1995), supplemented by Declaration to Supplement the 1994 Declaration on Measures to 
Eliminate International Terrorism, G.A. Res. 51/210, Annex, U.N. Doc. A/RES/51/210 
(Dec. 17, 1996). 
10. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling 
and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, opened for signature Jan. 13, 
1993, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 103-21 (1993), 1974 U.N.T.S. 45 [hereinafter Chemical 
Weapons Convention]. 
11. See generally Ralf Trapp, Advances in Science and Technology and the Chemical 
Weapons Convention, ARMS CONTROL TODAY, Mar. 2008 (raising, inter alia, the possible 
need for convention modifications). As to whether nanomachines are feasible, see infra 
Part I.A. 
12. See generally J. CLARENCE DAVIES, WOODROW WILSON INT’L CTR. FOR SCHOLARS, 
OVERSIGHT OF NEXT GENERATION NANOTECHNOLOGY (2009), available at 
http://207.58.186.238/process/assets/files/7316/pen-18.pdf. 
13. Except for the implications of nanobots, which as will be seen below, might 
involve some living parts, this Article does not extensively examine the separate 
biological aspects of nanotechnology and its interplay with the Biological Weapons 
Convention of 1972. See Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production 
and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their 
Destruction, Apr. 10, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 583, 1015 U.N.T.S. 163 [hereinafter Biological 
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widely regarded as crossing many of the traditional scientific 
boundaries of those fields of study.14 Nanotechnology is of 
particular interest to students of law and warfare15 in three 
respects: First, nanoparticles of known chemical warfare agents 
or precursors to those agents may have different effects on 
protective gear and on human physiology than conventionally 
sized particles of those agents.16 Second, nano-sized carriers, 
similar to those currently under development for 
chemotherapy,17 may deliver target doses of chemical agents to 
targeted cells in the human body.18 Third, speculative19 literature 
predicts that the eventual production of robots on the nanoscale 
will be possible some day.20 In effect, these nanoscale robots 
would enter the human body, penetrate cells, and cause them to 
act in a fashion similar to the effects of currently banned 
chemical weapons.21 
The underlying thesis of this Article is that while smaller-
sized particles and separate nano-sized carriers of known agents 
are clearly covered by the CWC, nanomimics are not as squarely 
within the relevant provisions. The bulk of this Article deals with 
that question. In light of that analysis, however, it is important to 
 
Weapons Convention]. The analysis, while analogous, has other implications simply 
outside the scope of this Article. Additional research in the field might prove fruitful for 
further study. 
14. DAVIES, supra note 12, at 16. 
15. There are, of course, numerous other regulatory interests including, inter alia, 
environment, health, safety, and trade. See generally JENNIFER PELLEY & MARC SANER, 
REGULATORY GOVERNANCE INITIATIVE, CARLETON UNIV., INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES 
TO THE REGULATORY GOVERNANCE OF NANOTECHNOLOGY (2009), available at 
http://www.carleton.ca/regulation/publications/Nanotechnology_Regulation_Paper_
April2009.pdf. 
16. MCGUINNESS, supra note 3, at 20. 
17. See discussion infra Part I.C. 
18. See infra notes 80–81 and accompanying text.  
19. Many reputable scientists reject such speculation as purely “science fiction.” See 
infra note 89 and accompanying text. This Article addresses the issue both because the 
U.S. Army has raised the question, and because history has shown that humanity’s 
destructive impulses are often the most fruitful for the progress of scientific knowledge. 
Note particularly the discussion below of speculation and arguments about the 
possibility of new chemical and biological weapons before the adoption of treaties in the 
1920s. Many of the most pessimistic scientific speculations at the time proved true. See 
discussion infra Part II.A. 
20. See generally Daniel Harris, Will Robots Come To Our Medical Rescue?, ELECTRONIC 
DESIGN, Aug. 16, 2007, at 28 (discussing how nanorobots can enter the human body to 
provide medical care). 
21. See id. 
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recognize that the CWC incorporates the 1925 Geneva Gas 
Protocol,22 which prohibits, in part, that “the use in war of 
asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of all analogous 
liquids, materials or devices.”23 An extremely strong argument can 
therefore be made that the CWC facially bans nanomimics. That 
argument, however, depends on the intention of the states 
signatory to the treaties.24 In determining the intention of a 
party, recourse may be had to the drafting history and working 
papers, contemporaneous general commentary by the legal 
community and the press, the events of the recent history before 
the treaty was signed, and, of course, signing statements and 
reservations.25 Some of that material is, however, mixed, 
contradictory, vague, lost, or was intentionally omitted in original 
 
22. Chemical Weapons Convention, supra note 10, pmbl, art. XIII. The Biological 
Weapons Convention (“BWC”) incorporates the 1925 Geneva Protocol as well. 
Biological Weapons Convention, supra note 13, pmbl., art. XVIII. Interestingly, the U.S. 
Senate ratified both the BWC and the Geneva Protocol on the same day, December 16, 
1974. See S. EXEC. REP. NO. 93-35 (1974); S. EXEC. REP. NO. 93-36 (1974). At the signing 
ceremony on January 22, 1975, President Gerald Ford described the ratification as 
“completing a process which began almost 50 years ago when the United States 
proposed at Geneva a ban on the use in war of ‘asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases’” 
and stated that “the United States has long supported the principles and objectives of 
the Geneva Protocol.” Gerald Ford, U.S. President, Geneva Statement on the Protocol 
of 1925 and Biological Weapons Convention, 72 DEP’T ST. BULL. 567 (1975). 
23. Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating Poisonous or 
Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925, 26 U.S.T. 571, 
94 L.N.T.S. 65 [hereinafter Geneva Protocol] (emphasis added). The BWC generally 
covers both poisons and toxins. Poison in its common usage refers to “any substance 
that, when relatively small amounts are ingested, inhaled, or absorbed, or applied to, 
injected into, or developed within the body, has chemical action that causes damage to 
structure or disturbance of function, producing symptoms, illness, or death.” W.B. 
SAUNDERS, DORLAND’S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1502 (31st ed. 2007) 
(emphasis added). A toxin, on the other hand, is defined as “a poison, frequently used 
to refer specifically to a protein produced by some higher plants, certain animals, and 
pathogenic bacteria, which is highly toxic for other living organisms. Such substances 
are differentiated from the simple chemical poisons and the vegetable alkaloids by their 
high molecular weight and antigenicity.” Id. at 1968. 
24. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31, May 23, 1969, 115 
U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention]; see also, e.g., Factor v. Laubenheimer, 
290 U.S. 276, 293 (1933) (“Considerations which should govern the diplomatic relations 
between nations, and the good faith of treaties, as well, require that their obligations 
should be liberally construed so as to effect the apparent intention of the parties to 
secure equality and reciprocity between them.”). 
25. See Vienna Convention, supra note 24, art. 32. 
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publications.26 It is, in short, a law professor’s nirvana, for it 
leaves room for endless analytical speculation. 
Despite the invitation to woolgather, this Article is limited to 
the tightest possible analytical approach. Part I begins with 
definitions of chemical and biological agents within existing 
treaties, and of nanoproducts, including those existing beyond 
presently-known technical capabilities, but which are at least 
reasonably conceivable (“nanobots”).27 Part II provides an 
overview of treaty law that is potentially applicable to nanobots. It 
first examines current treaties that are facially applicable to 
nanoproducts. Because of the possibility that the “all analogous 
 
26. For example, in his introductory comments at the 1922 Naval Conference 
former U.S. Secretary of State Elihu Root stated that the language introduced by the 
U.S. delegation was borrowed from the Treaty of Versailles, which ended World War I 
between most of the Allies and Germany. See Edwin James, Hughes Proposes Gas Ban, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 7, 1922, at 1. In fact, the U.S. proposal did substantially track the language of 
the Treaty of Versailles, but it also differed in respects vital to this analysis from the other 
treaties ending the Great War with Austria, Hungry, Bulgaria, and Turkey. See RAYMOND 
L. BUELL, THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE 207–09 (1922). Was Root intentionally 
misleading the conferees, did he honestly miss the distinctions, or did he recognize 
them, but think they were so unimportant as to not be worth mentioning? All those 
questions have a bearing on the analysis in this article and on future applications of the 
treaty banning chemical weapons on the 21st Century. See discussion infra Part 
II.A.1.d.ii. 
27. It has been suggested that the term “nanobots” is inherently misleading, and 
that a more accurate phrase is “enhanced nanomaterials.” Another suggestion was that, 
for the purposes of this Article, “nanobots” are indistinguishable from specifically 
engineered viruses. The Author disagrees that the term “nanobots” has no utility, but 
acknowledges that clearly it is fraught with discord. One problem in the area is that 
there are some assumptions based on prior speculation, initially envisioned by Kim Eric 
Drexler, about what is essentially self-replication of nano-sized machines. See K. ERIC 
DREXLER, ENGINES OF CREATION: THE COMING ERA OF NANOTECHNOLOGY 53–63 (1987). 
The dispute is fascinating, and beyond the Author’s capacity as a layman in the field of 
nanotechnologyto evaluate, but it is largely irrelevant to the question posed by the AEPI 
that is answered here. “Nanobot” for purposes of this Article is a device on the 
nanoscale which is capable of mimicking the effect of chemical nerve agents, see 
discussion infra Part I.A.4, but is neither a product of chemical processes, nor a 
biological agent as banned by the BWC. See discussion infra Part IV.A.3. This Article will 
therefore not address other pertinent critiques of the term, particularly those related to 
Brownian motion (movement of particles suspended in fluid), and the numbers of 
individual devices which might be necessary to constitute a lethal dose. It bears note, 
however, that the speculation in this Article is largely based on assumptions emerging 
from medical research, particularly in the field of cancer research. See discussion infra 
Part I.C. In any case, when one deals with potential weapons development it is always 
wise to err on the side of expecting the worst, for “[t]here are more things in heaven 
and earth, Horatio, than are dreamt of in your philosophy.” WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, 
HAMLET, act 1, sc. 5. 
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. . . devices” language of the 1925 Geneva Protocol28 bans 
nanobots, the Article examines very closely the origin, 
application, and meaning of that language. A close inspection 
necessarily involves considerable discussion of pre-1914 treaties, 
as well as the battles, weapons, tactics, and legal analyses in World 
War I, and the mass reaction to them, which resulted in a series 
of treaties implicating chemical weapons after the war ended. 
Part II then looks briefly at other treaties, conventions, and 
doctrines of international law that may impact the use of 
nanobots. Part III briefly examines current theories regarding 
good faith treaty interpretation and their implications for the 
utilization of antique (but not necessarily antiquated) doctrines 
and documents to interpret current law. Part IV then applies the 
current treaties to nanoproducts, both existing and potential, in 
light of the preceding discussion, and then turns to a discussion 
of whether a new treaty, or modifications or clarifications to 
existing treaties, are advisable. 
I. CURRENT DEFINITIONS OF CHEMICAL AGENTS, 
BIOLOGICAL AGENTS, AND NANOSYSTEMS 
The most modern sources of law controlling the acquisition 
and use of chemical and biological weapons are the 1972 
Biological Weapons Convention (“BWC”)29 and the 1993 CWC.30 
Given past experiences, the drafters of the more recent 
conventions relating to biological and chemical weapons were 
specific in their coverage.31 Accordingly, current law quite 
explicitly bans “[m]icrobial or other biological agents, or toxins 
whatever their origin or method of production, of types and in 
quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective 
or other peaceful purposes” and “[w]eapons, equipment or 
means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for 
 
28. See Geneva Protocol, supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
29. See Biological Weapons Convention, supra note 13. 
30. See Chemical Weapons Convention, supra note 10. 
31. As will be discussed below, the history of arms control treaties is often also a 
history of their evasion.Often, that evasion was justified by what the evading party 
characterized as distinguishing factors of the weapon that it used. See, e.g., infra Part 
II.A.1.c (discussing Germany’s use of chlorine gas in 1915).  
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hostile purposes or in armed conflict.”32 It is also unequivocal in 
its prohibition of all chemical weapons.33 
It is particularly important to note that the CWC covers any 
“chemical which through its chemical action on life processes 
can cause death, temporary incapacitation or permanent harm to 
humans or animals . . . regardless of their origin or of their 
method of production.”34 Accordingly, a broad class of current or 
immediately potential nanoproducts may be covered by the 
 
32. Biological Weapons Convention, supra note 13, art. I(1)–(2). 
33. See Chemical Weapons Convention, supra note 10, art. I. The CWC contains a 
very specific definition of “chemical weapons”: 
(a) Toxic chemicals and their precursors, except where intended for 
purposes not prohibited under this Convention, as long as the types and 
quantities are consistent with such purposes;  
(b) Munitions and devices, specifically designed to cause death or other 
harm through the toxic properties of those toxic chemicals specified in 
subparagraph (a), which would be released as a result of the employment of 
such munitions and devices;  
(c) Any equipment specifically designed for use directly in connection 
with the employment of munitions and devices specified in subparagraph (b). 
Id. art. II(1). “Toxic chemicals” are defined with a similar level of specificity: 
Any chemical which through its chemical action on life processes can cause 
death, temporary incapacitation or permanent harm to humans or animals. 
This includes all such chemicals, regardless of their origin or of their method 
of production, and regardless of whether they are produced in facilities, in 
munitions or elsewhere. 
Id. art. II(2). The CWC is written broadly enough to cover existing and undiscovered 
applications and substances. The continuing work of the Organization for the 
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons demonstrates that this level of breadth was intended 
by the drafters. See discussion infra Part IV.A.3.b; see also S. TREATY DOC. NO. 103-21, at 8 
(1993) (“The intention of this broad definition [of chemicals] is to prohibit all known 
and unknown, and future toxic chemicals in types and quantities that cannot be justified 
for permitted purposes”). But cf. Robert Pinson, Is Nanotechnology Prohibited By the 
Biological and Chemical Weapons Conventions?, 22 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 279, 294 (2004) 
(arguing that it may be possible to use nanotechnology for conventional weapon 
purposes under the broad exceptions permitted by the CWC). 
34. Chemical Weapons Convention, supra note 10, art. II(2). The CWC’s definition 
of chemical weapons differs from the way other international agreements define 
weapons. Typically, “a weapon is usually considered to be the entirety of its components, 
and characterized by certain more or less objective criteria . . . that would allow for 
distinction between those types of weapons covered by the treaty and those not 
covered . . . .” WALTER KRUTZSCH & RALF TRAPP, A COMMENTARY ON THE CHEMICAL 
WEAPONS CONVENTION 23 (1994). Under the CWC, by contrast,“ each of the 
components of a chemical weapons system in itself already has to be regarded as the 
prohibited weapon.” Id. at 24 (emphasis added); see also WALTER KRUTZSCH AND RALF 
TRAPP, VERIFICATION PRACTICE UNDER THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (1999) 
(commenting on the verification provisions under the CWC). 
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CWC; others might not. To comprehend potential applications 
one must first understand the language of nanotechnology.35 
A. Nanotechnology and Molecular Nanotechnology 
Nanotechnology is, broadly put, the science of the very 
small. In Military Nanotechnology, Jurgen Altmann states that 
nanotechnology, including nanoscience, “is about investigating 
as well as manipulating matter on the atomic and molecular 
level. At this level, the borders between the disciplines physics, 
chemistry, [and] biology vanish, including their sub-, 
intermediate and applied fields, such as materials science, 
mechanics, electronics, biochemistry, genetics, [and] 
neurology.”36 A useful discussion of general concepts is found in 
Nanotechnology and Homeland Security: 
[Nanotechnology] is the application of nanoscience to useful 
devices. Nanoscience . . . is the science that deals with objects 
with at least one dimension between one and one hundred 
nanometers in length, a size range called the nanoscale. A 
nanometer is one one-billionth of a meter . . . . [W]hy does 
[nanoscience] get so much hype, and why is it so important 
for national defense and national security? The first reason is 
that nanoscale objects . . . are a special kind of small. 
Individual atoms are around one-fifth of a nanometer. The 
size of almost all molecules . . . lies within the nanoscale, 
because it is the smallest level within which functional matter 
can exist . . . . This means that . . . we can make materials 
whose amazing properties can be defined in absolute terms 
[and] it is the scale at which the quirky quantum mechanical 
properties of matter and its more familiar mechanical 
properties (such as hardness, temperature and melting 
point) meet. At the nanoscale it is possible to take advantage 
of both sets of properties . . . .37 
 
35. Some useful terminology may be found in Classification Order 1850. Patent & 
Trademark Office, U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Classification Order 1850 (2005), available 
at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/opc/documents/1850.pdf (providing search 
criteria for nanotechnology patent research). 
36. JÜRGEN ALTMANN, MILITARY NANOTECHNOLOGY, POTENTIAL APPLICATIONS AND 
PREVENTIVE ARMS CONTROL 1 (2006). 
37. DANIEL RATNER & MARK A. RATNER, NANOTECHNOLOGY AND HOMELAND: NEW 
WEAPONS FOR NEW WARS SECURITY 13–14 (2004). 
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Certainly, there is a great deal of current military interest in 
nanotechnology38 and an equal amount of excitement, if not 
money, in the medical realm.39 Indeed, medical research has 
overlapping applicability of considerable interest: 
 
38. Nanotech research projects are being conducted at, inter alia, the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s Institute for Soldier Nanotechnologies, the U.S. 
Army’s Future Force Warrior program, the UK’s Future Infantry Soldier Technology 
project, Germany’s Projekthaus System Soldat, and Italy’s Soldato Futuro initiative. See 
The March of Technology, ECONOMIST, June 10, 2006, at 30 (discussing each of these 
programs); see, e.g., DIR., DEF. RESEARCH AND ENG’G, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., DEFENSE 
NANOTECHNOLOGY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM 3 (2007), available at 
http://www.nano.gov/html/res/DefenseNano2005.pdf (explaining that the objective of 
defense nanotechnology programs is “[t]o discover and exploit unique phenomena at 
these dimensions to enable novel applications enhancing war fighter and battle systems 
capabilities.”); JUN WANG & PETER J. DORTMANS, DEP’T OF DEFENCE, A REVIEW OF 
SELECTED NANOTECHNOLOGY TOPICS AND THEIR POTENTIAL MILITARY APPLICATIONS 22 
(2004) (Austl.), available at http://www.dsto.defence.gov.au/publications/2610/DSTO-
TN-0537.pdf (noting “the concept of nanobots needs to advance beyond the drawing 
board before being considered within feasible technology concepts.”); Lothar Ibrugger, 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, The Security Implications of Nanotechnology, 179 
STCMT 05 E, (2005) (discussing military applications of nanotechnology); Chapelle 
Brown, Nanotech Goes to War, EE TIMES, Aug. 25, 2003, http://www.eetimes.com/story/
OEG20030825S0017 (providing an overview of the Massachusett Institute of 
Technology’s Institute for Soldier Nanotechnologies); Barnaby J. Feder, Frontier of 
Military Technology Is the Size of a Molecule, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2003, at C2 (quoting from 
U.S. Deputy Under Secretary of Defense with the Office of Basic Research at the 
Defense Department that “[n]anotechnology will eventually alter warfare more than the 
invention of gunpowder”); David Hambling, Nanotechnology Goes to War, GUARDIAN 
(London), Mar. 5, 2009, at 6 (considering military applications of nanotechnology 
warfare); Stefan Nitschke, Nanotechnology: Applications for Naval Warfare, 26 NAVAL 
FORCES 36 (2005) (same). 
39. See, e.g., Robert Austin & Shuang-fang Lim, The Sackler Colloquium on Promises 
and Perils in Nanotechnology for Medicine, 105 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S. 17217, 17218 
(2008) (contemplating the potential application of nanotechnology in medicine); 
Adriano Cavalcanti et al., Medical Nanorobotics for Diabetes Control, in 4 NANOMEDICINE: 
NANOTECHNOLOGY, BIOLOGY, AND MEDICINE 127, 127–35 (2008) (same, with respect to 
diabetes); Adriano Cavalcanti et al., Nanorobot Hardware Architecture for Medical Defense, 8 
SENSORS 2932, 2947 (2008) (proposing mass embedded nanorobots with chemical 
sensors for early epidemiological detection, and which apparently does not consider the 
potential public reaction to perceived government intrusion); James R. Heath et al., 
Nanomedicine Targets Cancer, 300 SCI. AM., 44, 44–51 (2009) (reviewing the mechanics of 
nanoscale cancer monitoring systems); Tom C. Thomas & Rachelle Acuna-Narvaez, The 
Convergence of Biotechnology and Nanotechnology: Why Here, Why Now?, 12 J. COM. 
BIOTECHNOLOGY 105, 105–08, (2006) (“[N]anomaterials and devices can be built at the 
same size as cell components, making them ideal for interacting with individual 
molecules.”). Additionally, nanomaterials and devices are ideal for as well as the 
chemical delivery value of tree branched nanomaterials called “dendrimers.” Thomas & 
Acuna-Narvaez, supra, at 108; see also Giorgia Guerra, A Model for Regulation of Medical 
Nanobiotechnology: The European Status Quo, 3 NANOTECHNOLOGY. L. & BUS. 84 (2006) 
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Nanoscale devices and nanoscale components of larger 
devices are of the same size as biological entities. They are 
smaller than human cells (10,000 to 20,000 nanometers in 
diameter) and organelles and similar in size to large 
biological macromolecules such as enzymes and receptors—
hemoglobin, for example, is approximately 5 nanometers in 
diameter . . . . Nanoscale devices smaller than 50 nanometers can 
easily enter most cells, while those smaller than 20 nanometers 
can transit out of blood vessels, offering the possibility that 
nanoscale devices will be able to penetrate biological barriers 
such as the blood—brain barrier . . . [a]nd because of their 
size, nanoscale devices can readily interact with biomolecules on 
both the cell surface and within the cell . . . .40 
Why does this medical research matter in warfare?41 A basic 
understanding of some concepts of physiology, chemistry, 
biochemistry, and history is important to fully appreciate its 
relevance.42 An underlying concern of those who fear use of 
 
(pointing out the difficulty of classifying nanotechnology within the current legal 
regulatory hierarchy of the European Union). 
40. NAT’L CANCER INSTIT., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV., CANCER 
NANOTECHNOLOGY PLAN: A STRATEGIC INITIATIVE TO TRANSFORM CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 
AND BASIC RESEARCH THROUGH THE DIRECTED APPLICATION OF NANOTECHNOLOGY 25 
(2004) (emphasis added), available at http://ntc-ccne.org/documents/
cancer_nanotechnology_plan.pdf. 
41. See Andy Oppenheimer, Nanotechnology Paves Way for New Weapons, JANE’S 
CHEM-BIO WEB, July 27, 2005, http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/27a/317.html 
(“As with many technologies, the medical applications may be adapted for offensive 
purposes. Manipulation of biological and chemical agents using nanotechnologies could 
result in entirely new threats that might be harder to detect and counter than existing 
[chemical and biological weapons]. New agents may remove previous operational 
difficulties of biological warfare, such as effective delivery of the agent. The large surface 
area of nanoparticles, relative to their overall size, increases their toxicity when inhaled. 
Advanced capabilities may include the use of genetic markers to target specific organs in 
the body, or an ethnic group, or even a specific individual . . . . The design of new agents 
that attack specific body organs such as the central nervous system would enable far 
smaller amounts of the chemical to be made without detection and would require only 
small, low-level facilities.”). 
42. In 1914, a British scientist, Henry Dale, described the physiological effects of a 
substance called acetylcholine. In 1921, Otto Loewi, an Austrian scientist, provided the 
first proof that acetylcholine transmitted messages from one nerve cell to another, and 
from those cells to organs such as the heart. Loewi later demonstrated acetylcholine is 
broken down by an enzyme called cholinesterase. JONATHAN B. TUCKER, WAR OF NERVES 
CHEMICAL WARFARE FROM WORLD WAR I TO AL-QAEDA 52 (2006). In essence,  
[t]he arrival of a nerve impulse at the junction between a nerve and a muscle 
cell induces the release from the nerve ending of molecules of acetylcholine, 
which diffuse across a narrow gap called the synapse and stimulate receptors 
on the surface of the muscle cell, triggering a series of biochemical events that 
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nanobots in warfare, often not explained except with references 
to nerve agents,43 is that the bots will enter or otherwise affect 
nerve cells, and will act as cholinesterase inhibitors,44 but in a 
physical rather than a chemical manner.45 The results would be the 
same, but would they be covered by the CWC? 
 
cause the muscle fibers to contract. Under normal conditions, cholinesterase 
enzymes in the synapse immediately break down the acetylcholine and halt the 
stimulation of the receptors, allowing the muscle fibers to relax. . . . [Nerve 
gases] inhibit[] the action of cholinesterase . . . [thus freezing] the 
biochemical on-off circuit in the ‘open’ position, allowing [toxic acetylcholine 
build-up]. Because acetylcholine plays multiple roles in the peripheral, 
autonomic, and central nervous systems, excessive amounts give rise to diverse 
physiological effects [including violent, uncontrollable spasms of skeletal 
muscles followed by paralysis, excessive salivation, vomiting, bronchial 
constriction, and seizures]. Nerve agents can induce death by asphyxiation 
through three different mechanisms: constriction of the bronchial tubes, 
suppression of the respiratory center of the brain, and paralysis of the 
breathing muscles. 
Id. 52–54. This excellent work is extremely useful for anyone seeking to understand the 
history of the development and deployment of nerve gases. 
43. See Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Environmental Regulation of Nanotechnology: Some 
Preliminary Observations, [2001] 31 Envtl. Law Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10681, 10684 
(“Nanotechnological devices for military use also raise the issue that they do the work of 
chemical and biological weapons, but—at least arguably—do not fall within the treaties 
regulating chemical and biological weapons. The argument that nanotechnological 
weapons—at least those of destructive, rather than surveillance, type—would be 
functional equivalents of chemical and biological weapons would be a strong one, and 
indeed destructive nanoweapons would probably achieve their effects through chemical action, 
though it would be mechanically initiated.” (emphasis added)). 
44. Fed’n of Am. Scientists, Introduction to Chemical Weapons, 
http://www.fas.org/programs/ssp/bio/chemweapons/introduction.html (last visited 
Apr. 3, 2010) (“Nerve gases are liquids, not gases, which block an enzyme 
(acetylcholinesterase) that is necessary for functions of the central nervous system.”); see 
also discussion infra, Part II.A.1.d.iv. 
45. See U.S. CONG., OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, TECHNOLOGIES UNDERLYING 
WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION, USGPO No. OTA-BP-ISC-115, at 23–24 (1993), 
available at http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/ota/9344.pdf (“Two classes of nerve 
agents, designated G and V agents, were produced . . . by the United States and the 
former Soviet Union. The G-series nerve agents are known both by informal names and 
military code- names: tabun (GA), sarin (GB), GC, soman (GD), GE, and GF. This class 
of compounds was discovered in 1936 by Gerhard Schrader of the German firm IG 
Farben during research on new pesticides . . . . All the various G agents act rapidly and 
produce casualties through by inhalation, although they also penetrate the skin or eyes 
at high doses . . . . The V- series nerve agents include VE, VM, and VX, although only VX 
was weaponized by the United States. These agents were originally discovered in 1948 by 
British scientists engaged in research on new pesticides . . . . VX is an oily liquid that may 
persist for weeks or longer in the environment. Although not volatile enough to pose a 
major inhalation hazard, [V-series agents are] readily absorbedableable through the 
skin. The lethal dose of VX on bare skin is about 10 milligrams for a 70 kilogram 
man.”). 
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Despite considerable institutional skepticism,46 there has 
been at least some discussion of nanorobot concepts which 
appears to be based in hard fact and science,47 and capable of 
being utilized by nonexperts to examine reality.48 In Bio-
Nanorobotics: State of the Art and Future Challenges, the authors 
focus on molecular machines either naturally occurring, or 
created “from scratch” synthetically but “using nature’s 
components.”49 They note that “[t]he main goal in the field of 
molecular machines is to use various biological elements—whose 
function at the cellular level creates motion, force or a signal—as 
machine components.”50 The authors suggest that: 
So far, there does not exist any particular guideline or a 
prescribed manner, which details the methodology of 
designing a bio-nanorobot. There are many complexities, 
which are associated with using biocomponents (such as 
protein folding and presence of aqueous medium), but the 
advantages of using these are also quite considerable. These 
biocomponents offer immense variety and functionality at a 
scale where creating a man-made material with such 
capabilities would be extremely difficult. These 
 
46. See Rudy Baum, Nanotechnology: Drexler and Smalley Make the Case For and Against 
‘Molecular Assemblers,’ CHEMICAL & ENGINEERING NEWS, Dec. 1, 2003, at 37 
(documenting the well-publicized debate regarding the feasibility of nanotecology 
between Smalley and Drexler); Mikael Johansson, “Plenty of Room at the Bottom”: Towards 
an Anthropology of Nanoscience, ANTHROPOLOGY TODAY, Dec., 2003, at 3–6 (providing 
excellent examples of scientific skepticism of Drexler’s nano-concepts); Richard E. 
Smalley, Of Chemistry, Love and Nanobots, SCIENTIFIC AM., Sept. 2001, at 76–77 (arguing 
that certain types of nanorobots are not feasible); Rudy Baum, Nanotechnology: Drexler 
and Smalley Make the Case for and Against “Molecular Assemblers”, 81 CHEMICAL & 
ENGINEERING NEWS, Dec. 1, 2003, at 37–42; cf. K. Eric Drexler & Jason Wejnert, 
Nanotechnology and Policy, 45 JURIMETRICS J. 1, 8 (2004) (“A more serious issue is the 
prospect of losing the arms race in developing this technology. The United States 
presently has an informal but effective nanotechnology in place that, if continued, will 
guarantee loss in the arms race.”). 
47. Are Nanobots On Their Way?, NANOTECHNOLOGY WKLY., May 12, 2008, at 1 (“The 
first real steps towards building a microscopic device that can construct nano machines 
have been taken by U.S. researchers.”). 
48. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579, 589–92 (1993) 
(discussing expert testimony standards about scientific knowledge that may assist the 
trier of fact); cf. Lesley Wexler, Limiting the Precautionary Principle: Weapons Regulation in 
the Face of Scientific Uncertainty, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 459, 524–25 (2006) (arguing in 
favor of scientific knowledge standard similar to that mentioned in Daubert). 
49. See Ajay Ummat et al., Bio-Nanorobotics: The State of the Art, and Future Challenges, 
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biocomponents have been perfected by nature through 
millions of years of evolution and hence . .  . very accurate 
and efficient.51 
The authors go on to suggest that a “library of bio-
nanocomponents” will be developed including categories such as 
actuation, energy source, and signaling, enabling design and 
development of bio-nanosystems with “enhanced mobile 
characteristics” and the ability to “transport themselves as well as 
other objects to desired locations at the nano scale.”52 The 
authors contemplate this discussion in the context of medical 
repair,53 but the applications to future warfare appear equally 
possible,54 and they raise fascinating questions. As Shipbaugh 
notes, “[f]uturistic applications are highly speculative and a main 
source of contention in scientific debates over nanotechnology. 
It is not necessary to dwell upon replicating molecular systems to 
 
51. Id. at 19-19. 
52. Id. at 19-21. 
53. The authors’ discussion appears realistic. They conclude that problems like 
protein folding, precise mechanisms of molecular motors, and swarming behavior are 
unsolved. Id. at 19-33. Still, they assert: 
The future of bio-nanorobots . . . is bright. We are at the dawn of a new era in 
which many disciplines will merge including robotics, mechanical, chemical 
and biomedical engineering, chemistry, biology, physics, and mathematics so 
that fully functional systems will be developed. However, challenges towards 
such a goal abound. Developing a complete database of different biomolecular 
machine components and the ability to interface or assemble different 
machine components are some of the challenges to be faced in the near 
future. 
Id. 
54. It bears mention that the beginning of a new scientific epoch is always fraught 
both with possibilities and dead ends. One is reminded of the era between the Wright 
brothers’ announcement of manned powered heavier-than-air flight in December, 1903, 
and the myriad approaches of the next half dozen years. See Today in History: December 
17, First Flight, http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/today/dec17.html (last visited Apr. 3, 
2010) (“The announcement of the Wright brothers’ successful flight ignited the world’s 
passion for flying. Engineers designed their own flying machines, people of all ages 
wanted to witness the flights, and others wanted to sit behind the controls and fly.”). 
Scientists, futurists, quacks, cranks, and the suicidal adventurous explored not only wing-
warping versus elevators and ailerons, but also shapes mimicking nature, ornithopters, 
flying bicycles, and any number of other startling advances and lethal dead-ends. Some 
of them led to the modern air craft we now take for granted. See Movies and Photos, 
Photographs of the Invention of the Airplane, 
http://invention.psychology.msstate.edu/moviesandphotos/rogues.html (last visited 
Apr. 3, 2010) (containing photographs of such aircrafts); see also Posting by Miss 
Cellania to mental_floss blog, http://www.mentalfloss.com/blogs/ (Aug. 14, 2007, 04:46 
EST) (reviewing attempts at aviation prior to the Wright brothers’ landmark flight). 
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realize that nanotechnology applications can become very 
provocative.”55 
Indeed, the U.S. Army has considered the implications for 
some time, at least in the area of biological weapons. In 1999, 
Lonnie Henley raised the possibility of several novel biological 
warfare applications56 including, “subject to prevailing law and 
arms treaties,” selective agents that can distinguish friend from 
foe, triggered agents that harm only in specific situations “[n]ew 
ways to kill or incapacitate opponents,” “[p]enetration aids” to 
bypass defenses or immunities, or “[a]nti-material agents.”57 
Henley did not consider the chemical warfare implications, per 
se. 
Legal implications of nanotechnology in the unconventional 
weapons context, have been raised before.58 Many of the 
discussions have been narrowly directed to a particular regulatory 
approach,59 are downright utopian,60 or are relatively limited in 
their content.61 
 
55. Calvin Shipbaugh, Offense-Defense Aspects of Nanotechnologies: A Forecast of 
Potential Military Applications, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 741, 746 (2006). 
56. Henley included the the caveat that,  
[i]t is easy to get carried away with such speculation. Even with rapid progress 
in all the necessary fields, it will be at least decades before we can mass-
produce microscopic machinery tailored to our purposes. There is no reason 
to doubt that it is feasible in the long run, however, and some militarily useful 
products could be available in 20 years or so. 
Lonnie D. Henley, The RMA After Next, PARAMETERS, Winter 1999–2000, at 46. 
57. Id. 
58. See Gary E. Marchant & Douglas J. Sylvester, Transnational Models for Regulation 
of Nanotechnology, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 714, 719 (2006) (“Notwithstanding some 
science fiction scenarios, it is highly unlikely that current or near-term applications of 
nanotechnology would rise to the level of potential weapons of mass destruction. In the 
longer term, it is possible that some [could,] but such possibilities are likely far into the 
future and governments are unlikely to act to try and to prevent such scenarios through 
international agreements until such risks are more concrete and defined.”). See generally 
Pinson, supra note 33. The legal implications of nanotechnology have been raised in 
other areas as well. See Michael Van Lente, Building the New World of Nanotechnology, 38 
CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 173, 178–83 (2006) (listing extensive investments in 
nanotechnology on a global scale); Albert Lin, Size Matters: Regulating Nanotechnology, 31 
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 349, 351 (2007) (“Of more immediate concern [than nanobots] 
are the potential risks posed by nanoscale science and engineering.”); James Yeagle, 
Nanotechnology and the FDA, 12 VA. J.L. & TECH. 6 (2007) (advocating for greater federal 
study in the area of nanotechnology in order to create a regulatory regime). 
59. See, e.g., Gregory Mandel, Nanotechnology Governance, 59 ALA. L. REV. 1323 
(2008) (providing several suggestions on how to improve the regulation of 
nanotechnologuy); Kenneth W. Abbott et al., A Framework Convention for Nanotechnology?, 
[2008] 38 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10,507, 10,507–08 (discussing four general 
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Glenn Reynolds, however, directly addresses aspects of a 
number of important questions including that of bio-
nanorobotics. In Nanotechnology and Regulatory Policy, Reynolds 
notes that, “these nanodevices would not suffer from the 
constraints facing living organisms—they would not have to be 
 
principles for nanotechnology regulation, though not specifically weapons-related); 
Lynn L. Bergeson, Regulation, Governance and Nanotechnology: Is a Framework Convention 
for Nanotechnology the Way to Go?, [2008] 38 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10,515, 
10,515–17 (discussing approaches towards regulating nanotechnology, generally); David 
Rejeski, Comment on A Framework Convention for Nanotechnology?, [2008] 38 Envtl. L. Rep. 
(Envtl. Law Inst.) 10,518, 10,518–19 (same); see also, e.g., Brent Blackwelder, Comment on 
a Framework Convention for Nanotechnology?, [2008] 38 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 
10,520 (arguing that the need for a regulatory regime is so dire that a moratorium 
should be placed on nanotechnology worldwide until one is created); Sean Howard, 
Nanotechnology and Mass Destruction: The Need for an Inner Space Treaty, DISARMAMENT 
DIPLOMACY, July–Aug. 2002, at 3 (calling for an “inner space treaty” to guard against the 
use of nanotechnology as a weapon of mass destruction). 
Glenn Reynolds raises several problems with the prohibitionist approach 
mentioned by several authors. See Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Nanotechnology and Regulatory 
Policy: Three Phases, 17 HARV. J. L & TECH. 179, 191 (2003). Not only would it impact 
potentially useful scientific advances, but nanotechnology research facilities are 
relatively easy to hide from a prohibitionist inspection regime. Id.; see also, Wexler, supra 
note 48, at 515 (suggesting the amendment of article 36 of the 1977 Protocol I to the 
1949 Geneva Convention). 
While the protocols may, in some aspects, represent articulations of current 
customary law, the United States is not currently a signatory to the protocols. Cf. 
Vladimir Murashov & John Howard, The US Must Help Set International Standards for 
Nanotechnology, NATURE NANOTECH., Nov. 2008, at 635 (2008) (advocating 
implementation of international standards for nanotechnology); Joel Rothstein 
Wolfson, Social and Ethical Issues in Nanotechnology: Lessons From Biotechnology and Other 
High Technologies, [Aug. 2003] 22 Biotech. L. Rep. (Mary Anne Leibert, Inc.) 376, 381 
(“The dangers of nanotechnology as a terrorist weapon are easy to see. First, a nano-
robot that can operate within a human body could easily be programmed to destroy 
rather than heal.”). 
60. See, e.g., Lindsay V. Dennis, Note, Nanotechnology: Unique Science Requires Unique 
Solutions, 25 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 87, 111–13 (2006) (proposing the creation of an 
“Emerging Technologies Department” by U.S. Congress to provide “centralized 
regulation” of nanotechnology which would be independent of executive and 
congressional oversight). 
61. See Juan P. Pardo-Guerra & Francisco Aguayo, Nanotechnology and the 
International Regime on Chemical and Biological Weapons, 2 NANOTECHNOLOGY L. & BUS. 55 
(2005) (painting in very broad strokes the issues involved). Some analysis may be found 
in Jason Wejnert, Regulatory Mechanisms for Molecular Nanotechnology, 44 JURIMETRICS J. 
323 (2004). While Wejnert’s paper focuses on preventing the “‘release’ into the wild” of 
molecular nanotechnology products, it mentions both the possible development of a 
unique molecular nanotechnology treaty, and of something modeled around the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Id. at 329 He also discusses the potential application 
of both the Biological Weapons Convention and Chemical Weapons Convention. Id. at 
331–36. However, Wejnert’s paper posits enforcement problems, and does not address 
the current applicability issues raised in this paper. Id. at 349. 
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made of protein or other substances readily extractable from the 
natural environment, nor would they have to be capable of 
reproducing themselves.”62 It is interesting to compare this 
statement with Ummat, Sharma, Mavroidis, and Dubey’s 
discussion of bio-nanobots.63 Key questions arise about treaty 
coverage depending on whether these bots are, in fact, bugs, for 
they may, depending on attributes of life,64 fall within the BWC, 
the CWC, or in the cracks between.  
Reynolds also notes that “[t]he same technology that could 
selectively destroy cancer cells could instead target immune or 
nerve cells, producing death or further debility.”65 Others have 
raised similar issues: 
[N]ano-bots may in the future travel through the blood 
stream seeking and killing off cancer cells, or may assist with 
the regeneration of healthy cells. At the opposite extreme, it 
may also be possible to use nano-bots for military purposes to 
detect motion in a field and transmit signals many miles 
away, or to achieve “programmable” genocide. Drexler’s 
vision is that such robots, known as “assemblers,” will have 
the ability to self-replicate . . . and [be able] to work in 
unison to build macro-scale devices en masse. While 
commentators such as Whiteside and Smalley have dismissed 
these ideas as futuristic hype, nanotechnology nevertheless 
captures one exciting conceptual possibility.66 
The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute has 
expressed some concern in this area as well: 
 
62. Reynolds, supra note 59, at 185 (citing K. ERIC DREXLER, ENGINES OF CREATION, 
56-63 (rev. ed. 1990) as the sole source material on the underlying science). 
63. Ummat et al., supra note 49. 
64. In biology, the science that studies living organisms, “life” is the condition 
which distinguishes active organisms from inorganic matter, including the capacity for 
growth, functional activity and the continual change preceding death. A diverse array of 
living organisms (life forms) can be found in the biosphere on Earth, and properties 
common to these organisms—plants, animals, fungi, protists, archaea, and bacteria—are 
a carbon-, and water-based cellular form with complex organization and heritable 
genetic information. Living organisms undergo metabolism, maintain homeostasis, 
possess a capacity to grow, respond to stimuli, reproduce and, through natural selection, 
adapt to their environment in successive generations. See Brig Klyce, What is life?, 
http://www.panspermia.com/whatis2.htm (last visited Apr. 3, 2010); see also DORLAND’S 
ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY 920 (27th ed. 1988); J.B.S. HALDANE, WHAT IS LIFE? 
58–62 (1949). 
65. Reynolds, supra note 59, at 188. 
66. Diana Bowman & Graeme Hodge, A Small Matter of Regulation: An International 
Review of Nanotechnology Regulation, 8 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 3 (2007). 
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There is intensifying awareness around the world of the need 
to balance the obvious advantages of globalization with its 
increasingly apparent disadvantages. Regarding arms 
control, this is demonstrated by a growing need to balance 
the benefits of greater and more diffuse flows of people, 
goods, technologies and knowledge—including those 
relevant to developing weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD)—with a greater ability to monitor and prevent their 
misuse towards illicit and violent ends. This conundrum 
applies across a widening spectrum of current and emergent 
technologies—such as nuclear technologies, but especially in 
the biological sciences, including genetic engineering, 
synthetic biology and nanotechnologies—and, as discussed 
in this volume, raises new and vexing questions about the 
appropriate balance between the greater diffusion and the 
appropriate control of such technological advancements.67 
From a feasibility standpoint, the most likely application of 
this smallness to chemical warfare is the reduction of existing 
banned chemical weapons to a size possibly undetectable by 
current means and unfilterable by current protective gear, 
and/or the enhancement of effects of current weapons because 
of increased toxicity. Those “nano-enhanced” agents are a 
current concern of a number of entities. 
B. Nano-Enhanced Agents 
The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical 
Weapons(“OPCW”)68 conducts conferences to review ongoing 
chemical weapon developments. As part of its 2008 review 
conference, the OPCW issued a report by its Scientific Advisory 
Board on new scientific developments.69 The report identified 
 
67. Bates Gill, Introduction to SIPRI YEARBOOK 2008 2, 2 (2008); see also Ronald 
Sutherland, Chemical and Biochemical Non-Lethal Weapons: Political and Technical Aspects, 
SIPRI POLICY PAPER 23 (2008). 
68. The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (“OPCW”) is the 
implementing body of the Chemical Weapons Convention (“CWC”). The OPCW is 
given the mandate to achieve the object and purpose of the CWC, to ensure the 
implementation of its provisions, including those for international verification of 
compliance with it, and to provide a forum for consultation and cooperation among 
States Parties. See The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, 
http://www.opcw.org/about-opcw (last visited Apr. 3, 2010). 
69. Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, Second Special Session 
of the Conference of the States Parties to Review the Operation of the Chemical 
Weapons Convention, Apr. 7–18, 2008, Note by the Director-General: Report of the Scientific 
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three immediate areas of concern: the application of nanotech 
drug delivery systems to dissemination of aerosolized chemical 
warfare agents, new means of facilitating entry into the body or 
cells to achieve selective reactions, and, in some cases, higher 
toxicity than micronized material.70 Juan Pardo-Guerra and 
Francisco Aguayo note a concern over “the engineering of task-
specific enzymatic regulators [which] could be used for blocking 
(or over-promoting) key metabolic processes . . . to cause a 
defined hostile result.”71 They note that “due to their unusual 
forms of action, such substances would likely be invisible to the 
existing verification protocols of the [chemical and biological 
weapons] regime.”72 
These dissemination, entry, and toxicity concerns have been 
raised in both national and international fora.73 The U.S. 
Congressional Research Service has noted that scientific 
concern74 about nanoparticles is based in part on some of the 
very properties that researchers hope to exploit for medical 
purposes: 
The small size of nanoparticles may allow them to pass easily 
through skin and internal membranes. This raises questions, 
however, of whether exposure may be effectively confined to 
targeted tissues . . . . It is too soon to know whether such 
questions are serious cause for concern, but there is scientific 
evidence that some nanoparticles may be hazardous. For 
example, certain nanoparticles are known to be toxic to 
microbes, and EPA has reported some studies that have 
 
Advisory Board on Developments in Science and Technology, Doc. No. RC-2/DG.1 (Feb. 28, 
2008), available at http://www.opcw.org/index.php?eID=dam_frontend_push&docID=
1871. 
70. See id. ¶¶ 2.5–2.8. Altmann lists similar concerns including use of 
nanotechnology to provide “capsules for safe enclosure and delayed release,” “active 
groups for bonding to specific targets in organs or cells,” “vectors for easier entry[,]” 
“mechanisms for selective reaction with specific gene patters or proteins,” and 
“reducing friendly risk “by limiting the persistence or an improved binary principle.” 
ALTMANN, supra note 36, at 101–02. 
71. Pardo-Guerra & Aguayo, supra note 61, at 58. 
72. Id. at 59 (citing Jean Pascal Zanders, The Chemical Weapons Convention and 
Universality: A Question of Quality Over Quantity?, [2002] 4 DISARMAMENT FORUM 23). 
73. See Zanders, supra note 72, at 28. 
74. See, e.g., Ian Sample, Nanotechnology Poses Threat to Health, Say Scientists, 
GUARDIAN (London), July 30, 2004, at 2. 
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found nanoparticles generally (but not always) are more toxic 
than larger particles of identical chemical composition.75 
Questions remain, however, at the most basic levels: 
Even among researchers [who focus] on toxicity, there is no 
agreement about which data might be useful . . . . Scientists 
have not yet determined which physical-chemical properties 
(for example, size, shape, composition, stability, or electric 
charge) will be most important in determining . . . 
toxicological properties.76 
The toxicological properties of nanomaterials is in some 
ways the most urgent concern for enforcers, and at the same time 
perhaps the least interesting from a juridical viewpoint. There 
seems to be no possible argument that nano-enhanced poisons 
are any less banned under the current CWC Annexes than they 
would be at any other size.77 More interesting though, is the 
current emergence of nanodelivery systems in what may be a first 
step towards autonomous nanomachines.  
C. Nanobots as Delivery Systems  
The most likely immediate scenario for application of 
nanotechnology78 to chemical warfare is as a delivery system 
based on the chemotherapy model. As noted in The Economist: 
 
75. LINDA-JO SCHIEROW, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., ENGINEERED NANOSCALE 
MATERIALS AND DERIVATIVE PRODUCTS: REGULATORY CHALLENGES 4 (2008) (citations 
omitted, emphasis added). 
76. Id. at 7. This information might indicate a need to at least amend the appendix 
to the CWC, which is, of course, done on an ongoing basis in any case. Interesting issues 
arise when nanotech meets toxicity. For example, the U.S. Toxic Substances Control 
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2601 (2006), excludes nanomaterials that are not “chemical 
substances,” and it defines a “chemical substance” as “any organic or inorganic 
substance of a particular molecular identity” that is not a mixture. Id. § 2602(2). Given 
this definition, “it might not be clear whether certain nanoparticles consisting of a core 
inorganic material coated by an organic material would” be covered. SCHIEROW, supra 
note 75, at 12. That sort of legal question demonstrates the potential difficulty of 
determining coverage by international conventions if they are not read, as was clearly 
intended, with a very wide reach indeed. See discussion infra notes 326–36 and 
accompanying text.  
77. The possibility exists, of course, that some of those chemicals may have 
beneficial attributes in, say, chemotherapy, but exceptions already exist within the CWC 
regime for certain dual use materials. See Chemical Weapons Convention, supra note 10, 
arts. II(9), IV. 
78. As opposed to nanoparticles currently in use. 
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[A] second generation of nanoparticles has entered clinical 
trials. Some are so good at hiding their contents away until 
they are needed that the treatments do not merely reduce 
side-effects; they actually allow what would otherwise be 
lethal poisons to be supplied to the tumour only. Others do 
not depend on drugs at all. Instead, they act as beacons for 
the delivery of doses of energy that destroy cancer cells 
physically, rather than chemically.79 
It is also worth noting that the authors in Bio-Nanorobotics: The 
State of the Art extensively discuss inorganic molecular machines 
which may have applicability as chemical agent delivery systems: 
In the past two decades, chemists have been able to create, 
modify and control many different types of molecular 
machines. Many of these machines carry a striking 
resemblance with our everyday macroscale machines . . . . 
Not only this, all of these machines are easy to synthesize 
artificially, and are generally more robust than the natural 
molecular machines. Such artificial chemical machines are 
controllable in various ways [or in more than one way]. A 
scientist can have more freedom with respect to the design of 
chemical molecular machines depending on the 
performance requirements and conditions.80 
A great deal of work, both private and governmental, is 
going into research about delivery systems.81 The publicly 
available literature is largely devoted to various forms of cancer 
research; although other medical applications have been 
discussed.82 If such carriers are used to deliver poisons or toxins 
banned under the CWC, their facial illegality for that use again is 
quite clear.83 The carriers themselves, however, may very well 
 
79. Golden Slingshot; Treating Tumours, ECONOMIST, Nov.8, 2008, at 73; see also 
Nicholas Wade, New Cancer Treatment Shows Promise in Testing, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2009, 
at A7 (reporting that Australian researchers have used “minicells” coated with 
antibodies to attack tumors, some of which are each “loaded with half a million 
molecules of . . . a toxin used in chemotherapy.”). 
80. Ummat et al., supra, note 49, at 19-15. 
81. See, e.g., NanoRobotics System Lab Homepage, http://www.egr.msu.edu/
~ldong/ (last visited Apr. 3, 2010). 
82. See, e.g., Awadhesh Kumar Arya, Applications of Nanotechonology in Diabetes, 2008 
J. NANOMATERIALS & BIOSTRUCTURES, 221, 223 (concerning the treatment of diabetes). 
83. As discussed infra notes 355–60, the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol and the CWC 
would ban the delivered substances outright and make their delivery for military 
purposes a crime. 
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have dual usage,84 and the other uses may be to the medical 
benefit of humanity. 
The National Cancer Institute (“NCI”) of the National 
Institutes of Health explains how nanotechnology is applicable in 
battling cancer: 
Nanoscale devices are one hundred to ten thousand 
times smaller than human cells. They are similar in size to 
large biological molecules (“biomolecules”) such as enzymes 
and receptors. As an example, hemoglobin, the molecule 
that carries oxygen in red blood cells, is approximately 5 
nanometers in diameter. Nanoscale devices smaller than 50 
nanometers can easily enter most cells, while those smaller 
than 20 nanometers can move out of blood vessels as they 
circulate through the body. 
Because of their small size, nanoscale devices can 
readily interact with biomolecules on both the surface of 
cells and inside of cells. By gaining access to so many areas of 
the body, they have the potential to detect disease and 
deliver treatment in ways unimagined before now. And since 
biological processes, including events that lead to cancer, 
occur at the nanoscale at and inside cells, nanotechnology 
offers a wealth of tools that are providing cancer researchers 
with new and innovative ways to diagnose and treat cancer.85 
The NCI then goes on to explain specifically how 
nanotechnology can be used directly in cancer therapy both as a 
target for external radiation and as a carrier agent for nanosize 
does of chemical therapies: 
Nanoscale devices have the potential to radically change 
cancer therapy for the better and to dramatically increase the 
number of highly effective therapeutic agents. Nanoscale 
constructs can serve as customizable, targeted drug delivery vehicles 
capable of ferrying large doses of chemotherapeutic agents or 
 
84. Chemicals under the CWC are divided among “schedules.” Schedule 1 lists 
those chemicals which pose a high risk to the goals of the CWC, including precursor 
chemicals used to produce nerve agents or mustard agents. Schedule 2 lists those 
chemicals that generally are not produced in large commercial quantities for 
nonmilitary purposes and pose a significant risk to the purpose of the CWC. Schedule 3 
lists dual-use chemicals which may pose a risk to CWC goals but also have legitimate 
commercial purposes and are widely produced. See Chemical Weapons Convention, 
supra note 10, Annex on Chemicals. 
85. The Alliance for Nanotechnology in Cancer: Media Backgrounder, 
http://nano.cancer.gov/media_backgrounder.asp (last visited Apr. 3, 2010). 
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therapeutic genes into malignant cells while sparing healthy 
cells, greatly reducing or eliminating the often unpalatable 
side effects that accompany many current cancer therapies.86 
Thus, much of the nano-related research currently being 
conducted in medical laboratories is both exciting and terrifying. 
It offers both the promise of advanced medical treatment for 
previously incurable diseases, and the threat of more effective 
means for delivery of lethal chemicals as weapons of mass 
destruction. The same may be generally said of nanobots. 
Nanobots which would function solely to mimic existing or 
future CWC banned chemicals, however, are in a class by 
themselves. It is those hypothetical weapons which are the core 
subject of the question posed by the AEPI, and which are a core 
subject of this Article. 
D. Nanomimics of Existing Banned Weapons 
Finally, there is the AEPI’s scenario of “materials that act 
like chemical agents, . . . but are not classed as chemical agents 
under any existing protocol.”87 Those would be something other 
than nano-sized chemical agents. Most likely, to have any chance 
to avoid the CWC88 they would have to be nanobots. While some 
 
86. NATIONAL CANCER INSTITUTE, NANOTECHNOLGY CANCER BROCHURE 12–13 
(2004) (emphasis added), available at http://nano.cancer.gov/objects/pdfs/
cancer_brochure_091609-508.pdf. As a real world example of the promise of 
nanotechnology in drug delivery, the National Cancern Institute (“NCI”) says 
“Liposomes, which are first generation nanoscale devices, are being used as drug 
delivery vehicles in several products. For example, liposomal amphotericin B is used to 
treat fungal infections often associated with aggressive anticancer treatment and 
liposomal doxorubicin is used to treat some forms of cancer.” The Alliance for 
Nanotechnology in Cancer: Frequently Asked Questions, http://nano.cancer.gov/
learn/understanding/faq.asp (last visited Apr. 3, 2010). The NCI also notes that, “[i]n 
May 2004, two companies (American Pharmaceutical Partners and American 
BioScience) announced that the FDA accepted the filing of a New Drug Application 
(NDA) for a nanoparticulate formulation of the anticancer compound taxol to treat 
advanced stage breast cancer.” National Cervical Cancer Coalition: What is 
Nanotechnology, http://www.nccc-online.org/health_news/research_treatment/
what_is_nano.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2010) (citing the NCI). 
87. MCGUINNESS, supra note 3, at 20. 
88. It is not unreasonable to expect that if nanomimics were actually fielded as 
weapons, the user’s chief concern would be their effectiveness as a weapon capable of 
defeating existing detection and protection systems, rather than on their actual legality. 
That issue, in the past, seemed to arise more as a reaction to international criticism. See, 
e.g., German internal discussion and public justification of chlorine gas use in 1915, infra 
text accompanying notes 183–85. The 1977 protocol I, with its requirement of advance 
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scientists deride the concept as “science fiction,”89 it is discussed 
here both because Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency90 
deals in concepts which might have been called “science fiction” 
twenty years before their development,91 and also because, 
 
analysis of the legality of new weapons puts at least a new gloss on that process. See 
discussion, infra notes 293–94. If nonstate actors engaged in terrorism obtained such 
weapons, it is difficult to conceive that a ban in international law would have any positive 
effect; the point of terrorism is, after all, to terrorize. As those groups move toward state 
status, however, legal implications might have some impact. An interesting contrast and 
comparison might be made with the dualistic approaches of the Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea and its fielding of nuclear weapons, on their perceived interests and 
resulting acts. See Elisabeth Bumiller, Gates Looks to Tougher Approach on North Korea, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 30, 2009, at A8 (describing the international community’s approach to 
North Korea’s nuclear testing). An analogy can be drawn here to the movement of 
certain Palestinian groups from pure terrorism to mixed or quasi-state actor approaches 
between 1967 and the present. See, e.g., Adam Davidson, Hamas: Government or Terrorist 
Organization?, NPR, Dec. 6, 2006, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/
story.php?storyId=6583080. 
89. See, e.g, RATNER & RATNER, supra note 37, at 15–16 (“There are a number of 
compelling reasons why molecular assemblers are either impossible or at best in our 
distant future, and it’s worth looking in order to read sci-fi without nightmares.”). 
Altmann, on the other hand, list as military risks of nanotechnology both 
“superintelligent, virtually invisible devices” and “nanoweapons, artificial viruses, [and] 
controlled biological/nerve agents.” ALTMANN, supra note 36, at 5. Much of Altmann’s 
work, while interesting, seems highly speculative, even to a layperson. Note the 
emphasized qualifiers in the following: 
Whereas with MST [microsystems technology], micro-robots of centimeters, 
maybe a few millimeters size could be built, NT will likely allow development of 
mobile autonomous systems below 1 mm, maybe down to 10 um (this is still 2-3 
orders of magnitude above the size range around 100 nm envisioned for nano-
robots and universal molecular assemblers in MNT). 
Id. at 93 (emphasis added); see also Judith Reppy, Nanotechnology for National Security, in 
NANOTECHNOLOGY: SOCIETAL IMPLICATIONS—INDIVIDUAL PERSPECTIVES 232, 232–35 
(Mihail Rocco & William Bainbridge eds., 2007) (discussing the national security 
implication of nanotechnology, generally); William Tolles, Vision, Innovation, and Policy, 
in NANOTECHNOLOGY: SOCIETAL IMPLICATIONS—INDIVIDUAL PERSPECTIVES, supra, at 
127, 127–30 (arguing that while advances in nanotechnology are vastly important, there 
needs to be a measure of restraint as well in order to ensure their safe use). 
90. See About DARPA, http://www.darpa.mil/about.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2010) 
91. On March 23, 2007, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 
(“DARPA”) issued a requesting soliciting proposals for the development of “Chemical 
Robots” capable of manipulating their shape in order to traverse small openings. See 
Def. Advance Research Projects Agency, Special Focus Area: Chemical Robots BAA, 
Solicitation No. BAA07-21, add. 2 (Mar. 27, 2001), available at https://www.fbo.gov/?id=
30ae77f2004313f28bf4d07947e0b4d6. The DARPA request specifies that the ChemBots 
should be “soft, flexible, mobile objects that can identify and maneuver through 
openings smaller than their static structural dimensions.” Id. It goes on to add that, 
“nature provides many examples of ChemBot functionality. Many soft creatures, 
including mice, octopi, and insects, readily traverse openings barely larger than their 
largest ‘hard’ component.” Id.; cf. TERMINATOR 2: JUDGMENT DAY (TriStar Pictures 1991) 
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especially in warfare, many science fiction scenarios have become 
science fact.92 It is, in this context, worth noting, in its entirety, an 
August 2009 report in the Science Times section of the New York 
Times: 
You can’t build a machine without parts. That’s true for 
large machines like engines and pumps, and it’s true for the 
tiniest machines, the kind that scientists want to build on the 
scale of molecules to do work inside the body. Researchers at 
the Dana-Farber Cancer Institute and Harvard University 
have taken a step toward creating parts for molecular 
machines, out of DNA. In a paper in Science, Hendrick Dietz 
. . . Shawn M. Douglas and William H. Shih describe a 
programmable technique for twisting and curving DNA into 
shapes. Dr. Shih said the method used strands of DNA that 
self-assembled into rigid bundles, with the individual double 
helixes joined by strong cross-links. Manipulating the base 
pairs in the helixes—using more or fewer of them between 
cross-links—creates torque that causes the bundles to twist 
and bend in a specific direction. The researchers were able 
to control the degree of bending, and were even able to 
make a bundle bend back on itself. The researchers built 
several structures, including a 12-tooth gear and a wire-frame 
ball. Dr. Shih said that while it was possible that a future 
molecular machine might use parts like these, the work was 
meant to demonstrate that “if you want to make a machine, 
you are going to need very precise fabrication ability.” The 
goal, he added, is to make objects that are far more complex and 
eventually build a machine that could, say, deliver a drug to a 
precise spot in the body. Dr. Shih likened the work to the 
development of integrated circuits, where complexity has 
roughly doubled every 18 months for the past 40 years. 
“We’re motivated to improve the technology,” he said.93 
 
(depicting “the T-1000 compound, composed of a mimetic polyalloy, a liquid metal that 
allows it to take the shape and appearance of anything it touches”). The contract was 
ultimately awarded to Tufts University. See Tufts Joins the Chembot Creation Challenge with 
$3.3M DARPA Contract, MASS HIGH TECH, June 30, 2008, 
http://www.masshightech.com/stories/2008/06/30/daily8-tufts-joins-the-chembot-
creation-challenge-with-$3.3m-darpa-contract.html. 
92. See generally H.G. WELLS, THE WAR OF THE WORLDS (1898) (portraying a 
scenario where alien invaders die from Earth bacteria). See discussion about the Geneva 
Protocol, infra note 110, where biological weapons are banned though undeveloped. 
93. Henry Fountain, Scientists Use Curvy DNA to Build Molecular Parts, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 11, 2009, at D3 (quoting doctor William H. Shih ) (emphasis added). For a copy of 
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Shortly before press time for this article, the Wall Street 
Journal published an item headlined “Tiny Robots Made of DNA 
Can Walk, Pivot, Work with Microscopic Forklifts.” It said, in part: 
For the first time, microscopic robots made from DNA 
molecules can walk, follow instructions and work together to 
assemble simple products on an atomic-scale assembly line, 
mimicking the machinery of living cells, two independent 
research teams announced Wednesday. 
These experimental devices, described in the journal 
Nature, are advances in DNA nanotechnology, in which 
bioengineers are using the molecules of the genetic code as 
nuts, bolts, girders and other building materials, on a scale 
measured in billionths of a meter. The effort, which 
combines synthetic chemistry, enzymology, structural 
nanotechnology and computer science, takes advantage of 
the unique physical properties of DNA molecules to 
assemble shapes according to predictable chemical rules. 
. . . 
These new construction projects bring researchers a 
step closer to a time when, at least in theory, scientists might 
be able to build test-tube factories that churn out self-
assembling computers, rare chemical compounds or 
autonomous medical robots able to cruise the human 
bloodstream. 
. . . 
In the first project, a team of scientists led by 
biochemist Milan Stojanovic at Columbia built a molecular 
robot that moved on its own along a track of chemical 
instructions-the DNA equivalent of the punched paper tape 
used to control automated machine tools. 
Once programmed, the robot required no further 
human intervention, the researchers reported. It could turn, 
move in a straight line or follow a complex curve and then 
stop, all essentially on its own initiative. They documented its 
progress with an atomic force microscope as it strode along a 
path 100 nanometers long, about 30 times further than 
earlier DNA walkers could manage. 
 
the original study, see Hendrik Dietz et al., Folding DNA into Twisted and Curved Nanoscale 
Shapes, SCIENCE, Aug. 7, 2009, at 725–30. 
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"In the future, this could be used as a molecular machine that 
could bind to a cell surface, maybe carry a cargo and release 
something," said biochemist Hao Yan at the Biodesign 
Institute at Arizona State University, one of 12 researchers at 
four universities involved in the project.94 
The Arms Control Association recognized many of these 
potential issues in 2004 and suggested possible legal responses: 
Many of the international legal tools to prevent the 
development of these weapons are already in place, notably 
the [BWC] and the [CWC], which together ban military use 
of all of the weapons imagined here. Nevertheless, these may 
prove insufficient to prevent proliferation, and we should not 
shy away from new international treaties as necessary. 
Foremost among the new treaties that should be considered, 
or reconsidered, are those that would: add a compliance 
regime to the 1972 BWC; make development, possession, or 
use of chemical or biological weapons a crime over which 
nations may claim universal jurisdiction (like piracy, airline 
hijacking, and torture); and impose a single control regime 
over the possession and transfer of dangerous pathogens and 
toxins. Consideration should also be given to a new 
convention that would prohibit the nonconsensual 
manipulation of human physiology, to support and extend 
the provisions of the CWC, BWC, and international 
humanitarian law.95 
What the arms control experts seems to have in mind is not the 
“gray goo” scenario,96 or bots attacking soldiers of a specific 
genetic make-up,97 though both have been discussed by legal 
writers. Rather, the concern is that a nanobot that could target 
nerve cells or their receptors and block cholinesterase 
production through mechanical means is certainly conceivable.98 
The result would be precisely the same in terms of effects and 
 
94. Robert Lee Hotz, A Factory that Fits on a Pin—New Robots Made of DNA Can Walk, 
Pivot, Work with Microscopic Forklifts, WALL ST. J., May 13, 2010, at A3. 
95. Mark Wheelis, Will the New Biology Lead to New Weapons?, ARMS CONTROL TODAY, 
July–Aug. 2004, at 23. 
96. “Gray goo” is a term popularized by Eric Drexler in his book Engines of Creation, 
supra note 27, at 172–73, to describe self-replicating nanobots run amok. See Lawrence 
Osborne, The Gray-Goo Problem, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Dec. 14, 2003, at 17.  
97. See ALTMANN, supra note 36, at 102. 
98. For a general overview of nano-nerve targeting, see Surfdaddy Orca, Targeting 
Nerve Cells with Nanoparticles, H+ MAG., Oct. 6, 2009, http://www.hplusmagazine.com/
articles/nano/targeting-cancer-cells-nanoparticles. 
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lethality as the V-series of nerve gases,99 but with the potential for 
enhanced deliverability.100 Delivery (dissemination and 
dispersion) methods are important to this discussion because 
nanoproducts are different in so many ways from the norm.101 In 
 
99. TUCKER, supra note 42, at 154 (detailing the effects of a V-series agent on the 
body). For more information on difference between V-series and G-series nerve agents, 
see supra note 45. Gas is subject to dispersion and dissipation effects from time and 
weather which might not affect machines in the same manner. See TUCKER, supra note 
42, at 158–59. 
100. Both because existing filters and detectors could be ineffective, and because 
dispersion in new forms may become available. See RATNER & RATNER, supra note 37, at 
44. 
101. The Federation of American Scientists’ website does a very good job at 
illustrating this distinction: 
Perhaps the most important factor in the effectiveness of chemical weapons is 
the efficiency of dissemination. . . . The principal method of disseminating 
chemical agents has been the use of explosives. These usually have taken the 
form of central bursters expelling the agent laterally.Efficiency is not 
particularly high [due to] incineration . . . . Particle size will vary, since 
explosive dissemination produces a bimodal distribution of liquid droplets of 
an uncontrollable size . . . . The efficacy of explosives and pyrotechnics for 
dissemination is limited by the flammable nature of some agents. . . . 
Aerodynamic dissemination technology allows non-explosive delivery from a 
line source. Although this method provides a theoretical capability of 
controlling the size of the particle, the altitude of dissemination must be 
controlled and the wind direction and velocity known. . . . An important factor 
in the effectiveness of chemical weapons is the efficiency of dissemination as it 
is tailored to the types of agent. The majority of the most potent of chemical 
agents are not very volatile. . . . The agent must be dispersed within the 
boundary layer (<200-300 ft above the ground) and yet high enough to allow 
effective dispersal of the agent. . . . A more recent attempt to control aerosol 
particle size on target has been the use of aerodynamic dissemination and 
sprays as line sources. By modification of the rheological properties of the liquid, its 
breakup when subjected to aerodynamic stress can theoretically be controlled and an 
idealized particle distribution achieved. In practice, the task is more difficult, but it 
represents an area where a technological advance could result in major munition 
performance improvements. The altitude of dissemination must be controllable 
and the wind direction and velocity known for a disseminated liquid of a 
predetermined particle size to predictably reach the ground and reliably hit a 
target. Thermal dissemination, wherein pyrotechnics are used to aerosolize the 
agent[,] has been used particularly to generate fine, inhalable clouds of 
incapacitants. Most of the more complex agent molecules, however, are 
sensitive to high temperatures and can deteriorate if exposure is too lengthy. 
Solids are a notoriously difficult problem for dissemination, since they tend to 
agglomerate even when pre-ground to desired sizes. Dispersion considers the 
relative placement of the chemical agent munition upon or adjacent to a 
target immediately before dissemination so that the material is most efficiently 
used. For example, the artillery rockets of the 1950’s and early 1960’s 
employed a multitude of submunitions so that a large number of small agent 
clouds would form directly on the target with minimal dependence on 
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addition to the different physics and biology inherent in their 
small size,102 swarming,103 and emergence104 technologies may 
allow precise dosing by terminating targeting once a lethal dose 
has been achieved.105 
How much of this really is science fiction, one can only 
speculate. It is interesting, though, that BBC News reported in 
2008 that: 
A tiny chemical “brain” which could one day act as a remote 
control for swarms of nano-machines has been invented. The 
molecular device—just two billionths of a metre across—was 
able to control eight [nanomachines] simultaneously in a 
test. . . . “If [in the future] you want to remotely operate on a 
tumour you might want to send some molecular machines 
there,” explained Dr. Anirban Bandyopadhyay of the 
International Center for Young Scientists, Tsukuba, 
Japan. . . . “But you cannot just put them into the blood and 
[expect them] to go to the right place.” Dr. Bandyopadhyay 
believes his device may offer a solution. One day you may be 
able to guide the nanobots through the body and control 
their functions, he said.106 
 
meteorology. Another variation of this is multiple “free” aerial sprays such as 
those achieved by the BLU 80/B Bigeye weapon and the multiple launch 
rocket system. While somewhat wind dependent, this technique is considerably 
more efficient in terms of agent quantities. In World War I, canisters of 
chlorine were simply opened to allow the gas to drift across enemy lines. 
Although this produced limited results, it is indicative of the simplicity of 
potential means of dispersion . . . . There is sufficient open literature 
describing the pros and cons of various types of dissemination to dictate the 
consideration of all of them by a proliferant.  
Federation of American Scientists: Chemical Weapons Delivery, http://www.fas.org/
programs/ssp/bio/chemweapons/delivery.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2010) (emphasis 
added). 
102. See ALTMANN, supra note 36, at 1. 
103. See generally Sean J. A. Edwards, Swarming and the Future of Warfare, (Sept. 
2004) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Pardee Rand Graduate School), available at 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/rgs_dissertations/2005/RAND_RGSD189.pdf) (describing 
swarming as an effective warfare tactic when military operations are decentralized and 
non-linear). 
104. See generally Peter A. Corning, The Re-Emergence of “Emergence”: A Venerable 
Concept in Search of a Theory, Institute for the Study of Complex Systems, COMPLEXITY, July–
Aug. 2002, at 18. (recounting the history of the term “emergence” and detailing some of 
its current usages). 
105. A simple emergence feedback limit could, for example, direct devices 
elsewhere once an underlying prime concentration level had been achieved. 
106. Jonathan Fildes, Chemical Brain Controls Nanobots, BBC NEWS, Mar 11, 2003, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/nol/ukfs_news/mobile/newsid_7280000/newsid_7288400/
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It is the prospect of a self-guided nanobot, self-controlling their 
functions, which seems to particularly trouble military 
commentators.107 As the AEPI asked, are “nanomachines . . . 
chemical weapons under the provisions of the Chemical 
Weapons Convention?”108 
To answer that question, others need to be answered: What 
are the currently applicable treaties, and do they need to be 
modified? To understand their reach it is necessary to first begin 
with the core treaty which is still binding, and which is 
incorporated in all other currently applicable law, the 1925 
Geneva Gas Protocol.109 Indeed, to understand where we are 
today, we must closely examine the protocol’s history, reaching 
back to the 19th century. 
II. TREATIES APPLICABLE TO NANOWEAPONS 
A. Facially Applicable Treaties 
Several treaties are facially applicable to at least some nano-
related weapons. They include the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol, as 
well as the more recent Biological and Chemical Weapons 
Conventions. Because their background and negotiation are 
directly relevant to their coverage, this Article deals with those 
points in considerable detail. 
1. The 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol 
The 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol (“1925 Protocol”) was an 
important step in global attempts to ban chemical and biological 
weapons but it was neither the first, nor the only step.110 In its 
 
7288426.stm (second alteration in original); see also Anirban Bandyopadhyay & 
Somobrata Acharya, 16-Bit Parallel Processing in a Molecular Assembly, 105 PROC. NAT’L 
ACAD. SCI. 3668, 3668 (2008) (describing how a 16-bit molecular assembly machine 
“represents a significant conceptual advance to today’s fastest processors, which execute 
only one function at a time”). 
107. See, e.g., MCGUINNESS, supra note 3, at 14; Henley, supra note 56, at 5; Nygren, 
supra note 6, at 15. 
108. See MCGUINNESS, supra note 3, at 27. 
109. Geneva Protocol, supra note 23. 
110. A quarter of a century earlier, the second declaration produced by the first 
Hague Peace Conference in 1899 provided that “The Contracting Powers agree to 
abstain from the use of projectiles the object of which is the diffusion of asphyxiating or 
deleterious gases.” Declaration (IV, 2) Concerning Asphyxiating Gases, Jul. 29, 1899, 
187 Consol. T.S. 453, reprinted in THE HAGUE CONVENTIONS AND DECLARATIONS OF 1899 
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article-by-article review of the CWC prior to U.S. ratification, the 
Defense Treaty Inspection Readiness Program (“DTIRP”) noted 
that: 
The fourth preambular paragraph [of the CWC] recognizes 
that the Convention reaffirms the principles and objectives 
of, and obligations assumed under, the Geneva Protocol of 
1925 and [the BWC] . . . . The Geneva Protocol of 1925, read 
together with the reservations made to it, amounts to a ban on 
the first use of chemical weapons insofar as it relates to the 
United States.111 
How did that ban on poison gas come into effect, and what 
does it cover? The first question is important to understand the 
intent of the drafters and signatories; the second is vital since its 
terms are incorporated into and reiterated by both the CWC and 
the BWC,112 and are unquestionably current and binding 
international law. 
 
AND 1907, at 250 (James Brown Scott ed., 3d ed. 1918) [hereinafter “Hague 
Asphyxiating Declaration”]. The 1925 Protocol represents the first multilateral treaty 
actually coming into effect which, at least in some instances, banned first use of 
chemical weapons in armed conflicts. It was only applicable to signatory parties, and was 
subject to use of chemical weapons for reprisal, but it proved, as discussed below, 
surprisingly effective. Even nonsignatory states, such as the United States (which signed 
but did not obtain Senate ratification until 1975), repeatedly declared their intention to 
abide by its terms in wartime. See Barton J. Bernstein, Why We Didn’t Use Poison Gas in 
World War II, AM. HERITAGE, Aug./Sept. 1985,. at 40 (“During World War II, 
international law did not actually bar the United States from using gas warfare—
although America had signed the 1925 Geneva. Protocol outlawing gas, the Senate had 
never ratified it. Yet every peacetime President from Warren G. Harding to Franklin D. 
Roosevelt had defined gas as immoral and pledged to abide by the agreement.”). 
111. S. TREATY DOC. NO. 103-21, at 2 (1993) (emphasis added); see also Chemical 
Weapons Convention, supra note 10, art. XIII (“Nothing in this Convention shall be 
interpreted as in any way limiting or detracting from the obligations assumed by any 
State under the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, 
Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva 
on 17 June 1925, and under the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, 
Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on 
Their Destruction, signed at London, Moscow and Washington on 10 April 1972”). 
112. The 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol was later incorporated into the preamble to 
the Biological Weapons Convention: 
Recognising the important significance of the Protocol for the 
Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and 
of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on June 17, 1925, and 
conscious also of the contribution which the said Protocol has already made, 
and continues to make, to mitigating the horrors of war,  
Reaffirming their adherence to the principles and objectives of that 
Protocol and calling upon all States to comply strictly with them,  
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a. Why Gas Mattered 
It is not often that legal analysis can legitimately coalesce 
with picture and poem, but I can think of no better way to give 
some flavor to the contemporary reader of the horror with which 
the general public and the average veteran viewed gas warfare in 
the decade after the end of the Great War. The work reproduced 
below is the pictorial counterpoint to Wilfred Owen’s poetry113 
 
Recalling that the General Assembly of the United Nations has repeatedly 
condemned all actions contrary to the principles and objectives of the Geneva 
Protocol of June 17, 1925 
Biological Weapons Convention, supra note 13, pmbl. Similarly, the preamble to the 
Chemical Weapons Convention provides in part: “Recognizing that this Convention 
reaffirms principles and objectives of and obligations assumed under the Geneva Protocol of 
1925, and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and 
Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction 
signed at London, Moscow and Washington on 10 April 1972.” Chemical Weapons 
Convention, supra note 10, pmbl. (second emphasis added). 
113. Most especially, being Owen’s completely accurate and terribly effective Dulce 
et Decorum Est. Wilfred Owen, Dulce et Decorum Est, in THE COLLECTED POEMS OF 
WILFRED OWEN 55 (C. Day Lewis ed., Pantheon 1964). The author has never come 
across a better description of the sensations that he experienced when masking in a U.S. 
army practice gas chamber than “an ecstasy of fumbling.” Id. Contemporary descriptions 
of German gas shells affirm their unique sound of Owen’s “hoots.” See, e.g., L.F. HABER, 
THE POISONOUS CLOUD: CHEMICAL WARFARE IN THE FIRST WORLD WAR 189, 192 (1986) 
(describing the noise that Allied forces associated with the detonation of gas shells as a 
distinctive “plop”). The poem reads in full: 
Bent double, like old beggars under sacks, 
Knock-kneed, coughing like hags, we cursed through sludge, 
Till on the haunting flares we turned our backs 
And towards our distant rest began to trudge. 
Men marched asleep. Many had lost their boots 
But limped on, blood-shod. All went lame; all blind; 
Drunk with fatigue; deaf even to the hoots 
Of tired, outstripped Five-Nines that dropped behind. 
 
Gas! Gas! Quick, boys!—An ecstasy of fumbling, 
Fitting the clumsy helmets just in time; 
But someone still was yelling out and stumbling, 
And flound’ring like a man in fire or lime . . . 
Dim, through the misty panes and thick green light, 
As under a green sea, I saw him drowning. 
 
In all my dreams, before my helpless sight, 
He plunges at me, guttering, choking, drowning. 
 
If in some smothering dreams you too could pace 
Behind the wagon that we flung him in, 
And watch the white eyes writhing in his face, 
His hanging face, like a devil’s sick of sin; 
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which epitomized the popular revulsion against the war, 
politicians, industry, and propaganda that seized the general 
public, especially in the Western democracies, at the end of the 
war.114 
That horror, especially with gas warfare,115 was a tangible thing 
which directly affected international policy after November 11, 
1918.116 “The public . . . was influenced by many dramatic 
 
If you could hear, at every jolt, the blood 
Come gargling from the froth-corrupted lungs, 
Obscene as cancer, bitter as the cud 
Of vile, incurable sores on innocent tongues,— 
My friend, you would not tell with such high zest 
To children ardent for some desperate glory, 
The old Lie; Dulce et Decorum est 
Pro patria mori. 
Id. Among the many other English language “war poets” were Edmund Blunden, Robert 
Graves, Isaac Rosenberg, and Siegfried Sassoon. See THE PENGUIN BOOK OF FIRST WORLD 
WAR POETRY (George Walter ed., 2004); see also THE OXFORD BOOK OF WAR POETRY (Jon 
Stallworthy ed., 1984). 
114. In Sargent’s painting the sky is yellow in the aftermath of a mustard gas attack. 
Mustard gas may appear as a yellow-brown cloud, but if it was present in the levels 
presented, the soldiers in the painting would not be standing in line unmasked. See 
Mustard Gas - Council on Foreign Relations, http://www.cfr.org/publication/9551/#p1 
(last visited Apr. 3, 2010). Rather, Sargent is adding to the horror of the viewer with a 
certain level of artistic license. 
115. See, e.g., JOHN ELLIS, EYE DEEP IN HELL: TRENCH WARFARE IN WORLD WAR 1, 
65-68 (1976) (quoting, among others, a nurse as saying, “I wish those people . . . could 
see the poor things burnt and blistered all over with great mustard-coloured suppurating 
blisters, with blind eyes . . . all sticky and stuck together, and always fighting for breath, 
with voices a mere whisper, saying that their throats are closing and they know they will 
choke.”). 
116. Ludwig Haber notes that: 
Figure 1. John Singer Sargent, Gassed (Imperial War Museum, London 1918–1919). 
Reprinted from John Singer Sargent Virtual Gallery, http://www.jssgallery.org/
paintings/gassed/gassed.htm. 
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illustrations of gas warfare in photographs and some deeply 
moving paintings. Gas was looked on as something particularly 
wicked, something unfair and cowardly, against which a ‘fair 
fight’ was impossible.”117  
Certainly, gas proponents knew that intense distaste was a 
threat to their future. The Chemical Warfare Service of the 
United States Army, and the U.S. chemical industry, especially 
Dupont118 and Dow Chemical,119 had a vested interest in the 
continued use of poison gases as weapons of war. As early as 1921 
Brigadier General Amos Fries, the chief of what was then the 
Army’s Chemical Warfare Service, argued that: 
 
[R]omanticism versus technology had a powerful intellectual attraction to 
many famous authors, and it led directly to the campaigns for the control of 
what the French called “armes désloyales” for which the nearest translation is 
“unfair weapons”. The argument even had its technical side: many infantry 
and artillery officers were baffled by poison gas . . . . Finally, we need to bear in 
mind that until 1918 the British and the French were more affected by gas 
than the Germans. . . . [I]n the course of 1918 the situation altered. . . . [I]n 
the last year of the war, German writers . . . changed their perceptions. [Eric 
Maria] Remarque’s All Quiet on the Western Front . . .  reached a vast 
audience and with him . . . effects of the First World War on the minds of the 
masses began. 
HABER, supra note 113, at 231. See also Haber’s discussion of Sargent’s Gassed, supra 
note 114; Owen’s Dulce et Decorum Est, supra note 113; HABER, supra note 113, at 233; 
and TIM COOK, NO PLACE TO RUN, THE CANADIAN CORPS AND GAS WARFARE IN THE 
FIRST WORLD WAR 7–8 (1999) (presenting Owen’s poem as “the true face of poison 
gas . . . .”). 
117. WILLIAM MOORE, GAS ATTACK: CHEMICAL WARFARE 1915–18 AND AFTERWARDS 
195 (1987). 
118. See SPECIAL COMM. INVESTIGATION OF THE MUNITIONS INDUS., PARTIAL 
PRELIMINARY REPORT ON WARTIME TAXATION AND PRICE CONTROL, S. REP. NO. 74-944, 
pt. 3, at 3–13 (1936). 
119. See Munitions Industry: Hearings Before the Spec. Comm. Investigating the Munitions 
Industry Pursuant to S. Res. 206, 73d Cong., pt. 11, at 2564–68 (1934) [Spec. Comm. 
Hearings on Munitions] (exhibit to testimony reproducing a speech delivered by William 
J. Hale, Vice President of Dow Chemical Company). The U.S. chemical dye industry 
desired both a protective tariff and an embargo on chemical imports into the United 
States, ostensibly to protect the industry’s readiness and ability to produce chemical 
weapons. See FREDERIC BROWN, CHEMICAL WARFARE: A STUDY IN RESTRAINTS 56–59 
(1968). Brown notes that, “[t]he propaganda used by the dye industries was both 
virulent and effective. . . . In short, a continuous stream of gas propaganda was 
maintained throughout the early 1920’s.” Id. at 59. In arguing for a protective tariff 
before a professional fraternal organization, Doctor William Hale described gas as “the 
most effective weapon of all time [and] the most humane ever introduced into war by 
man.” Spec. Comm. Hearings on Munitions, supra, at 2565. He then went on to state, “In 
this war after the war our battle cry must be ‘To Hell with all the German imports! Down 
with every thing opposed to American industries!’” Id. at 2568. 
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[Gas] is far from being the most horrible form of warfare, 
provided both sides are prepared defensively and offensively. 
Medical records show that out of every 100 Americans 
gassed, less than two died, and as far as records of four years 
show, very few are permanently injured. . . . Various forms of 
gas . . . make life miserable or vision impossible to those 
without a mask. Yet they do not kill.120 
Fries’ chapter on “The Future of Chemical Warfare” is telling, 
both for what it says and for the defensive language it uses about 
critics of gas as a legitimate weapon: 
The pioneer, no matter what the line of endeavor, 
encounters difficulties caused by his fellow-men just in 
proportion as the thing pioneered promises results. . . . [If] 
the results promises to be great, and especially if the rewards 
 
120. AMOS FRIES & CLARENCE WEST, CHEMICAL WARFARE 13 (1921). Fries 
expanded on that position in his testimony before the United States Senate: 
I consider [gas] one of the most important agents in any possible future war. It 
caused, even in the last war, when the Germans never fully realized the power 
of it until it was too late, and the enemy was never able to produce all he 
wanted—it caused over 27 per cent of all the American casualties, although 
the death rate was very light from gas. If you take out the deaths from other 
causes, the percentage of wounded rises to almost one third of all our 
wounded. 
Tariff Act of 1921 and Dyes Embargo: Hearing on H.R. 7456 Before the Comm. on Finance, 
67th Cong. 387 (1921) (statement of Amos Fries, Brigadier General). Robert Harris and 
Jeremy Paxman would respond later: 
[A]dvocates of chemical warfare later argued that gas was actually the most 
humane of the weapons used in the First World War, wounding far more than it 
killed. But the figures do not reveal either the horror or the persistence of gas 
wounds. Nor do they show the psychological casualties. As the fighting 
dragged on, the constant state of gas readiness imperceptibly sapped men’s 
strength and fighting spirit. 
ROBERT HARRIS & JEREMY PAXMAN, A HIGHER FORM OF KILLING 18 (2002). 
[T]here appears to have been a deliberate campaign to underestimate the 
number of men killed and wounded by gas. Officially, 180,193 British soldiers 
were gassed, of whom just 6,062 were killed. However, the list of categories 
these numbers do not include is staggering. . . . Apologists for gas warfare used 
the statistics to argue that gas was “humane” . . . . And what of the victims of 
these “civilized” weapons? In Britain in 1920, 19,000 men were drawing 
disability pensions as a result of war gassing. . . . In 1929 Porton [Down 
Research Station] investigated a further seventy-two cases of mustard gassing 
and found evidence of fibrosis, TB, persistent laryngitis, TB of the spine, 
anemia, aphonia, conjunctivitis and pulmonary fibrosis. These, of course, were 
secret reports, only declassified years later. In public, Porton maintained that 
the popular press “scare-mongered” about the long term effects of gas 
poisoning. 
Id. at 36–37. 
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promised to the investor and those working with him 
promises to be considerable, the difficulties thrown in the 
way of the venture become greater and greater. Indeed, 
whenever great results are promised, envy is engendered in 
those in other lines whose importance may be diminished or 
who are so short-sighted as to be always opposed to 
progress.121 
Fries’ anger at what he clearly considered the ignorance and 
illogic of those who oppose gas warfare come through at the 
conclusion of his book: 
[W]hat should . . . any highly civilized country consider 
giving up chemical warfare. To say that its use against savages 
is not a fair method of fighting, because the savages are not 
equipped with it, is arrant nonsense. No nation considers 
such things today. If they had, our American troops, when 
fighting the Moros in the Philippine Islands, would have had 
to wear the breechclout and use only swords and spears. 
Notwithstanding the opposition of certain people who, 
through ignorance or for other reasons, have fought it, 
chemical warfare has come to stay . . . . It is just as sportsman-
like to fight with chemical warfare as it is to fight with 
machine guns. . . The American is a pure sportsman and asks 
odds of no man. He does ask, though, that he be given a 
square deal. He is unwilling to agree not to use a powerful 
weapon of war when he knows that an outlaw nation would 
use it against him . . . . How much better it is to say to the 
world that we are going to use chemical warfare to the 
greatest extent possible in any future struggle.122 
Fries, as it turns out was incorrect in his expectations,123 but 
for a very long time his arguments carried a great deal of 
weight.124 What they demonstrate here is the other side of a long 
and bitter conflict about the morality of using poison gas in war.  
 
121. Id. at 435. Fries’ comments here appear to be aimed at officers of other 
branches who thought chemical warfare dishonorable, ineffective, or both. See, e.g., 
discussion of intervention by U.S. representatives in negotiations for the Washington 
Naval Treaty in 1922, infra at 215. 
122. Id. at 438–39.  
123. Eventually, there was a complete ban on possession and development though 
it took over seventy years. 
124. For example, Fries was cited in and supported by Russell Ewing, The Legality of 
Chemical Warfare, 61 AM. L. REV. 58 (1927), who argued that: 
In defiance of facts, experience and history, the nations of the world are still 
striving to outlaw chemical warfare. This is due in part to blind ignorance, lack 
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b. Efforts to Regulate Poisons and Gases Before World War I 
There had, in fact, been considerable discussion of 
poisonous and asphyxiating gases before their wide use began in 
1915. Part of the reason was the recognition of the illegality of 
poisonous weapons articulated in U.S. Army General Order 100 
in 1863.125 Another was the philosophy articulated by Czar 
Nicholas II of Russia in his proposition for what became the 
Hague Conference of 1899: “Hundreds of millions are devoted 
to acquiring terrible engines of destruction, which, though today 
regarded as the last word of science, are destined tomorrow to 
lose all value in consequence of some fresh discovery in the same 
field.”126 
 
of imagination, and, in no small degree, to misinformation. It may seem 
incredible but we have a situation in this country where the American Legion, 
a group of men who have fought in the last war and many of whom would fight 
in the next one should another come, favor chemical warfare as over against 
other weapons while the President and his administration are opposed to its 
use and are attempting to outlaw it.  
Id. at 60. He adds that: 
[A]nti-gas sentiment as embodied in the [1925 Geneva Gas Protocol] but the 
only logical conclusion that can be drawn is that it was insincere. The delegates 
had their ears to the ground and followed the popular clamor of the moment, 
disregarding history, the established practice, and the admitted facts regarding 
the efficiency and humanity of chemical warfare. Such has always been the 
course of these so-called world conferences. They proclaim some . . . scheme 
. . . only to be soon forgotten or disregarded.  
Id. at 73. He concludes: 
Owing to the primordial aversion to the new, combined with prejudice, 
propaganda, and the desire of statesmen and diplomats for popular acclaim, it 
has been easy in peace time to secure conventions of this nature. But when 
whole populations become fanned into a passion and war in all its grim and 
sordid reality comes, “military necessity” will compel the contending parties to 
employ the most efficient weapons at their disposal. 
Id. at 75–76. 
125. See FRANCIS LIEBER, INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF ARMIES OF THE 
UNITED STATES IN THE FIELD (Gov't Printing Office 1898) (1863) (initially published as 
U.S. War Dep't, General Orders No. 100 (Apr. 24, 1863)). The so-called “Lieber Code” 
was named for its principal initial drafter Columbia University law professor Francis 
Lieber. The Lieber Code was widely accepted by European powers in the decades 
following its promulgation. See FRANCIS LEIBER, AND THE CULTURE OF THE MIND 58 
(Charles R. Mack & Henry H. Lesesne eds., 2005) Its significance to the laws of war 
cannot be overstated. See JOSEPH H. CHOATE, THE TWO HAGUE CONFERENCES 13 (1913) 
(“This [1899 Hague Conference] codification of the laws and customs of land warfare 
was based on the Laws and Customs of Warfare adopted by the Brussels Conference in 
1874, which in turn grew out of Dr. Francis Lieber’s Instructions for the Government of 
Armies in the Field, Known as General Order 100 of 1863.”). 
126. CHOATE, supra note 125, at 5–6. 
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Choate discusses the gas provision of the First Conference: 
“In the same spirit of humanity, the Conference of 1899, after 
much discussion, agreed to abstain from the use of projectiles, 
the object of which is the diffusion of asphyxiating of deleterious 
gases . . . .”127 In fact, in 1899 it was the Russian delegate who 
introduced the asphyxiating gases proposal, and who, when 
others objected that all explosives produced gases which might 
asphyxiate, defined the prohibition to “include only those 
projectiles whose object is to diffuse asphyxiating gases, and not 
to those whose explosion produces incidentally such gases.”128 
Choate then discusses the prohibition, at the 1907 Conference, 
of the launching of projectiles from balloons, which he says was 
embodied in the comment of a British delegate who asked what 
purpose would “be served by the protective measures already 
adopted for war on land, if we open to the scourge of war a new 
field more terrible perhaps than all the others?”129 
The second Hague reiteration of the 1899 ban on poison 
weapons,130 and the continuation of the 1899 limits on 
asphyxiating gases seemed quite clear, and yet eight years after 
the 1907 Convention, Germany deployed chlorine gas at Ypres, 
Belgium.131 What happened in 1915 and in the ensuing years of 
World War I and, more importantly for present purposes, what 
impact did the use of gas and its rationale at the time have on 
Post-World War I treaty making? 
 
127. Id. at 15. But note, that in 1899, Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan, then the U.S. 
delegate, and later author of the highly influential THE INFLUENCE OF SEAPOWER UPON 
HISTORY 1660-1783 (Pelican Publishing Company 2003) (1890), voted against banning 
gas and argued that no practical asphyxiating shell had been developed and there was 
no proof it would be crueler than other forms of warfare. CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR 
INTERNATIONAL PEACE, INSTRUCTIONS TO THE AMERICAN DELEGATES TO THE HAGUE 
PEACE CONFERENCES AND THEIR OFFICIAL REPORTS 36 (1916); see also Hague 
Asphyxiating Declaration, supra note 110. 
128. WILLIAM HULL, THE TWO HAGUE CONFERENCES AND THEIR CONTRIBUTIONS 
TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 87 (1908). 
129. Id. at 14 (quoting Lord Reay, one of the British delegates). 
130. Compare Convention with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land 
Annex art. XXIII, July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803, 1 Bevans 247 (“[I]t is especially 
prohibited . . . [t]o employ poison or poisoned arms . . . .”), with Convention Respecting 
the Laws and Customs of War on Land Annex art. 23, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 1 
Bevans 631 (“[I]t is especially prohibited . . . [t]o employ poison or poisoned 
arms . . . .”). 
131. See, e.g., SIMON JONES, WORLD WAR GAS WARFARE TACTICS AND EQUIPMENT 4–
8 (2007) (chronicling the the decision to use gas shells and the siege of Ypres). 
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c. What Happened in the Great War? 
At the very core of the legal dispute involving German use of 
gas in 1915 were drafting ambiguities in the pertinent treaties: 
Did “asphyxiating” cover gases which worked through other 
means such as skin absorption? Did “poison” cover nonlethal or 
allegedly nonlethal weapons? Was release of gas from cylinders 
within the coverage of the ban on “projectiles?” Were fine 
powders considered as gases if they had the same effect? 
Germany’s arguments were widely discussed both during, 
and immediately after the war. Germany took the position that 
France had made “prior use of asphyxiating gases.”132 It cited 
instructions issued by the French Ministry of War on February 21, 
1915 concerning grenades and gas cartridges containing 
“stupefying gases,” the purpose of which was to “make untenable 
the surroundings of the place where they burst.”133 The 
instructions provided that “the vapors [of the] asphyxiating gases 
are not deadly, at least when small quantities are used.”134 The 
Germans took the position that, of necessity, the French were 
admitting the gases were deadly in large quantities, and that they 
were simply reprising with their later attacks.135 
Ludwig F. Haber, the son of the man who was held 
responsible for Germany’s use of chlorine gas in 1915,136 has 
published an extensive study of the subject: 
The spirit of the Conventions was surely clear enough: to 
stop new and potentially more awful weapons. But the letter 
was obscure and open to widely differing interpretations . . . . 
When the Germans used gas at Ypres, they were held to be in 
breach of the Conventions on several counts . . . [Germany] 
argued at the time, and later, that (i) the Conventions did 
not cover gas blown from cylinders, (ii) the Allies had used 
gas first, (iii) gases were not poisonous, and (iv) after the 
war, gas shells were implicitly excluded because they were 
not causing needless suffering . . . . [Haber seems to 
 
132. Official German Press Report of June 25, 1915, in 3 THE GREAT EVENTS OF THE 
GREAT WAR 138, 138 (Charles F. Horne ed., 1920). 
133. Id. 
134. Id. at 139. 
135. See id. 
136. Doctor Fritz Haber, 1868–1934, winner of the Nobel Prize for Chemistry in 
1918. See generally DIETRICH STOLTZENBERG, FRITZ HABER: CHEMIST, NOBEL LAUREATE, 
GERMAN, JEW (2004). 
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conclude the German claims of Allied first use are 
questionable at best]. The most one can say about gas and 
smoke is that by the eve of the war military awareness of 
chemical had increased to the extent that some soldiers were 
willing to consider them and a very few, with a more 
innovating turn of mind, were even experimenting with 
various compounds. The substances used with the exception 
of phosgene, were not toxic. There were no military stocks of 
gases, nor of gas shell, save for very limited supplies tear gas 
grenades and cartridges in French hands.137 
The military reaction was mixed on both sides. The German 
commander of the Army Corps at Ypres said in his memoires: 
I must confess that the commission for poisoning the enemy, 
just as one poisons rats, struck me as it must any 
straightforward soldier; it was repulsive to me. If, however, 
the poison gas were to result in the fall of Ypres, we would 
win a victory that might decide the entire campaign. In view 
of this worthy goal, all personal reservations had to be 
silent . . . . War is necessity and knows no exception.138 
It is important here to note that many of the weapons used by 
both sides were not gases per se. Rather, they often involved 
particles of toxic materials disbursed in smokes and or by shell 
fragmentation.139 Thus, Haber points out: 
[T]he particular anxiety caused by the German Blue Cross 
shells [was] with their arsenical filling. Whilst the German 
method of disbursing the active agent by high explosive 
fragmentation ensured that it would have little toxic effect, 
there were occasions when particulates capable of penetrating the 
SBR140 were produced . . . . Blue Cross shells were a potential 
 
137. HABER, supra note 113, at 19–21. 
138. TUCKER, supra at note 42, at 13, 392 (quoting BERTHOLD VON DEIMLING, AUS 
DER ALTEN IN DIE NEUE ZEIT 201 (Berlin, 1930)); see also STÉPHANE AUDOIN-ROUZEAU & 
ANNETTE BECKER, 14-18: UNDERSTANDING THE GREAT WAR 155 (2000). 
139. As the Military Law Review points out: 
The gas shell used in 1915 . . . evolved from an earlier model which was first 
used in October 1914. At that time double salts of dionialine was added to the 
powder of the projectile. The irritant would hover as dust in the air after the shell 
burst. It was not very intense. Nevertheless, an unnoticed important first step 
had been taken toward gas warfare. 
Joseph Kelly, Gas Warfare in International Law, 9 MIL. L. REV. 1, 7 (1960) (emphasis 
added). 
140. The small box respirator (“SBR”) was the last World War I version of the 
British protective mask. See JONES, supra note 131, at 31–32. 
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danger, and the Allied experts were concerned that the Germans 
might introduce arsenical smoke generators; soldiers would 
thereby be rendered so debilitated that they couldn’t fight 
any more.141 
Finally, Haber again raises the issue of the Hague conventions: 
The agreements were negotiated and signed at a time when 
statesmen were supposed to have moral standards, and it was 
generally expected that such declarations of principles . . . 
would be respected by all belligerents in a future war. The 
events of August-September 1914 [German’s invasion of 
Belgium] dented these illusions, the German [use] of 
chlorine the following spring shattered them, and set a 
precedent [contemporary language] still conveys the 
emotional shock. Conan Doyle wrote that the Germans had 
“sold their souls as soldiers” . . . it was only a short step to 
legitimize the use of gas at all times, and not solely in 
retaliation against the enemy’s first use. . . . The German 
post-war attitude was that the Hague Conventions still 
applied, indeed they had not been breached in 1915–18. 
[Furthermore] in any case the Germans had not been guilty 
of a precedent for it was the French who had first used 
bullets and shells with toxic materials.142 
Haber concludes that the practical effect of these attitudes 
was that international agreements to abandon poison gas would 
be meaningless unless accompanied by peacetime verification 
and wartime sanctions against transgressors.143 The Allies, as 
victors, and eventually as treaty negotiators, seemed to disagree 
with that conclusion, for in the postbellum period they produced 
a number of treaties designed to prevent future uses of 
poisonous and asphyxiating gases and similar “processes” or 
“devices.”144 What they meant by those words is a key to analysis 
in this Article. 
 
141. HABER, supra note 113, at 256 (emphasis added). 
142. Id. at 291. 
143. Id. 
144. As will be discussed below, the use of the words “processes” as opposed to the 
word “devices” is a key part of the Author’s analysis leading to his conclusion that it was 
the intent of the drafters from 1919 to 1925 to ban something more than just toxic and 
asphyxiating gases, and that they specifically knew and predicted that additional new 
types of weapons would mimic but not take the same physical form as the existing 
chemical weapons. See discussion infra Part II.A.1.d.i. 
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d. Post-War Efforts to Control Chemical Warfare 
The fear of chemical war in general, while initially pointed 
at Germany, was, in fact, by the end of the decade, directed 
generally at all industrialized powers. In 1928, a French author 
predicted that: 
Everyone foresees this new form of plague will rapidly 
progress. No one doubts that if war explodes again each side 
will use chemical weapons which will play the central role; 
everything else will be an accessory. These weapons, studied 
in secret and prepared in the world’s laboratories, will 
become progressively more deadly.145 
Bernauer summarizes the post-war situation: 
Increasing public awareness of the horrors of chemical 
warfare stimulated further efforts aimed at a ban on 
[chemical weapons]. The Treaty of Versailles prohibited 
Germany, the State which had used chemical weapons first in 
World War I, from manufacturing or importing poisonous 
gases. Other peace treaties of 1919-20 contained similar 
provisions. The Treaty of Washington which was to limit the 
use of submarines, but never entered into force, included 
limitations on the use of noxious gases . . . . In May, 1925, a 
conference on methods to control the international arms 
trade was convened in Geneva within the framework of the 
League of Nations. At this conference the United States 
initially proposed a prohibition of the export of chemical 
weapons. Many states objected to such a ban . . . . The 
United States therefore proposed to conclude an agreement 
banning the use of chemical weapons in war.146 As a result of 
a Polish initiative, biological means of warfare were added. 
On 17 June 1925 the “Protocol for the Prohibition of the 
Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and 
of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare” was adopted. It was, 
 
145. HENRI LEWITA, AUTOUR DE LA GUERRE CHIMIQUE 39 (1928) (Fr.) (author’s 
translation). 
146. The use of the word “therefore” may not be entirely accurate. As discussed 
infra in Part II.A.1.d.iii, the reasons for the U.S. proposal of a ban on use of chemical 
weapons seemed to lie in domestic politics rather than within the conference 
negotiations. 
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by and large, modeled after Article 5 of the Washington 
Treaty of 1922.147 
The initial steps to reach that protocol began, as Bernauer 
notes, with the drafting in 1919 of the Treaty of Versailles148 
which ended the war between Germany and the Allies, and 
continued with the other separate treaties ending the war with 
other members of the Central Powers.149 
i. The Treaties Ending the War 
The language most often cited as a starting point for the 
post-World War I legal treatment of chemical weapons is article 
171 of the Treaty of Versailles: “The use of asphyxiating, 
poisonous or other gases and all analogous liquids, materials or 
devices being prohibited, their manufacture and importation are 
strictly forbidden in Germany. The same applies to materials 
specially intended for the manufacture, storage and use of the 
said products or devices.”150 The French version of article 171 
reads: “L’emploi de gaz asphyxiants, toxiques ou similaires, ainsi que de 
tous les liquides, matières ou procédés analogues étaient prohibés, la 
fabrication et l’importation en sont rigoureusement interdites en 
Allemagne. Il en est de même du matériel spécialement destiné à la 
fabrication, à la conservation ou à l’usage desdits produits ou 
procédés.”151 
The broad language of the Allied drafters at Versailles was 
not unintentional. Among the “main principles which guided the 
Allies in framing the Military Terms” of the Treaty was to “avoid 
all ambiguity, which might hereafter give Germany a pretext for 
evading her obligations.”152 Verwey points out that, in fact, the 
original text in article 5 of the pre-Versailles draft, “Concerning a 
 
147. THOMAS BERNAUER, THE PROJECTED CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION: A 
GUIDE TO NEGOTIATIONS IN THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT 11–12 (1990) (citations 
omitted). 
148. Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany, June 
28, 1919, S. DOC. NO. 66-49 (1919), 225 Consol. T.S. 188 [hereinafter Treaty of 
Versailles]. 
149. BERNAUER, supra note 147, at 11–12. As will be discussed below, those separate 
treaties contained somewhat differing language in their articles relating to bans on 
possession of chemical weapons.. 
150. Treaty of Versailles, supra note 148, art. 171. 
151. Id. (French text). 
152. 2 HISTORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE OF PARIS: THE SETTLEMENT WITH 
GERMANY 127 (H. Temperley ed., 1920). 
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Definitive Military Status of Germany,” provided: “Production or 
use of asphyxiating, poisonous or similar gases, any liquid, any 
material and any similar device capable of use in war are 
forbidden.”153 “There is no doubt,” says Verwey, “that this 
formulation was intended to mean ‘forbidden in and to 
Germany’,154 since the Allied Powers certainly did not intend to 
give up the production of chemical weapons themselves.”155 
Later, he notes, the provision shows up as article 13 of the 
“Naval, Military and Air Conditions of Peace” where the 
Versailles article 171 language appeared.156 Verwey says that 
“[t]here is no indication . . . in the records that the phrase ‘being 
prohibited’ was inserted on purpose,” and that the discussions 
rather point to the opposite conclusion; that the entire article 
was related to Germany’s obligations alone . . . .”157 Verwey’s 
conclusion that the gas articles of Versailles and other treaties 
were aimed at the Central Powers alone seems to be the correct 
interpretation,158 although its significance was, for present 
 
153. WIL VERWEY, RIOT CONTROL AGENTS AND HERBICIDES IN WAR 262 (1977). 
154. In their official response to protests of the treaty’s harshness from the German 
delegation at Versailles, the Allies stated that Germany was “the first to use poisonous 
gas notwithstanding the appalling suffering it entailed” and that, inter alia, was “why 
Germany must submit for a few years to certain special disabilities and arrangements.” 
Georges Clemenceau, Allied Reply to German Delegates’ Protest Against Proposed Peace Terms 
at the Paris Peace Conference, TIMES (London), June 17, 1919, at 1, reprinted in 13 AM J. 
INT’L L. 545–52 (1919). 
155. VERWAY, supra note 153, at 262. Harold Vaughn noted contemporaneously 
that: 
After what became routine statements in favor of the idea that all nations 
should now disarm, the delegates did nothing except to strip the defeated 
powers of their remaining military establishments, and then plan how to keep 
them in a state of permanent military inferiority. Wilson’s fourth point called 
for the reduction of national armaments ‘to the lowest point consistent with 
domestic safety,’ but it was applied only to Germany. 
HAROLD VAUGHN, VERSAILLES TREATY, 1919; GERMANY’S FORMAL SURRENDER AT THE 
END OF THE GREAT WAR 36 (Franklin Watts 1975). 
156. VERWAY, supra note 153, at 262 
157. Id. Verwey adds that this impression is supported by the insertion of 
flamethrowers into the concomitant articles of the peace treaties with Austria (article 
135) and Hungry (article 119), noting “[i]t could hardly be [argued] that anno in 1919 
flamethrowers were considered prohibited by specific customary international law.” Id. 
158. Adolf-Boelling Overweg in 1937 thought article 171 was “eine Fiktion ohne 
praktische Bedeutung.” That is, “a fiction without practical meaning.” ADOLF-BOELLING 
OVERWEG, DIE CHEMISCHE WAFFE UND DAS VOLKERRECHT 69 (1937) (F.R.G.) (author’s 
translation). Overweg analyzes the background history of article 171 in considerable 
depth, but makes no mention of textual discrepancies regarding “devices” between the 
French and English versions. See id. at 64–72. 
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purposes, mooted by subsequent developments in 1922 and 
1925, when the later treaties incorporated and ratified the 
relevant language.159 
What is important for this Article, however, is the Versailles 
ban on devices,160 which was, indeed, present in the drafts from 
the very beginning.161 It is interesting to note that the various 
treaties ending the war with the Central Powers were not exactly 
the same regarding banned chemical weapons. As noted above, 
article 171 of Versailles refers to “analogous liquids, materials or 
devices.”162 The Treaty of St. Germaine-en-Laye,163 which ended 
 
159. The conclusion seems logical, since everything in the drafting process of the 
post-war treaties was designed to prevent the losing parties from ever again presenting a 
military threat. See BROWN, supra note 119, at 52. He notes that: 
There was . . . a significant difference between the first draft prepared by the 
Foch Committee of the Supreme War Council on March 3, 1919, and the final 
article. The draft article was blunt . . . .  
“Production or use of asphyxiating, poisonous or similar gases, any liquid, 
any material and any similar device capable of use in war are forbidden.”  
The draft article was accepted without comment on March 6 and March 10, 
1919. The regulations were redrafted to reflect substantive comments on other 
articles between March 10 and March 17. In the redrafted regulations . . . 
Article 5 became Article 13, and the wording was changed to that of the final 
Article 171. There is no indication that the change in wording was realized to be other 
than procedural. 
Id. at 52–53 n.1. (emphasis added) (citations omitted); see also A HISTORY OF THE PEACE 
CONFERENCE OF PARIS, supra note 152, at 134 (“Whatever we may do to reduce the 
strength of the German Army, and to prevent the military training of the people, there 
are, and will for some time continue to be, in Germany several millions of men trained 
and inured to war. Similarly, there are large numbers of regimental and staff officers, 
with ample war experience. These are accomplished facts, which we are powerless to 
alter. On the other hand, it is quite possible to deprive Germany of the arms, ammunition, and 
material necessary for the equipment of a great army.” (emphasis added)). 
160. “Device” is currently defined in England as “A thing designed for a particular 
function or adapted for a purpose; an invention. A contrivance, esp a (simple) 
mechanical contrivance . . . . An explosive contrivance, esp. a nuclear bomb” 1 SHORTER 
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 667 (6th ed. 2007). A more contemporaneous English 
definition is not fundamentally different. “Something invented and constructed for a 
special purpose; an instrument or combination of instrumentalities formed with 
intelligence and design; contrivance; as, a mechanical device for controlling vibration.” A 
STANDARD DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 502 (London, Funk & Wagnalls 
1895). 
161. VERWEY, supra note 153, at 262. 
162. Treaty of Versaille, supra note 148, art. 171. 
163. Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Austria, Sept. 
10, 1919, S. DOC. NO. 66-92 (1919), 226 Consol. T.S. 8 [hereinafter Treaty of St. 
Germaine-en-Laye].  
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the war with Austria, added flamethrowers164 to the mix, but kept 
the reference to devices: “The use of flamethrowers, 
asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and all similar liquids, 
materials or devices being prohibited . . . .”165 Apparently, there 
“devices” still modifies “gases” since the language is unchanged 
from Versailles except for the addition of flamethrowers.166 
There has been considerable discussion about the meaning 
of the word “similares” modifying asphyxiating and toxic gases in 
the French version, versus the word “analogous” in the English 
text.167 During the Vietnam conflict, the United States took the 
 
164. The modern flamethrower was designed by Berlin engineer Richard Fiedler 
and the German Army tested two models in 1901. Michael Dewar, The First Flame Attacks, 
in TANKS & WEAPONS OF WORLD WAR I, 47–48 (Bernard Fitzsimons ed., 1973). The 
smaller version, more commonly used, was gas pressurized, light enough to be man-
portable and had a range of approximately twenty yards. Id. The larger version had a 
forty-yard range. Id. The weapon was used as early as October, 1914, but its first major 
use was at Hooge in July, 1915. Id. Other nations on both sides quickly adopted the 
weapon, which was used extensively in World War II, and the Korean and Vietnam Wars. 
STEPHEN BULL, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MILITARY TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION 88–89 
(2004). The United States unilaterally removed flamethrowers, but not flame weapons, 
from its arsenal in 1978. See Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of 
Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to 
Have Indiscriminate Effects, Protocol III arts. 1(a), 2(1), Oct. 10, 1980, S. TREATY DOC. 
NO. 103-25 (1981), 1342 U.N.T.S. 137 [hereinafter Conventional Weapons Convention] 
(defining flamethrowers as incendiary weapons and limiting, but not prohibiting, their 
use). The subsequent use of flamethrowers, taken together with the Convention on 
Conventional Weapons language, makes it clear that states have not viewed that weapon 
as a “device” covered by the 1925 Protocol or subsequent treaties. 
165. Treaty of St. Germaine-en-Laye, supra note 163, art. 135. 
166. Immediately before presentation of the draft Treaty of Versailles to Germany 
on May 10, 1919, the Council of Four (Lloyd George of England, Vittorio Emanuele 
Orlando of Italy, Georges Clemenceau of France, and Woodrow Wilson of the United 
States) decided to next complete the treaty with Austria-Hungary and ordered its 
Central Secretariat to prepare a draft. 4 A HISTORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE OF PARIS: 
THE SETTLEMENT WITH GERMANY 141–42 (H. Temperley ed., 1920). The military clauses 
were drafted by the British section which followed the general arm limitations imposed 
on Germany. Id. at 143. The council’s military representatives adopted the British draft, 
which followed the Versailles language precisely “except that the word Flammenwerfer 
[flamethrowers] was added in the first line of Article 135.” Id. at 150. Thus, the 
modification of “gases” by “devices” not only preceded the additional word, there was 
apparently no intent to do anything other than add another banned weapon to a 
convenient clause. 
167. A General Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments under 
the sponsorship of the League of Nations and attended by League members plus the 
United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (“U.S.S.R.”) took place in 
Geneva from 1932 to 1934. See Mount Holyoke College, Department of International 
Relations, Disarmament Discussions 1932-34, http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/
WorldWar2/disarm.htm (last visited Apr. 3, 2010). In the preparatory work for that 
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position that the French text excluded tear gases because they 
were not similar to choking or poisonous gases and others 
disagreed because they thought tear gas “analogous.”168 
There has not, however, been a similar discussion of 
whether there is a distinction between “analogous devices” and 
“procédés analogues,” in the second clause of the first sentence of 
article 171.169 The word “devices” in the specific sense of related 
equipment or application is better articulated with “appareil” 
(apparatus) or “dispositif” (device).170 While “procédé” may be 
translated as “processes” in general circumstances, for example 
technique de fabrication (manufacturing technique), it also carries 
a more specific meaning.171 “Procédé” has the strong connotation 
of bringing about a similar result or end-state. One common 
synonym for “procédé” appears to be “conduite” (behavior).172 
Indeed, a subtext of artificially obtaining an analogous result is 
inherent in the word. It is therefore significant that the 
 
conference, the British Foreign Office produced a Memorandum on Chemical Warfare 
which pointed out “a serious ambiguity” regarding the translation of the word 
“similaires” as “other.” See Minutes of the Sixth Session (Second Part) of the Preparatory 
Commission for the Disarmament Conference, Minutes of Twentieth Meeting, December 2, 1930, 
League of Nations Series No. 9, 311 (1931), available at 
http://digital.library.northwestern.edu/league/le00307h.pdf. The U.K. memorandum 
proposed French and English language drafts which substituted the English word 
“similar” for “other.” Id. More interesting here, the U.K. draft also substituted, without 
comment, the word “processes” for “devices” as a translation for “procédés.” Id. The 
conference adopted the U.K. draft, but, of course, it never produced even a final draft 
treaty before it dissolved in light of events which were to lead to the Second World War. 
168. See infra note 222. 
169. Treaty of Versailles, supra note 148, art. 171; see, e.g., Natalino Ronzitti, Le 
Desarmement Chimique et le Protocole de Geneve de 1925 [Chemical Disarmament and the 
Geneva Protocol of 1925], 35 ANNUAIRE FRANCAIS DE DOIT INTERNATIONAL 149 (1989) 
(Fr.) (discussing at length the “similares” versus “other” debate, but never mentions any 
conflict between “analogous  devices” and “procédés analogues”). 
170. See id. 
171. Relevant  definitions from the Larousse Dictionary state: 
 Manière d’agir, de se comporter : Ce sont là des procédés malhonnêtes. 
[Manner of acting or behavior. They are proceeding dishonestly.] 
 Manière de s’y prendre, méthode pratique pour faire quelque chose : Un 
nouveau procédé de fabrication. [Means to an end, practical method to 
do something: A new manufacturing process.] 
 Recette toute faite visant à obtenir artificiellement un résultat avec peu de 
moyens. [Recipe for artificially obtaining a result with the least 
means.] 
LAROUSSE FRENCH-ENGLISH, ENGLISH-FRENCH DICTIONARY (New ed. 2007), available at  
http://www.larousse.fr/ (author’s translations). 
172. See id. 
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translation “processes” was used elsewhere,173 but rejected for 
“devices.” Thus, the French version provides some additional 
evidence that the intention was to include entities with similar or 
analogous effects, outcomes, or behaviors, rather than simply 
devices associated with distribution of otherwise banned 
substances.174 
The situation, of course, gets more complicated. In the 
Treaty of Neuilly-sur-Seine with Bulgaria, flamethrowers are kept 
in the relevant article 82, but the word “processes” is substituted 
for “devices.”175 Does that substitution indicate any intent to 
change the nature of the treaty? It is difficult to support that 
conclusion, because six months later when a treaty is signed with 
Hungary, the language veers back to “similar devices.”176 Later in 
1920, the preliminary treaty with Turkey again contained the 
“similar processes” phrase,177 but, to complicate the puzzle even 
 
173. See infra notes 175, 177 and accompanying text (using “processes” in other 
treaties ending World War I). 
174. Interestingly, Josef Kunz, in Gaskrieg und Völkerrecht, says: 
Durch Versailles, Artikel 171, wird Deutschland die Herstellung und Einfuhr von 
erstickenden, giftigen und ähnlichen Gasen, von allen entsprechenden Flüssigkeiten, 
Stoffen oder Verfahrensarten sowie von Gebrauch der genannten Erzeugnisse oder 
Verfahrensarten sowie von allem Material das eigens für die Herstellung, 
Aufbewahrung oder den Gebrauch der genannten Erzeugnisse oder Verfahrensarten 
bestimmt ist  streng untersagt und zwar im Hinblick daruf, dass dieser Gebrauch 
verboten ist. [In the view of the fact that its use is forbidden, by Versailles, article 
171, Germany is strictly forbidden from the production and importation of 
suffocating, poisonous and similar gases, of all corresponding liquids, 
materials or types of procedure, as well as the products or types of procedure 
mentioned as well as by all material particularly intended for the production, 
storage or the use of the products or kinds of procedure mentioned.] 
JOSEF KUNZ, GASKRIEG UND VÖLKERRECHT 37 (1927) (author’s translation). Kunz uses 
the phrase “entsprechenden . . . Verfahrensarten” (corresponding type of procedure) 
which effectively translates the French phrase “procédés analogues,” but which in the 
context must mean something else, since as used, a “type of procedure” could not in 
itself be produced, stored, or imported. Id. It is telling that in the next sentence, he 
concludes that article 171 is “identisch sind” (identical with) the parallel articles of the 
other treaties ending World War I. Id. 
175. Treaty of Peace between the Principal Allied and Associated Powers and 
Bulgaria art. 82., Nov. 27, 1919, S. DOC. NO. 67-7, at 47–162 (1921), 226 Consol. T.S. 
334. 
176. Treaty of Peace between the Principal Allied and Associated Powers and 
Hungary art. 119, June 4, 1920, S. DOC. NO. 67-7, at 163–319 (1921), 6 L.N.T.S. 187. 
177. Treaty of Peace between the Principal Allied and Associated Powers and 
Turkey art. 176, opened for signature Aug. 10, 1920, S. DOC. NO. 67-7, at 320–448 (1921), 
reprinted in 15 AM. J. INT’L L. 179 (Supp. 1921). 
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further, the entire article relating to chemical weapons was 
deleted when the final version of the treaty was signed in 1923.178 
In short, every treaty except Versailles bans flamethrowers, 
and every treaty except Versailles uses the word “similar” while 
Versailles utilizes “analogous.” However, the first, second, and 
fourth treaties use “devices” while the operable word in the third 
and fifth is “processes.” How is it possible to know what the 
language was intended to mean? Interestingly, article 172 of the 
Treaty of Versailles required that Germany “disclose . . . the 
nature and mode of manufacture of all explosives, toxic 
substances or other like chemical preparations used by them in the 
war or prepared by them for the purpose of being so 
used . . . .”179 By contrast, it did not require the disclosure of 
similar or analogous devices or processes.180 Whether or not it is 
even possible to deduce from this dissimilar language that the 
drafters had any particular intent, it is at least clear that they were 
aware that language could vary in many ways, and seemed to 
choose the broadest possible language in the ban contained in 
article 171 and its parallels in other treaties.181 
Fries’ discussion of methodology current in 1921 is 
enlightening: 
[W]e must expect that new gases, new methods of turning 
them loose, and new tactical uses will be developed . . . . 
Some of the poisonous gases are so powerful in minute 
quantities and evaporate so slowly that their liberation does 
not . . . cause a cloud. Consequently, we have gases that 
cannot be seen. Others form clouds by themselves, such, for 
instance, as the toxic smoke candle, where the solid is driven 
off by heating . . . . It would be idle to attempt to enumerate 
the ways and means by which chemicals will be used in the 
future. In fact, one could hardly conceive of a situation 
where gas or smoke will not be employed, for these materials 
may be liquids or solids that either automatically, upon exposure to 
the air, turn into gas, or which are pulverized by high explosive, or 
driven off by heat. This varied character of the materials 
 
178. See generally Treaty of Peace with Turkey, July 24, 1923, 28 L.N.T.S. 11. 
179. Treaty of Versailles, supra note 148, art. 172 (emphasis added). 
180. Id. 
181. For discussion of other possible treaty language, see Herbert F. Manisty, The 
Use of Poison Gas in War, 9 TRANSACTIONS GROTIUS SOC’Y 17, 17–28 (1923). 
  
908 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 33:858 
enables them to be used in every sort of artillery shell, bomb 
or other container carried to the field of battle.182 
It is worth noting that Fries’ arguments about the technical 
legality of German conduct were still being made as late as 1942, 
when a law review note was published stating that “[b]rutal as she 
otherwise was, Germany did not violate international law by the use of 
chlorine on April 22, 1915.”183 Of course, the thesis of that note is 
somewhat impacted by its concluding sentence: “There is hardly 
a field of peaceful human endeavor which does not owe a debt to 
the Chemical Warfare Service.”184 Of particular interest here, 
though, is the author’s argument that: 
The Germans had [in 1914] developed a [lacriminatory] gas-
filled artillery shell by modifying a 10.5 cm. shrapnel . . . . 
This gas projectile was not within the interdiction of 
Declaration II [of the Hague Convention], for diffusion of 
asphyxiating or deleterious gas was not its sole object. Its 
main purpose was that of shrapnel against personnel. 
Further, it disbursed a fine dust of solid and not a gas.185 
Indeed, as Fries points out, one of the areas where Germany did 
early work was in arsenic derivatives.186 The most commonly used 
German arsenical was diphenylchloroarsine (“Blue Cross”), 
which was “a white solid, which readily penetrated the [gas mask] 
canister and caused sneezing.”187 This substance 
was used in shells carrying a high bursting charge. The 
explosion of the shell scattered the Sneezing Gas in the form 
of a very fine cloud of particles. While the charcoal of the 
mask will remove most poisonous gases, it has no protective 
power against clouds or mists. The Sneezing Gas passed 
through the best canister, and through its peculiar 
physiological effect caused great discomfort to the men and 
 
182. FRIES & WEST, supra note 120, at 436–37 (emphasis added.). 
183. Cyrus Bernstein, Note, The Law of Chemical Warfare, War Law Notes: The Law of 
Chemical Warfare, 10 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 889, 908 (1942) (emphasis added). 
184. Id. at 915. 
185. Id. at 907 (emphasis in original omitted) (second emphasis added). 
186. FRIES & WEST, supra note 120, at 180. 
187. Id. at 181; see also James F. Norris, The Manufacture of War Gases in Germany, 11 
J. INDUS. & ENGINEERING CHEMISTRY 817, 824–25 (1919). Germany used various colored 
markings for identifying different gas types. See SIMON JONES, WORLD WAR GAS WARFARE 
TACTICS AND EQUIPMENT 50 (2007) (“They simplified the classification to Green, Blue 
and Yellow Cross: green for lung irritant; blue for sensory irritant, i.e. solids to penetrate 
respirator filters; and yellow for mustard gas.” (emphasis added)). 
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numerous casualties through forcing the men to remove 
their masks.188 
The British experimented with this substance as well.189 
Much of the point of the discussion above is that 
professional soldiers and diplomats knew very well at the end of 
World War I that poisonous, asphyxiating, and related weapons 
came in forms other than gas;190 signatory states might be 
anxious to avoid the technical strictures of any treaty;191 and they 
were willing to try to write a ban which took into account all 
possible forms of poisonous, asphyxiating and related weapons 
foreseeable in the future.192  
 
188. Clarence J. West, The Chemical Warfare Service, in THE NEW WORLD OF SCIENCE: 
ITS DEVELOPMENT DURING THE WAR 148, 153, (Robert M. Yerkes ed., 1920); see also 
Nuclear Threat Initiative, Diphenylchloroarsine, http://nti.org/e_research/profiles/
nk/chemical/1094.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2010) (“Military doctrine in World War I . . . 
counted on its being able to force soldiers to remove their protective masks, and thus 
becoming vulnerable to it or other chemical agents.”). 
189. In 1918, the British experimented with burning granules from a German Blue 
Cross shell and quickly realized its ability to penetrate their respirator. Inspired by those 
Blue Cross experiments, they “perfected the thermogenerator . . . which produced an 
arsenic smoke capable of penetrating all known respirators apart from their own. As well 
as causing intense pain in the sinuses it also created temporary but intense feelings of 
psychological misery.” JONES, supra note 187, at 57–59. Thermogenerator grenades, 
adapted as aerial bombs, became the first air dropped chemical weapons when used by 
the Royal Air Force against Bolshevik forces near Archangel in 1919. Id. at 57; see also 
MICHAEL KETTLE, CHURCHILL AND THE ARCHANGEL FIASCO 316 (1992) (“On April 16 
[1919], Churchill’s Secretary received a letter . . . from Sir Keith Price [an explosives 
and munitions expert] which stated, ‘If there is going to be a White Sea campaign, do 
not let the powers that be overlook the new gas generators. I really believe they are the 
most deadly weapon which has yet been produced . . . . The D.M. generator knocks 
people out for say 48 hours but does not kill them, the D.A. kills alright; which is the 
right medicine for the Bolshevist.”). “D.A.” was, in fact, the British code name for 
diphenylchloroarsine, the chemical in Blue Cross. David B. Kirkwood, Non-Lethal 
Weapons, in MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR 4 (1996). “D.M.A.” was the code 
name for diphenylamine chlorasine. Id. Sir Keith Price appears to have been confused 
about the names and qualities of DA and DM. KETTLE, supra, at 316. 
190. See supra note 182–189. 
191. See supra notes 132–44; see also, e.g., DENNIS MYERS ET AL., THE TREATY OF 
VERSAILLES AND AFTER: ANNOTATIONS OF THE TEXT OF THE TREATY 44–54 (1968) 
(noting the German and U.S. commentators’ arguments about the technical legality of 
Germany’s deployment of chlorine gas from cylinders in 1915). 
192. See supra note 179. It is worth noting that in 1940 the U.S. Army was actively 
concerned with defenses against irritant smoke which it defined as “a chemical agent 
which can be disseminated as extremely small solid or liquid particles in air, and . . . 
causes intolerable sneezing, coughing, lacrimation, or headache, followed by nausea and 
temporary physical disability when breathed in very low concentrations.” CHEMICAL 
WARFARE SERV., U.S. ARMY, DEFENSE AGAINST CHEMICAL ATTACK 4 (1940). The Army 
also recognized that there was a distinction between irritant gas candles and toxic smoke 
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One startlingly applicable statement regarding such 
weapons was made by ex-Major Victor Lefebure, who had served 
from November 1917 through the end of the war as the British 
liaison officer with the French Army for chemical warfare.193 
Lefebure later authored The Riddle of the Rhine about the German 
chemical industry and its ties to gas warfare.194 In 1921 he was 
invited to address the Grotius Society as part of its Problems of 
Peace and War series.195 Lefebure began his address by arguing 
that “chemical warfare is far too potent, decisive, flexible, secret, 
and generally dangerous to be left unharnessed in a world which 
pretends to disarm.”196 He devoted much of his address to how 
new chemical weapons are developed through research, 
development and manufacturing stages, and he proposed 
designing applicable treaty controls at all three stages.197 His 
conclusion, however, not only resonates after almost ninety years, 
but it is direct evidence of how broadly weapons-related scientists 
and soldiers were thinking contemporaneously with the drafting 
of the treaties discussed here: 
I should point out that these remarks are not limited to 
chemical warfare, but they apply to the development of all 
new weapons. Taking a long-distance view, no distinction should 
be made. If sub-atomic forces can eventually be harnessed for war 
they must be subjected to the same control and attempts at 
suppression during their development stages. Chemical warfare 
happens to be the present problem of the maximum 
practical importance in this field.198  
 
candles. See U.S. DEP’T OF WAR, TECHNICAL MANUAL: GERMAN-ENGLISH MILITARY 
DICTIONARY 506 (1944) (defining “giftnebelkerze” as an “irritant gas candle” and 
“giftrauchkerze” as a “toxic-smoke candle”). 
193. Obituary, Victor Lefebure, TIMES (London), 1948, at 394.  
194. VICTOR LEFEBURE, THE RIDDLE OF THE RHINE (1921).  
195. See Victor Lefebure, Chemical Warfare: The Possibility of its Control, 7 
TRANSACTIONS GROTIUS SOC’Y 153 (1921). 
196. Id. at 157. 
197. See id. 
198. LEFEBURE, supra note 194, at 12 (emphasis added). There is a great deal of 
useful historical evidence in this area. Particularly useful is the Report of the Committee 
Appointed to Consider the Question of Chemical and Bacteriological Warfare, League of Nations 
Official Journal Special Supp. No. 26, 121 (1924). Regarding chemical warfare the 
committee notes: 
The term “gas” as used in connection with warfare does not correspond to the 
scientific definition of gases. In reality it includes not only gases but solid or 
liquid substances which are reduced to powder or spray in the air . . . . Such 
substances are by no means rare. The majority are common materials, 
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Thus it seems clear from the evidence that the Versailles 
Treaty drafters knew the poisonous and asphyxiating “gases” of 
the Great War were often something other than gas in the 
technical sense of physicists,199 and that there was an attempt at 
inclusion rather than exclusion of anything which might produce 
analogous results. It does not assist the researcher attempting to 
divine intent that many of the negotiations were kept secret and 
the records ostensibly destroyed.200 Once again, however, there is 
some other guidance. In a 1922 analysis of the “Secret Minutes of 
the Paris Peace Conference” the New York Times revealed that: 
Two things were at once assumed by the conference and 
brushed aside, as the most vital problems often are, 
practically without discussion: First, that Germany should be 
utterly disarmed, so far as military uses were concerned, of 
airplanes, poison gas, submarines, tanks, etc. Every one [sic] 
agreed to that. Second, no one at Paris considered for a 
moment an immediate general reduction of armament in 
these new Instrumentalities which should apply to the allies 
as well as to the enemy States . . . . They were all agreed on 
an absolute prohibition of the military use of gases . . . . But 
the other Allies wished to go much further. They wished to 
 
ordinarily manufactured and employed in large quantities for peace-time 
requirements, so that “there is very little difference between the manufacture of 
pharmaceutical products and that of injurious substances used in war.” 
Id. (emphasis added); cf. W. Eysinga, La Guerre Chimique et le Mouvement pour sa Repression 
[Chemical War and the Movement for Its Repression], in 16 ACADEMIE DE DOIT 
INTERNATIONAL 335 (Leyden, 1972) (1927) (Fr.). 
199. See ASTM INTERNATIONAL, ASTM DICTIONARY OF ENGINEERING SCIENCE & 
TECHNOLOGY 269 (10th ed. 2005) (defining gas as “the state of matter in which the 
molecules are practically unrestricted by intermolecular forces so that the molecules are 
free to occupy all space within an enclosure” and particulate as “a general term used to 
describe a finely divided solid of organic or inorganic matter”). ASTM International, 
originally known as the American Society for Testing and Materials, is a voluntary 
standards development organization and source for technical standards. See About 
ASTM International, http://www.astm.org/ABOUT/aboutASTM.html (last visited Apr. 
3, 2010). Importantly, this group defines “smoke” as “small gas-borne particles resulting 
from incomplete combustion.” Id. at 433. That understanding of the meaning of 
“smoke” really has not changed since W.F.M. Goss noted in 1916, that the properties of 
smoke were defined as “gaseous and solid products of combustion, visible and invisible,” 
and that smoke regarded as possessing both solid and gaseous constituents. W.F.M. 
Goss, Smoke as a Source of Atmospheric Pollution, 181 J. FRANKLIN INST. 305, 320 (1916). 
200. See, MYERS ET AL., supra note 191, at iii (noting that “negotiations which 
resulted in the language of the treaty taking its final form have not been recorded, for it 
was not the intention of the makers but the action of the parties to the treaty which was 
to be ascertained. It was seldom found to be pertinent to discuss interpretations of the 
language finally adopted”). 
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compel the German Government to disclose her chemical 
processes and secrets . . . . [Secretary of State Robert Lansing 
expressed President Wilson’s view that] “since the use of 
asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and all analogous matters or 
devices had been prohibited,201 including their manufacture or 
importation, he thought that was sufficient safeguard . . . .” It 
became crystal clear as these discussions developed that everything 
depended upon point of view . . . . If men looked upon inventions 
and scientific appliances only from the point of view of war, then 
everything became dangerous; there must be an attempt to corner 
every contingency with a prohibition and often a perpetual 
prohibition at that; with a final reducto ad absurdum in trying 
to penetrate the secrets of men’s minds. . . . Prohibitions 
were not enough [Wilson argued, what was needed also was a 
League of Nations].202 
In any case, it was the “analogous devices” language of 
Versailles that was adopted first by the Washington Naval 
Conference in 1922,203 and then in the 1925 Geneva Gas 
Protocol.204 The history behind these words indicates, however, 
that the drafters specifically chose “analogous devices” over 
“similar processes,” that they were determined to prevent 
Germany from again arguing that such weapons were outside the 
scope of treaty language, and that they were very well aware that 
smoke and particulate matter could be produced and used as a 
lethal weapon of war to disburse asphyxiating or toxic chemicals. 
 
201. Note that in the French text, Lansing is quoted as saying “Il s’agit d’obliger les 
Allemandes a faire connaitre les secrets de fabrication de certains produits employees pour des 
procedes de guerre contraires au doit des gens. Ceci vise essentiallement les gaz et autres 
produits chimiques. [This is to oblige Germany to disclose the secrets of making certain 
products employed for illegal warfare. Essentially, it is aimed at gases and other chemical 
products]” Paul Mantoux, Official Interpreter, 1 LES DELIBERATIONS DE CONSEIL DES 
QUATRE 24 MARCH–28 JUNE, 1919 267 (Editions de Centre National de la Recherche 
Scientifque 1955) (emphasis added) (author’s translation). While the English language 
notes of what Lansing actually said are probably most authentic, it is interesting that the 
official French interpreter translated “asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and all 
analogous matters or devices had been prohibited” as les gaz et autres produits chimiques. 
Id. 
202. Ray Baker, America and the World Peace, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 1922, at 80 
(emphasis added). 
203. Treaty between the United States of America, the British Empire, France, Italy, 
and Japan Relative to the Protection of the Lives of Neutrals and Noncombatants at Sea 
in Time of War and to Prevent the Use in War of Noxious Gases and Chemicals art. V, 
opened for signature Feb. 6, 1922, S. DOC. NO. 67-126, at 886 (1922), 3 Malloy 3116 
[hereinafter Washington Submarine Treaty]. 
204. Geneva Protocol, supra note 23. 
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The decision at Washington in 1922 to use the words “analogous 
devices”205 becomes directly relevant to determination whether 
the CWC covers nanomimics in light of that history. 
ii. The Washington Naval Conference 
The Washington Naval Conference was a post-war meeting 
among nine military powers organized by the administration of 
U.S. President Warren G. Harding for the purpose of arms 
control and peace in East Asia.206 The conference produced five 
significant treaties over the course of three months.207 A full 
description of the proceedings at the Washington Conference 
may be found in a published doctoral thesis by Raymond Buell.208 
Buell notes that a subcommittee was created to specifically 
address the topic of poisonous gases.209 The Subcommittee on 
Poison Gas privately reported on December 8, 1921, that 
suppressing poison gas was unwise and unworkable,210 and issued 
a public report on January 6, 1922, which concluded that “the 
only limitation practicable is to wholly prohibit the use of gases 
against cities and other large bodies of noncombatants in the 
same manner as high explosives may be limited, but that there 
 
205. See Washington Submarine Treaty, supra note 203, art. V. 
206. See, e.g., THE USA IN THE MAKING OF THE USSR: THE WASHINGTON 
CONFERENCE, 1921–1922, AND ‘UNINVITED RUSSIA’ 1–3 (2004). 
207. See Washington Submarine Treaty, supra note 203; Treaty between the United 
States of America, Belgium, the British Empire, China, France, Italy, the Netherlands, 
and Portugal Relating to the Revision of Chinese Custom Tariff, Feb. 6, 1922, 44 Stat. 
2122, 2 Bevans 381; Treaty between the United States of America, Belgium, the British 
Empire, China, France, Italy, Japan, the Neterlands, and Portugal, Relating to Principles 
and Policies to be Followed in Matters Concerning China, Feb. 6, 1922, 44 Stat. 2113, 38 
L.N.T.S. 277 (commonly referred to as the “Nine-Power Treaty”); Treaty between the 
United States of America, the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan Agreeing to a 
limitation of Naval Armament, Feb. 6, 1922, 43 Stat. 1655, 25 L.N.T.S. 202 (commonly 
referred to as the “Five-Power Treaty”); Treaty between the United States of America, 
the British Empire, France, and Japan Relating to Their Insular Posessions and Insular 
Dominions in the Pacific Ocean, Dec. 13, 1921, 43 Stat. 1646, 25 L.N.T.S. 183 
(commonly referred to as the “Four-Power Treaty”). 
208. See BUELL, supra note 26. 
209. See id. at 205. Of the two U.S. members on the subcommittee, one was 
Brigadier General Amos Fries of the U.S. Army’s Chemical Warfare Service. See Editorial, 
The Suppressed Report, 17 J. INDUS. & ENGINEERING CHEMISTRY 662, 662 (1925); see also 
supra note 120. 
210. See Editorial, supra note 209, at 662 (reproducing a copy of the report). 
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could be no limitation on their use against the armed forces of 
the enemy, ashore or afloat.”211  
The advisory committee to the U.S. delegation, however, 
reported that poison gas was “abhorrent to civilization . . . a 
cruel, unfair and improper use of science, [and] demoralizing to 
‘the better instincts of humanity.’”212 The advisory committee 
resolved that “chemical warfare, including the use of gases, 
whether toxic or nontoxic, should be prohibited by international 
agreement, and should be classed with such unfair methods of 
warfare as poisoning wells, introducing germs of disease, and 
other methods that are abhorrent in modern warfare.”213 The 
U.S. delegation to the conference rejected the subcommittee’s 
advice and, following a presentation by Secretary of State Charles 
Evans Hughes, Elihu Root214 introduced the following resolution 
on January 6, 1922:215 
The use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or analogous liquids 
or other gases and all materials, or devices having been justly 
condemned by the general opinion of the civilized world and 
 
211. BUELL, supra note 26, at 208 (quoting the public subcommittee report) 
(emphasis omitted). A full copy of the report can be found in Text of the Conference 
Discussions, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 1922, at 3. 
212. Id. at 206. This committee was appointed by President Harding to represent 
public opinion and included among its members, General John Pershing, the 
commander of the American Expeditionary Force in 1917–1918, Herbert Hoover, 
Samuel Gompers, the Assistant Secretaries of the Navy and of War, and an 
undersecretary of state. Id. n.9. For a list of all the members on the committee, see S. 
DOC. NO. 67-126, at 785 (1922). 
213. Id. at 208. The advisory committee reasoned that while use of lethal gas 
against military opponents might be legal, the potential harm far outweighed any utility. 
It added that “[t]he committee is of the opinion that the conscience of the American 
people has been profoundly shocked by the savage use of scientific discoveries for 
destruction rather than construction,” and that whatever the views of technical experts 
“the committee feels the American representatives would not be doing their duty in 
expressing the conscience of the American people were they to fail in insisting upon the 
total abolition of chemical warfare . . . whether against combatant or noncombatant.” Id. 
at 386. 
214. Former Secretary of War (1899–1904) and Secretary of State (1905–1909) of 
the United States. See generally ELIHU ROOT, ADDRESSES ON INTERNATIONAL SUBJECTS 
(1916). 
215. See James, supra note 26 (“Mr. Hughes . . . recommended that the report of 
the Conference Experts’ Committee on Poison Gas, which declared it unwise to try to 
prohibit its use, be set aside, and that the conference act on a report of a subcommittee 
of the American Advisory Committee, recommending the ban on gas warfare . . . . Mr. 
Hughes then asked Mr. Root present, on behalf of the American delegation, a 
resolution for the abolition of gas warfare.”). For a summary of the speech delivered by 
Charles Evans Hughes, see Text of the Conference Discussions, supra note 202. 
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a prohibition of such use having been declared in treaties to 
which a majority of the civilized world are parties—now, to 
the end that this prohibition shall be universally accepted as 
a part of international law, binding alike the conscience and 
practice of nations, the signatory powers declare their assent 
to such a prohibition . . . .216 
Note that the emphasized language differs significantly from the 
Versailles treaty.217 Apparently, there was a scrivener’s error in 
the copying of Versailles article 171, or Root erred in its reading. 
By the time the treaty was signed, however, article 5 of the 
Washington Submarine Treaty was again congruent with 
Versailles. It provides: 
The use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, 
and all analogous liquids, materials or devices, having been 
justly condemned by the general opinion of the civilized 
world and a prohibition of such use having been declared in 
treaties to which a majority of the civilized Powers are 
parties, The Signatory Powers, to the end that this 
prohibition shall be universally accepted as a part of 
international law, binding alike the conscience and practice 
of nations, the signatory powers declare their assent to such a 
prohibition, agree to be bound thereby as between 
themselves, and invite all civilized nations to adhere 
thereto.218 
Thus, the Versailles language was fully restored in the 1922 
Treaty. It was that language which was incorporated into the 
 
216. S. DOC. NO. 67-126, at 388 (1922) (emphasis added). A full copy of this 
resolution can also be found in James, supra note 26. 
217. Compare S. DOC. NO. 67-126, at 388 (1922) (“The use in war of asphyxiating, 
poisonous or analogous liquids or other gases and all materials, or devices having been 
justly condemned by the general opinion of the civilized world and a prohibition of such 
use having been declared in treaties . . . .”), with Washington SubmarineTreaty, supra 
note 203, art. V (“The use of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and all analogous 
liquids, materials, or devices being prohibited . . . .”). Root told the conference that he 
was introducing language that “represented the most extraordinary consensus of 
opinion that one could well find upon any international subject.” See Text of the 
Conference Discussions, supra note 202. He also indicated that it was borrowed from the 
Treaty of Versailles, but reflected in many of the treaties that ended the Great War. See 
id. In fact it was only the Versailles language from article 171, and that, of course, was 
not entirely correct. See discussion of variations in treaties ending World War I, supra 
Part II.A.1.d.i. 
218. Washington SubmarineTreaty, supra note 203, art. V. 
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Geneva Gas Protocol in 1925, and which in turn was reiterated as 
binding by the CWC.219 
iii. The 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol 
The Geneva Protocol of 1925 placed the 1922 Washington 
use ban on the table for all states.220 The U.S. Senate, however, 
after the country acted as the prime proponent of a ban, refused 
to ratify the protocol at that time.221 
Once again, the 1925 protocol articulated an attempt to ban 
use in war of chemical weapons, and once again the “devices 
versus processes”222 question arises. The language of the protocol 
tracks the 1922 treaty: 
 
219. Chemical Weapons Convention, supra note 10, pmbl. 
220. Geneva Protocol, supra note 23. It is worth remembering that the 1922 treaty 
and the 1925 protocol were drafted in light of a wide effort to end all international 
armed conflict. See generally JAMES SHOTWELL, PLANS AND PROTOCOLS TO END WAR, 
HISTORICAL OUTLINE AND GUIDE, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE 
(1925). 
221. See HARRIS & PAXMAN, supra 120, at 47–48 (“The United States Chemical 
Warfare Service launched a highly effective lobby . . . . As has often happened since, the 
fight for chemical weapons was represented as a fight for general military preparedness. 
Senators joined the CWS campaign, among them the chairman of the Committee on 
Military Affairs who opened his attack on ratification in the senate debate with a 
reference to the 1922 Washington Treaty: ‘I think it is fair to say that in 1922 there was 
much of hysteria and much of misinformation concerning chemical warfare.’”). As 
noted earlier, the United States eventually ratified the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol in 
1975, supra note 22, and its binding nature was, of course, reiterated in the CWC. 
Chemical Weapons Conventions, supra note 10, pmbl. It is interesting to note that prior 
to ratification, the acting director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency 
testified to the U.S. Senate that: 
This is an area in which a fairly substantial amount of research has now begun 
to be undertaken and hopefully on the basis of that we would be able to 
approach this problem on the basis of the 1967 study and not on the basis of a 
1925 convention, no disrespect intended to the drafters of the 1925 convention, they 
did the best they could with the information available at their disposal, but the total 
activity should be looking at the problem of a new situation rather than the 
same amount of energy expended on the question of whether or not we 
should ratify the 1925 convention. 
Policy Implications of Armament and Disarmament Problems: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Disarmament of the Comm. on Foreign Relations, 90th Cong. 180 (1967) [hereinafter 1967 S. 
Hearings on Arms] (testimony of Sen. Adrian S. Fisher) (emphasis added). 
222. As noted above, variations in the language of the treaties, and in the two 
official text languages of French and English, have in the past been the subject of 
considerable international discord. See supra Part II.A.4.a. These problems carried over 
into the 1925 protocol. For example, the 1925 Geneva Protocol was long the subject of a 
dispute over whether it banned “tear” gasses: The English version of the protocol stated 
that “the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases” was prohibited, while the 
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Whereas the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other 
gases, and of all analogous liquids materials or devices, has 
been justly condemned by the general opinion of the 
civilized world; and Whereas the prohibition of such use has 
been declared in Treaties to which the majority of Powers of 
the world are Parties; and To the end that this prohibition 
shall be universally accepted as a part of International Law, 
binding alike the conscience and the practice of 
nations . . . .223 
Similarly, the official French version is, in all operative 
language, precisely the same as the 1922 treaty: 
Considerant que l’emploi à la guerre de gaz asphyxiants, toxiques 
ou similaires, ainsi que de tous liquides, matières ou procédés 
analogues, a été à juste titre condamné par l’opinion générale du 
monde civilisé, CONSIDERANT que l’interdiction de cet emploi a 
été formulée dans les traités auxquels sont Parties la plupart des 
Puissances du monde, DANS LE DESSEIN de faire universellement 
reconnaître comme incorporée au droit international cette 
interdiction, qui s’impose également à la conscience et à la pratique 
des nations . . . .224 
 
French version referred to “l’emploi a la Guerra de gaz asphyxiants, toxiques ou similares.” See 
Geneva Protocol, supra note 23. For the interpretation that the protocol did not ban tear 
gas, the United States, which argued for the legality of use of “non-lethal gases” in war, 
relied on the word “similares” (similar) in the French version of the protocol, rather 
than “autres” which would have been a direct translation of the word “other,” as in the 
English version. See VERWEY, supra note 170, at 226–27 (discussing implications arising 
from apparently conflicting texts in the French and English versions of the protocol). 
The United States took the position that while “other” gases might include tear gases, 
they were not “similar” to toxic or asphyxiating gases. See id. at 227; cf. Limitations on Use 
of Chemical and Bacteriological Agents in Warfare: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Disarmament of the Committee on Foreign Relations, 90th Cong. 55 (1967) [hereinafter 1967 
S. Hearings on Chemical Agents] (testimony of Cyrus Vance, U.S. Deputy Sec’y of Def.); 
1967 S. Hearings on Arms, supra note 221, at 62 (statement of Cyrus Vance, U.S. Deputy 
Sec’y of Def.) (stating that the United States has “used riot-control agents in Vietnam—
agents similar to those used by police forces throughout the world”); see also OFFICE OF 
PUB. AFFAIRS, U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY, INTERNATIONAL 
NEGOTIATIONS ON THE BIOLOGICAL—WEAPONS AND TOXIN CONVENTION 40 (1975) 
(“[T]he ambiguity of the protocol on riot-control agents had been recognized for 40 
years.”). See generally R. R. Baxter & Thomas Buergenthal, Legal Aspects of the Geneva 
Protocol of 1925, 64 AM. J. INT’L L. 853 (1970) (discussing the validity of the U.S. 
argument); George Bunn, Banning Poison Gas and Germ Warfare: Should the United States 
Agree?, 1969 WIS. L. REV. 375 (1969) (same). 
223. Geneva Protocol, supra note 23. 
224. Id. 
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The historical and textual analysis above225 is equally 
applicable here. There is simply no doubt that the authors had in 
mind, given their then current knowledge and environment, a 
concern that limiting the treaty to analogous liquids and 
materials might miss something that had already been used or 
which could be developed, and that the inclusion of “devices” 
was no accident. That conclusion is strongly supported by the 
French use of the word “procédés” in lieu of alternative 
phraseologies.226 As will be seen below, the 1925 protocol has 
been incorporated into newer treaties, but it has never ceased to 
bind either its signatories or other states as an expression of 
customary law.227 The protocol did not entirely eliminate use in 
war of toxic or asphyxiating chemical weapons, but, as the 
following discussion shows, their use was certainly curtailed after 
1925. 
iv. Practical Effect of the Protocol and Other Post-War Law After 
1925 
Although chemical stockpiles continued to grow long after 
the 1925 protocol entered into effect, their actual use in war was 
greatly curtailed.228 While there was some documented use, both 
before the protocol, the United Kingdom in Siberia (1919, 
arsenicals)229 and the Third Rif War (1924, mustard gas),230 and 
 
225. See discussion supra Part II.A.1.d.i. 
226. See discussion supra Part II.A.1.d.i. 
227. The United States, for example, even before ratification in 1975, repeatedly 
recognized the declaratory nature of the 1925 protocol. See 1967 S. Hearings on Chemical 
Agents, supra note 222, at 55 (testimony of Cyrus Vance, U.S. Deputy Sec’t of Def.) (“We 
supported the Unites States affirmative vote in the United Nations General Assembly . . . 
on a resolution calling on all nations to observe the principles and objectives of the 
Geneva protocol of 1925. We have observed these principles consistently since 1925, 
although the United States . . . did not ratify the Geneva protocol.”). 
228. See generally Julian Perry Robinson, The Negotiations on the Chemical Weapons 
Convention: A Historical Overview, in THE NEW CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION: 
IMPLEMENTATION AND PROSPECTS 17 (M. Bothe et al. eds., 1998). 
229. KETTLE, supra note 212, at 316. 
230. During the Third Rif War in Spanish Morocco between 1921 and 1927, the 
Spanish Army of Africa dropped chemical warfare agents in an attempt to put down the 
Berber rebellion. RUDIBERT KUNZ & ROLF-DIETER MÜLLER, GIFTGAS GEGEN ABD EL 
KRIM: DEUTSCHLAND, SPANIEN UND DER GASKRIEG IN SPANISCH-MAROKKO, 1922–1927 
(1990); cf. DAVID WOOLMAN, REBELS IN THE RIF: ABD EL KRIM AND THE RIF REBELLION 
(1968). 
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afterwards, Italy in Ethiopia (1936, mustard gas)231 and Japan in 
China (1937–1945, certainly mustard and biological warfare, 
possibly other gases),232 usage was generally limited to attacks by 
colonial powers on those with no means of reprisal who were 
viewed by the user as engaged in otherwise illegitimate warfare.233 
While there have been disputed allegations of various uses of 
chemical or toxic weapons as late as after World War II,234 
 
231. A.J. BARKER, THE RAPE OF ETHIOPIA 1936, 56–57 (1971) (“[W]hile Rome was 
rejecting the accusations, the Ethiopians were being systematically softened up with gas 
attacks . . . . [N]ot only was gas used throughout the war, but afterwards as well to break 
down the resistance of the Ethiopian freedom fighters.”). Much later, the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (“ICRC”) documented Italian use of mustard gas in a 
report filed by Doctor Marcel Junod of the ICRC delegation to Ethiopia: 
Junod also confronted the appalling reality of mustard gas and its effects: 
“That evening [18 March 1936] I had occasion to see with my own eyes an 
Italian aircraft spraying the ground with an oily liquid, dropping like fine rain 
and covering a huge area with thousands of droplets, each of which, when it 
touched the tissues, made a small burn, turning a few hours later into a blister. 
It was the blistering gas the British call mustard gas. Thousands of soldiers 
were affected by severe lesions due to this gas . . . .” 
Bernard Bridel, Les ambulances à croix rouge du CICR sous les gaz en Ethiopie [ICRC Red 
Cross Ambulances Gassed in Ethiopia], LE TEMPS (Switz.), Aug. 13, 2003, partially translated 
at http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/5RUHGM. 
232. According to historians Yoshiaki Yoshimi and Seiya Matsuno, chemical 
weapons were authorized by specific orders given by Emperor Shōwa himself, 
transmitted by the chief of staff of the army. For example, the emperor authorized the 
use of toxic gas on 375 separate occasions during the battle of Wuhan from August to 
October of 1938. They were also used during the invasion of Changde. Those orders 
were transmitted either by Prince Kotohito Kan’in or General Hajime Sugiyama. See 
HERBERT P. BIX, HIROHITO AND THE MAKING OF MODERN JAPAN 361 (2000) (citing 
Yoshiaki Yoshimi & Seiya Matsuno, Dokugasusen Kankei Shiryō II,Kaisetsu [Materials on 
Poison Gas Warfare], in KAISETSU, HŌKAN 2, JŪGONEN SENSÔ GOKUHI SHIRYŌSHŪ (Funi 
Shuppankan 1997) (Japan)). Japan deployed biological weapons against the Chinese a 
number of times through “Unit 731” of the Japanese Imperial Army. See id. at 364. See 
generally DANIEL BARENBLATT, A PLAGUE UPON HUMANITY: THE HIDDEN HISTORY OF 
JAPAN’S BIOLOGICAL WARFARE PROGRAM (2004). Unused Japanese mustard gas stocks in 
northeast China were inadvertently released as recently as August 2003, injuring a 
number of civilians. The Chinese government apparently claims an estimate of over 
700,000 remaining Japanese chemical munitions. See Wu Gang & Li Jing, Japanese 
Weapon Container Dug Up, CHINA DAILY (English ed.), May 26, 2004, at 1. 
233. See, e.g., Javier Espinosa, Gas Mostaza Sobre el Rif [Mustard Gas on the Rif], EL 
MUNDO (Madrid), Apr. 18, 2001, http://www.elmundo.es/2001/04/18/sociedad/
983737.html (referencing a telegram sent by the then-High Commissioner of Spanish 
Morocco Damaso Berenguer to the Spanish minister of War in the Third Rif War on 
August 12, 1921, stating: “I have been obstinately resistant to the use of suffocating gases 
against these indigenous peoples but after what they have done, and of their treasonous 
and deceptive conduct, I have to use them with true joy” (author’s translation)). 
234. There was speculation that Russians used chemical poisons in aerial offensives 
in East Asia. See, e.g., Yellow Rain, TIME, Sept. 14, 1981, at 22 (alleging Soviet use of “the 
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documented use by states seems to be limited to the Iran-Iraq 
War and to internal Iraqi conflicts. During this period, the Iraqi 
government attacked its own rebellious citizens and Iran.235 
 
chemical agent trichothecene toxin, known as T2.”). See generally STERLING SEAGRAVE, 
YELLOW RAIN: A JOURNEY THROUGH THE TERROR OF CHEMICAL WARFARE (1982) 
(documenting the alleged uses of T2 by the Russian military). Egyptian bombers 
allegedly used mustard and other nerve agents in Yemen against royalist rebels during 
the early- and mid-1960s. See TUCKER, supra, note 42, at 190–96 (discussing Egypt’s 
alleged use of chemical agents). 
235. This is documented by the respected international security analysis group 
GlobalSecurity: 
In 1982, early in the Iran-Iraq War, the Iraqis used riot control agents to 
repel Iranian attacks. They progressed to the use of CW agents in mid-1983 
with mustard, and in March 1984 with tabun (the first use ever of a nerve 
agent in war). The Iraqis continued to use chemical weapons until the end of 
hostilities in August 1988; in addition they introduced the nerve agents sarin 
and GF late in the war. 
In March 1986, UN Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar formally 
accused Iraq of using chemical weapons against Iran. Citing the report of four 
chemical warfare experts whom the UN had sent to Iran in February and 
March 1986, the secretary general called on Baghdad to end its violation of the 
1925 Geneva Protocol on the use of chemical weapons. The UN report 
concluded that “Iraqi forces have used chemical warfare against Iranian 
forces”; the weapons used included both mustard gas and nerve gas. The 
report further stated that “the use of chemical weapons appear[ed] to be 
more extensive [in 1981] than in 1984.” Iraq attempted to deny using 
chemicals, but the evidence, in the form of many badly burned casualties 
flown to European hospitals for treatment, was overwhelming. By July 1986 it 
was estimated that Iraqi chemical warfare was responsible for about 10,000 
casualties. 
Although the Iraqis initially used chemical weapons to prevent defeat and 
to reduce battlefield losses, they later integrated CW attacks into combined-
armed operations designed to regain lost territory and to gain the offensive. 
Iraq’s use of CW in the war with Iran can be divided into three distinct phases: 
1. 1983 to 1986--used in a defensive role; typically to deflect Iranian 
human-wave assaults. In 1984 Iraq became the first nation to use a nerve 
agent on the battlefield when it deployed Tabun-filled aerial bombs 
during the Iran-Iraq war. Some 5,500 Iranians were killed by the nerve 
agent between March 1984 and March 1985. Tabun kills within minutes. 
Some 16,000 Iranians were reported killed by the toxic blister agent 
mustard gas between August 1983 and February 1986. 
2. 1986 to early 1988--iraq adapts use against Iran to disrupt Iranian 
offensive preparations. 
3. early 1988 to conclusion of the war-- Iraq integrated large nerve agent 
strikes into its overall offensive during the spring and summer of 1988 
leading to the ceasefire. 
Iran used chemical weapons late in the war, but never as extensively or 
successfully as Iraq. The success of Iraqi offensive operations in the southern 
sector in mid-1988 ultimately caused the Iranians to cease hostilities. The use 
of chemical weapons contributed to the success of these operations. 
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These attacks are the only general use of mustard gas in 
continuous and open conflict since 1918, and the first fully 
documented use of nerve gases in war. It is worth noting that in 
the case of both Japan and Iraq, the League of Nations and the 
United Nations (“U.N.”), respectively, took the position that 
those states were engaged in violations of the 1925 protocol.236 
The Iran-Iraq War started in 1982, and by early 1984 the 
press was reporting Iranian allegations regarding Iraqi use of 
toxic chemical weapons.237 By mid-1984, a U.N. investigating 
mission found evidence of Iraqi use of nerve agents.238 In early 
1986, in light of Iranian allegations of renewed Iraqi use of 
chemical weapons, and threats to retaliate in kind, the Security 
Council passed Resolution 582 noting that: 
[B]oth the Islamic Republic of Iran and Iraq are parties to 
the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of 
Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of 
Bacteriological Methods of Warfare signed at Geneva on 17 
June 1925 . . . [The Secretary-General] [a]lso deplores . . . in 
particular, the use of chemical weapons contrary to obligations 
under the 1925 Geneva Protocol . . . .239 
Immediately following the adoption of that resolution, Secretary-
General Perez de Cuellar instructed an investigating mission to 
 
Chemical Weapons Programs – Iraq Special Weapons Facilities, 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/iraq/cw-program.htm (last visited Apr. 3, 
2010). 
236. See, e.g., Pres. of the Sec. Council, Note by the President of the Security Council, 
U.N. Doc. S/17932 (Mar. 21, 1986) (“The Council strongly condemn this continued use 
of chemical weapons in clear violation of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 which prohibits 
the use in war of chemical weapons.”); Appeal by the Chinese Government, 19 L.N.O.J. 878 
(reminding Japan that “the use of toxic gases is a method of war condemned by 
international law, which cannot fail, should resort be had to it, to meet with the 
reprobation of the civilized world”). Japan, of course, had at that time withdrawn from 
the League, and simply ignored its call for negotiations. U.S. Department of State, 
Background Note: Japan, Sept. 2009, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/4142.htm 
(documenting Japan’s withdrawal from the League of Nations in 1933). 
237. See Bernard Gwertzman, U.S. Says Iraqis Used Poison Gas Against Iranians in 
Latest Battles, N.Y. TIMES, at A1; see also Julian Robinson & Jozef Goldblat, Chemical 
Warelfare in the Iraq-Iran War 1980-1988, SIPRI FACT SHEET, 1984, available at 
http://www.iranchamber.com/history/articles/chemical_warfare_iran_iraq_war.php. 
238. See Report of the Specialists Appointed by the Secretary-General to Investigate 
Allegations by the Islamic Republic of Iran Concerning the Use of Chemical Weapons, U.N. Doc. 
S/16433 (Mar. 26, 1984). 
239. S.C. Res. 582, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/582 (Feb. 24, 1986). (second emphasis 
added). 
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proceed to Iran.240 The mission submitted a report to the 
Secretary-General on March 7, 1986.241 Medical observations, 
chemical analysis, and examination of unexploded munitions 
demonstrated unquestionable and extensive Iraqi use of mustard 
gas.242 The Iraqi use of chemical warfare against Iran was the only 
extensive use of such weapons in a major war since World War I. 
However, it was not the only time that use of such weapons was 
considered. 
As has been discussed above, following World War I there 
was a considerable lobby in various militaries for the 
development of, possession of, and preparation to use chemical 
weapons.243 In addition to German weapon developments, the 
World War II Allies possessed and deployed extensive stocks of 
chemical weapons,244 and were prepared to use them if necessary 
(although the definition of “necessity” varied).245 
Following the end of World War II, the principal developers 
and stock-pilers of chemical weapons were the United States and 
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (“U.S.S.R.”).246 Both sides 
used prior German research and their own development work to 
test and deploy both the G-series of nerve gases, and the V-series 
of increasingly deadlier materials, both chemical and 
 
240. See The Secretary-General, Report of the Mission Dispatched by the Secretary-General 
to Investigate Allegations of the Use of Chemical Weapons in the Conflict Between the Islamic 
Republic of Iran and Iraq, ¶9, U.N. Doc. S/17911 (Mar. 12, 1986). 
241. See id. at ¶11. 
242. See id. at ¶ 20. 
243. See supra note 221 and accompanying text. 
244. For example, a U.S. Liberty ship, S.S. John Harvey, was sunk in the port of Bari, 
Italy, on December 2, 1943, with a cargo of 1350 tons of mustard gas on its way to Army 
forward storage depots. See RICK ATKINSON, THE DAY OF BATTLE: THE WAR IN SICILY AND 
ITALY 1943–1944, at 271–77 (2007). 
245. U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt was only prepared to use chemical weapons 
in reprisal for chemical attack. In fact, he overruled a plan to use mustard against the 
Japanese on Iwo Jima. See COLONEL JOSEPH H. ALEXANDER, CLOSING IN: MARINES IN THE 
SEIZURE OF IWO JIMA 48 (1994). In contrast, U.K. Prime Minister Winston Churchill 
several times urged the use of mustard gas, stating, “I want a cold-blooded calculation 
made as to how it would pay us to use poison gas, by which I mean principally 
mustard . . . . I want the matter studied in cold blood by sensible people and not by that 
particular set of psalm-singing uniformed defeatists which one runs across now here now 
there.” See Bernstein, supra note 110. The British were fully prepared to do so to repel a 
German invasion on the beaches. See Christopher Bellamy, Sixty Secret Mustard Gas Sites 
Uncovered, INDEP. (London), Jun. 4, 1996, at 2. 
246. See TUCKER, supra note 42, at 154. There was other participants in the race, 
including France, the People’s Republic of China, and the United Kingdom. See id. at 
153. 
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biological.247 Eventually, the following factors pushed the main 
actors towards signing and ratifying two new conventions: (1) the 
increasing and real possibility of actual use in warfare; (2) 
accidental releases;248 (3) criminal or inadvertent transfers of 
chemical or biological weapons to other countries or non-state 
actors;249 and (4) and the possibility of independent development 
and deployment by terrorists.250 
2. 1972 Bacteriological and Toxin Weapons Convention 
On April 10, 1972, the BWC opened for signature. After 
twenty-two governments deposited their instruments of 
ratification the treaty entered into force on March 26, 1975.251 It 
was the first multilateral disarmament treaty banning an entire 
class of weapons.252 As of February 2010, the BWC had 163 states 
parties and thirteen signatories.253 There are still as of yet 
nineteen states that have neither signed nor ratified the BWC.254 
 
247. See id. at 154. 
248. See KEN ALIBEK & STEPHEN HANDELMAN, BIOHAZARD: THE CHILLING TRUE 
STORY OF THE LARGEST COVERT BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS PROGRAM IN THE WORLD—TOLD 
FROM INSIDE BY THE MAN WHO RAN IT 71–76 (1999) (explaining the accidental release 
by the U.S.S.R. of weaponized anthrax at Sverdlovsk—now Yekaterinburg—on April 2, 
1979). This release occurred after the U.S.S.R had already ratified the BWC. See infra 
note 252. This situation represents one aspect of the verification and enforcement 
problems implicit in any arms control treaty of this nature. 
249. See MICHAEL JOHN GARCIA, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV., BIOLOGICAL AND 
CHEMICAL WEAPONS: CRIMINAL SANCTIONS AND FEDERAL REGULATIONS 4–8 (2004); see 
also Treasa Dunworth et al., National Implementation of the Biological Weapons Convention, 
11 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 93 (2006); Int’l Crisis Group, North Korea’s Chemical and 
Biological Weapons Programs, ICG Asia Report No. 167 (2009). 
250. See TUCKER, supra, note 42 at 333; see also Kyle B. Olson, Aum Shinrikyo: Once 
and Future Threat?, 5 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 513 (1999). 
251. See Biological Weapons Convention, supra note 13, art. XIV(3); see also BWC 
Implementation Support Unit, Office for Disarmament Affairs, Biological Weapons 
Convention: Background Information (n.d.), available at http://www.unog.ch/
80256edd006b8954/(httpassets)/699b3ca8c061d490c1257188003b9fee/$file/
bwc-background_inf.pdf. 
252. Banning an entire class of weapons stands in contrast to banning types of 
weapons, such as the ban against exploding bullets as required under the St. Petersburg 
Convention of 1868. Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive 
Projectiles Under 400 Grammes Weight, Nov. 29–Dec. 11, 1868, 18 Martens Nouveau 
Recueil (ser. 1) 474 [hereinafter St. Petersburg Declaration]. 
253. See Membership of the Biological Weapons Convention, http://www.unog.ch/
80256ee600585943/(httppages)/7be6cbbea0477b52c12571860035fd5c (last visited Apr. 
3, 2010). 
254. See id. 
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The United Kingdom, United States, and Russian Federation are 
the BWC’s depositaries.255 
States parties to the BWC undertake “never in any 
circumstances to develop, produce, stockpile, or otherwise 
acquire or retain” the following class of substances: 
microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their 
origin or method of production, of types and in quantities 
that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or 
other peaceful purposes; [or] weapons, equipment or means 
of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile 
purposes or in armed conflict.256 
As noted above, both the BWC and the CWC incorporate the text 
of the Geneva Protocol.257 That incorporation is important for 
several reasons discussed above,258 but it also operates as a gap-
filler in any potential areas of doubt where an argument might 
be made that an engineered virus was not the equivalent of 
nanomachines,259 and not yet a living thing intended to fall 
within the BWC.260 In fact, the BWC and CWC overlap because 
they both incorporate the Geneva Protocol and because they 
both cover toxins.261 This overlap and incorporation must inform 
 
255. See Biological Weapons Convention, supra note 13, art. XIV(2). 
256. See id. 
257. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
258. See supra notes 24–27 and accompanying text. 
259. At least some experts have informed the Author that engineered viruses are, 
for all intents and purposes, nanomachines. This information was obtained at a 
conference with the Author on July 8, 2009, in Washington D.C., in which he agreed to 
keep confidential the names of participants and specific quotations. 
260. For two reasons, there is no doubt the BWC could be fairly interpreted to 
include even engineered viruses: 1) the inclusion of smallpox within the BWC even 
though a virus is not per se a living thing; 2) the generally accepted scientific conclusion 
that a virus is in fact a biological entity. See Robert Edwards & Forest Rohwe, Viral 
Metagenomics, 3 NATURE REVIEWS MICROBIOLOGY 504 (2005). Given the potentially grave 
consequences of the use of engineered viruses as weapons, it is important that we 
interpret the BWC as covering their usage for banned purposes. 
261. There is overlap between biological warfare and chemical warfare as the use in 
war of toxins, whether produced by living organisms, or otherwise, is banned under the 
provisions of both the BWC and the CWC. Considerable interpretative value may be 
found in definitional section of the relevant U.S. statute. 18 U.S.C. § 178 2–4 (2006) 
defines criminally banned biological weapons:  
(2) the term "toxin" means the toxic material or product of plants, animals, 
microorganisms (including, but not limited to, bacteria, viruses, fungi, 
rickettsiae or protozoa), or infectious substances, or a recombinant or 
synthesized molecule, whatever their origin and method of production, and 
includes— 
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the upcoming analysis on application to new and developing 
nanomaterials. 
3. 1993 Chemical Warfare Convention 
The CWC was the culmination of a long period of 
international negotiation.262 It was opened for signature on 
January 13, 1993,263 and entred into force on April 29, 1997, after 
the sixty-fifth state party deposited its ratification instrument six 
months earlier.264 As of February 2010, the treaty has 188 states 
parties and two signatories.265 
The CWC is designed to eliminate an entire category of 
weapons of mass destruction by prohibiting the development, 
production, acquisition, stockpiling, retention, transfer, and use 
of chemical weapons.266 Excepted from this general prohibition 
 
(A) any poisonous substance or biological product that may be 
engineered as a result of biotechnology produced by a living organism; or  
(B) any poisonous isomer or biological product, homolog, or derivative of 
such a substance; 
(3) the term "delivery system" means— 
(A) any apparatus, equipment, device, or means of delivery specifically 
designed to deliver or disseminate a biological agent, toxin, or vector; or  
(B) any vector; 
(4) the term "vector" means a living organism, or molecule, including a 
recombinant or synthesized molecule, capable of carrying a biological agent or 
toxin to a host 
Id. 
262. See United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs, http://www.un.org/
Depts/dda/WMD/cwc/ (last visited Apr. 3, 2010) (specifically, “a decade of long and 
painstaking negotiations”). 
263. See Status of the CWC, http://treaties.un.org/pages/
viewdetails.aspx?mtdsg_no=XXVI-3&chapter=26&lang=en (last visited Apr. 3, 2010). 
Even before the CWC was opened for signature, the U.N. General Assembly passed a 
resolution on November 30, 1992 that read, “Bearing in mind the Final Declaration of 
the Conference of States Parties to the 1925 Geneva Protocol and Other Interested States, held 
in Paris from 7 to 11 January 1989, in which participating States stressed their 
determination to prevent any recourse to chemical weapons by completely eliminating 
them.” G.A. Res. 47/39, pmbl., U.N. Doc. A/RES/47/39 (Nov. 30, 1992) (emphasis 
added). 
264. See Chemical Weapons Convention, supra note 10, art. XXI(1); see also Status 
of the CWC, supra note 263. 
265. See Status of the CWC, supra note 263. 
266. Chemical Weapons Convention, supra note 10, art. I(1) State parties are also 
obligated under Article 1 to destroy all existing stockpiles of chemical weapons, 
chemical weapons abandoned in the territory of another state party, and chemical 
weapon production facilities. See id. art. I(2)–(4). Article 2 of the CWC includes key 
definitions for the terms “chemical weapons” and “toxic chemicals.” See supra note 33. 
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are legal uses intended for peaceful purposes.267 The treaty’s 
categorical prohibition of chemical weapons is administered by 
the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons 
(“OPCW”),268 which conducts inspection of military and 
industrial plants in all of the member nations, and works with 
stockpile countries. All parties are also required to submit a 
declaration concerning their possession of current chemical 
weapons, old chemical weapons, and production facilities upon 
sighning the treaty.269 
The CWC identifies three classes of controlled chemicals 
which can either be used as weapons or in the manufacture of 
weapons.270 Classification is based on the quantities of the 
substance produced commercially for legitimate purposes.271 
Each class is split into two parts: part A covers chemicals that can 
be used directly as weapons and part B extends coverage to 
chemicals useful in the manufacture of chemical weapons.272 The 
annexes and schedules incorporated within the CWC provide the 
criteria for defining these groups of chemicals.273 Chemicals 
listed in schedule 1 have few or no uses outside of chemical 
weapons;274 while production or use of these chemicals may be 
permissible for research, medical, pharmaceutical, or chemical 
 
267. Chemical Weapons Convention, supra note 10, art. VI (“Each State Party has 
the right, subject to the provisions of this Convention, to develop, produce, otherwise 
acquire, retain, transfer and use toxic chemicals and their precursors for purposes not 
prohibited under this Convention.”). The convention goes on to define “purposes not 
prohibited under this convention” as “(a) Industrial, agricultural, research, medical, 
pharmaceutical or other peaceful purposes; (b) Protective purposes, namely those 
purposes directly related to protection against toxic chemicals and to protection against 
chemical weapons; (c) Military purposes not connected with the use of chemical 
weapons and not dependent on the use of the toxic properties of chemicals as a method 
of warfare; (d) Law enforcement including domestic riot control purposes.” See id. art. 
II(9); see also S. Exec. Res. 75, 105th Cong. (1997) (“[R]equiring the President to certify 
to Congress on an annual basis that “the legitimate commercial activities and interests of 
chemical, biotechnology, and pharmaceutical firms in the United States are not being 
significantly harmed by the limitations of the Convention on access to, and production 
of, those chemicals and toxins listed in Schedule 1.”). 
268. Chemical Weapons Convention, supra note 10, art. VIII(A). 
269. See id., art. III(1). 
270. See id., Annex on Chemicals. 
271. See id., sec. A. 
272. See id., sec. B. 
273. See id. 
274. See id., sec. A(1). Examples of schedule 1 chemicals are mustard gas, nerve 
agents, and substances solely used as precursor chemicals in their manufacture. See id., 
sec. B, sched. 1. 
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weapon defense testing purposes, production above one 
hundred grams per year must be declared to the OPCW.275 Each 
country is limited to possessing a maximum of one ton of these 
materials.276 Chemicals listed in schedule 2 have legitimate small-
scale applications;277 manufacture of these chemicals must be 
declared, and export of these chemicals to non-CWC countries is 
limited.278 Chemicals listed in schedule 3 have large-scale 
industrial uses apart from chemical weapons.279 Plants that 
manufacture more than thirty tons of schedule 3 chemicals per 
year must declare the produced quantity and subject themselves 
to inspection; additionally, there are restrictions on export of 
schedule 3 chemicals to non-CWC countries.280 
The treaty also deals with “discrete organic compounds.”281 
Unless a plant solely produces explosives or hydrocarbons, the 
OPCW must be informed of and may inspect any plant 
producing or expecting to produce more than two hundred tons 
of discrete organic compounds per year, or thirty tons if the 
chemical contains phosphorus, sulfur, or fluorine. 
A U.N. publication on disarmament negotiations accurately 
reports that: 
[T]he Geneva Protocol of 1925 and the Biological Warfare 
Convention of 1972 are relatively simple as far as their 
content and mechanisms of implementation are concerned. 
It became increasingly clear at the beginning of the 1970s 
that such a simple approach to a comprehensive ban on 
chemical weapons was not acceptable to some countries, 
particularly the United States and the United Kingdom. One 
of the reasons given was that chemical weapons had a higher 
military value than biological . . . . Therefore, especially 
Western countries believed that international verification of 
compliance with a total prohibition of chemical weapons 
 
275. See id., Annex on Implimentation and Verification, pt. VI. 
276. See id. 
277. See id., Annex on Chemicals, sec. A(2). 
278. See id., Annex on Implementation and Verification, pt. VII. 
279. See id., Annex on Chemicals, sec. A(3). For example, phosgene is a precursor 
in the manufacture of many legitimate organic materials. See id., Annex on 
Implementation and Verification, pt. VII. 
280. See id. 
281. Id., pt. IX(A). The United States defines discrete organic chemicals as any 
carbon compounds apart from long chain polymers, oxides, sulfides and metal 
carbonates. See U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Unscheduled Discrete Organic Chemicals, 
http://www.cwc.gov/index_chemicals_udoc.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2010). 
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should be more intrusive in order to ensure the security of 
all parties to the agreement.282 
All parties to the CWC agree never to develop, produce, acquire, 
possess, transfer, prepare to use, or use chemical weapons.283 
Through its detailed definitions, its declaration requirement,284 
and the OPCW, the CWC creates a regime with very broad reach; 
the incorporation of the Geneva Protocol and the BWC’s parallel 
obligations greatly amplify the probability that most 
nanotechnology products with toxic or poisonous application in 
war will fall within the CWC’s regime. A number of other 
potentially applicable treaties and international law doctrines are 
worth at least a brief mention here as well. 
B. Other Potentially Applicable Treaties and Doctrines 
In addition to the treaties discussed above, a number of 
other treaties and binding principles of international law may 
impact nanoparticles and nanomimics and their use as weapons 
of war.285 There are several treaties that, although not facially 
applicable to nanobots, may nevertheless impact their use in 
warfare. Similarly, there are also several general doctrines which 
may bear on the use of nanobots that are worth mentioning. 
1. Geneva Conventions III and IV, and Additional Protocol I of 
1977 
The Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of 
Prisoners of War (“Geneva Convention III”)286 and the Geneva 
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilians (“Geneva 
Convention IV”)287 include several articles that generally impact 
gas warfare in the context of prisoners of war (“POWs”). In 
particular, Geneva Convention III requires continued gas 
 
282. BERNAUER, supra note 147, at 1. 
283. See, e.g., Chemical Weapons Convention, supra note 10, art I. 
284. See id., art. III. 
285. See generally Kelly, supra note 139. 
286. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War; Aug. 12, 
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva Convention III]. 
287. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of 
War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva Convention IV]. 
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protection for POWs,288 and Geneva Convention IV requires gas 
protection for internees.289  
 
288. Article 18 of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of 
War (“Geneva Convention III”) states the following: 
[A]ll effects and articles of personal use, except arms, horses, military 
equipment and military documents, shall remain in the possession of prisoners 
of war, likewise their metal helmets and gas masks and like articles issued for 
personal protection. Effects and articles used for their clothing or feeding 
shall likewise remain in their possession, even if such effects and articles 
belong to their regulation military equipment. 
Geneva Convention III, supra note 286, art. 18. Note that the ICRC interprets Geneva 
Convention III as specifically requiring gas protection for prisoners of war: 
[T]he requirement that prisoners of war must have shelters against air 
bombardment “to the same extent as the local civilian population” implies 
that . . . shelters must be supplied for prisoners of war in the same conditions 
as for the civilian population . . . . If civilian workers employed in a particular 
industry are issued with special equipment for use during air-raids (gas masks, 
protective clothing, etc.), such equipment must also be made available to prisoners of 
war. 
INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE THIRD GENEVA CONVENTION 
RELATIVE TO THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR 188(Jean S. Pictet ed., 1960) 
(emphasis added) (quoting Geneva Convention III, supra note 286, art. 23). 
289. Article 85 of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Civilians 
states the following: 
[T]he Detaining Power is bound to take all necessary and possible measures to 
ensure that protected persons shall, from the outset of their internment, be 
accommodated in buildings or quarters which afford every possible safeguard 
as regards hygiene and health, and provide efficient protection against the 
rigors of the climate and the effects of the war. 
Geneva Convention IV, supra note 287, art. 85. Additionally, article 88 states: 
[I]n all places of internment exposed to air raids and other hazards of war, 
shelters adequate in number and structure to ensure the necessary protection 
shall be installed. In case of alarms, the measures internees shall be free to 
enter such shelters as quickly as possible, excepting those who remain for the 
protection of their quarters against the aforesaid hazards. Any protective 
measures taken in favor of the population shall also apply to them. 
Id. art. 88. Furthermore, a 1991 U.N. report concerning Israel’s Geneva Convention IV 
obligations to Palestinians in the occupied territories with respect to gas protection 
informs this point of inquiry: 
Since the inception of the crisis, Iraq had repeatedly threatened to attack 
Israel with conventional and non-conventional weapons in the event of 
hostilities. As part of its civil defense procedures, Israel provided to its citizens 
gas masks and related equipment for protection against a chemical attack. The 
Israeli authorities also issued gas masks to the Palestinian residents of 
Jerusalem. United Nations officials in the area repeatedly expressed concern 
about the need of the Palestinian population as a whole to be given such 
equipment. On 14 January 1991, the Israeli High Court of Justice ruled as 
follows: “The Military Commander must indeed exercise equality in the area. 
He may not discriminate between residents. When the Military Commander has 
reached the conclusion that protective kits must be distributed to Jewish residents in the 
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Other relevant provisions are found in the 1977 Protocol 
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 
(“Protocol I”).290 Although a large part of Protocol I is at least in 
some way related to protecting against the utilization of any 
weapon,291 certain portions have particular application to the 
nanoweapons discussed here. This is particularly true of article 
36: 
[I]n the study, development, acquisition or adoption of a 
new weapon, means or method of warfare, a High 
 
area, protective kits must also be distributed to the area’s Arab residents.” The High 
Court ordered that 
“[F]irst, the 173,000 gas masks presently in stock in emergency 
warehouses must be immediately distributed to adults living in the areas 
surrounding Jerusalem, as well as in those areas near the Green Line. 
Second, all efforts possible should be made to secure masks for the 
children of these adults, and these masks must be distributed immediately 
upon their being obtained. Third, all residents of the area should receive 
masks immediately upon their being purchased by the Military 
Commander. The Military Commander must make every possible effort 
to secure these masks as soon as possible.” 
Despite the urgency expressed in the decision of the High Court, the 
distribution of gas masks from Israel’s existing stock proceeded slowly. The 
IDF spokesman’s office told B’Tselem, an Israeli human rights organization, 
that, as of 2 February 1991, 50,000 masks had been given out. Those that were 
distribution lacked the atropine and decontamination powder contained in 
the kits provided to Israeli citizens. Few, if any, masks were made available to 
Palestinian children. Furthermore, the vast majority of Palestinian detainees - 
many of whom are housed in tents and therefore more vulnerable in the event 
of an attack—were not given gas masks. For its part, UNRWA launched an 
appeal and received, from international donors, 62,000 masks for adults. Its 
distribution of the masks was slowed by the fact that the Israeli authorities 
requested that they be delivered on a house-to-house basis during the curfews. 
The Secretary-General, Report Submitted to the Security Council by the Secretary-General in 
Accordance with Resolution 681, ¶11, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/22472 
(Apr. 9, 1991) (emphasis added). 
290. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 
1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Protocol I]. While this Article largely deals with 
international armed conflicts and discusses only Protocol I, the principles articulated 
would be precisely the same in a non-international conflict—excluding police use of 
lacrimators—as in Iraqi use against its citizens. Thus, Protocol II’s strictures are at least 
worth noting as relevant. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 
August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed 
Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609. Notably, the United States is not party to 
Additional Protocol II of 1977. See States Parties / Signatories to Additional Protocol II 
of the Geneva Convention, http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/websign?readform&id=475 (last 
visited Apr. 3, 2010). 
291. See, e.g., id. arts. 35, 51, 57. 
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Contracting Party is under an obligation to determine 
whether its employment would, in some or all circumstances, 
be prohibited by this Protocol or by any other rule of 
international law applicable to the High Contracting Party.292 
While much of the discussion of nanoweapons presented here 
argues that they are simply old swine in new battles, to the extent 
that nanomimics do indeed represent anything that existing 
conventions do not cover, article 36 of Protocol 1 would clearly 
require advance determination of their legality. Other relevant 
provisions of Protocol I are are those relating to protection of the 
civilian populace,293 and precautions required in attacks.294 
 
292. See id. art. 36. 
293. Article 51 of Protocol I addresses protection of the civilian population:  
1. The civilian population and individual civilians shall enjoy general 
protection against dangers arising from military operations. To give effect to 
this protection, the following rules, which are additional to other applicable 
rules of international law, shall be observed in all circumstances. 
. . . 
4. Indiscriminate attacks are prohibited. Indiscriminate attacks are:  
(a) those which are not directed at a specific military objective;  
(b) those which employ a method or means of combat which cannot be 
directed at a specific military objective; or  
(c) those which employ a method or means of combat the effects of 
which cannot be limited as required by this Protocol; and consequently, 
in each such case, are of a nature to strike military objectives and civilians 
or civilian objects without distinction. 
5. Among others, the following types of attacks are to be considered as 
indiscriminate:  
(a) an attack by bombardment by any methods or means which treats as a 
single military objective a number of clearly separated and distinct 
military objectives located in a city, town, village or other area containing 
a similar concentration of civilians or civilian objects; and  
(b) an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian 
life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination 
thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct 
military advantage anticipated. 
Id. art. 51. 
294. Article 57 of Protocol I addresses precautions in attack: 
1. In the conduct of military operations, constant care shall be taken to spare 
the civilian population, civilians and civilian objects. 
2. With respect to attacks, the following precautions shall be taken:  
(a) those who plan or decide upon an attack shall:  
(i) do everything feasible to verify that the objectives to be attacked 
are neither civilians nor civilian objects and are not subject to special 
protection but are military objectives within the meaning of 
paragraph 2 of Article 52 and that it is not prohibited by the 
provisions of this Protocol to attack them;  
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2. The Early Poison Conventions 
The ban on poisonous weapons is an ancient one.295 
Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States 
in the Field (“General Order 100”) is the first comprehensive 
modern articulation regulating armed conflict.296 it provides, 
inter alia, that “the use of poison in any manner, be it to poison 
wells, or food, or arms, is wholly excluded from modern warfare. 
He that uses it puts him self [sic] out of the pale of the law and 
usages of war.”297 However, the stricture dates from well before 
the nineteenth century: 
[P]roscription of toxic weapons seems almost as ancient as 
the weapons themselves. The earliest surviving references to 
toxic warfare are probably those in the Indian epics . . . and 
it is to the Manu laws of India, which forbade the use of 
poison weapons, that a line of ancestry can be drawn . . . . It 
is a culturally diverse ancestry, reaching back not only 
through Hague and Roman law via Grotius, but also through 
the warfare regulations which the Saracens derived from the 
Koran.298 
 
(ii) take all feasible precautions in the choice of means and methods of attack 
with a view to avoiding, and in any event to minimizing, incidental loss or 
civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects;  
(iii) refrain from deciding to launch any attack which may be 
expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, 
damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be 
excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage 
anticipated;  
(b) an attack shall be cancelled or suspended if it becomes apparent that 
the objective is not a military one or is subject to special protection or that 
the attack may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury 
to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which 
would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military 
advantage anticipated;  
(c) effective advance warning shall be given of attacks which may affect 
the civilian population, unless circumstances do not permit. 3. When a 
choice is possible between several military objectives for obtaining a 
similar military advantage, the objective to be selected shall be that the 
attack on which may be expected to cause the least danger to civilian lives 
and to civilian objects. 
Id. art. 57 (emphasis added). 
295. See, e.g., supra note 1. 
296. See LIEBER,supra note 125. 
297. Id. art. 70. 
298. Robinson, supra note 228, at 17. 
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Thus, article 23(a) of the annex to the Hague Convention  
of 1907 Respecting the Laws and Customs of War (“Hargue 
Convention IV”) provides that “[i]t is especially forbidden to 
employ poison or poisoned weapons.”299 This language, however, 
must be balanced against its past interpretations, and states 
rejecting any applicability to poisonous or asphyxiating gases.300 
According to the International Court of Justice in the Nuclear 
Weapons Advisory Opinion, the “prime or even exclusive effect” of 
a weapon must be to poison in order to qualify as poisonous 
within the meaning of the annex to Hague Convention IV.301 
Because these agreements concerned toxic and asphyxiating 
gases and smokes, the early bans against poisons were ignored or 
distinguished by state usage,302 and in any case have been 
superseded by the Geneva Protocol, BWC, and CWC, which are 
now the recognized source of international law due to their 
specificity and effectiveness.303 
3. Conventional Weapons Convention 
The Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use 
of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be 
Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects 
(“Conventional Weapons Convention”)304 entered into force on 
December 2, 1983.305 The only potentially applicable portion of 
the Conventional Weapons Convention appears to be Amended 
Protocol II, which entered into force in 1998 (“Amended 
Protocol II”)306 and covers landmines, booby-traps, and “other 
 
299. Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Annex art. 
23(a), Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 205 Consul. T.S. 277 [hereinafter Hague Convention 
IV]. 
300. See Kelly, supra note 285, at 44. 
301. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 
I.C.J. 226, 248 (July 8). 
302. Cf. supra notes 132–44, 222 (discussing Germany's attempts to legitimize its 
use of chemical weapons under previous treaties and U.S. use of tear gas under the 1925 
Geneva Protocol). 
303. See CLIVE PARRY, THE SOURCES AND EVIDENCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 51–52 
(1965). 
304. See Conventional Weapons Convention, supra note 164. 
305. See id. art. 5(1), (3); Status of the Conventional Weapons Convention, 
http://treaties.un.org/pages/viewdetails.aspx?src=treaty&mtdsg_no=xxvi-
2&chapter=26&lang=en (last visited Apr. 3, 2010). 
306. See Status of Amended Protocol II to the Conventional Weapons Convention, 
http://treaties.un.org/pages/viewdetails.aspx?src=treaty&mtdsg_no=xxvi-2-b&chapter=
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devices.”307 These are the most important elements of Amended 
Protocol II of the Conventional Weapons Convention: (1) use of 
landmines and booby-traps is highly regulated but not banned;308 
(2) anti-personnel landmines must be kept in clearly marked and 
protected minefields or be equipped with self-destruction and 
self-deactivation mechanisms that disarm and render the mines 
unusable after a relatively short period of time;309 (3) mines 
scattered by aircrafts, artillery, or missiles require self-destruction 
and deactivation mechanisms;310 (4) anti-personnel mines must 
be detectable by common mine detection equipment to enable 
their location and safe removal after a conflict;311 (5) mine 
clearing responsibility rests with the government controlling the 
territory where mines are located.312 
In the past, interest in mines from a chemical weapons 
perspective focused exclusively on their use as deployment 
devices; however, it is also interesting to look at some of the 
definitions in Amended Protocol II of the Conventional Weapons 
Convention. Most notably, “booby-trap” is defined more broadly 
than “mine.” The definition of mine is “a munition . . . designed 
to be exploded,” while the definition of booby-trap is “any device 
or material which is designed, constructed or adapted to kill or 
injure, and which functions unexpectedly when a person disturbs or 
approaches an apparently harmless object or performs an 
apparently safe act.”313 
The facial argument for coverage of nanomimic devices as 
booby-traps—at least in circumstances where they affect a person 
performing an apparently safe act, such as breathing—is actually 
 
26&lang=en. The seventy-six countries bound by the protocol include most, but not all, 
of the world’s major current or past landmine producers—China, India, Israel, Pakistan, 
Russia, and the United States—which have refused to join the Ottawa Convention 
banning anti-personnel landmines. See id.; see also  Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their 
Destruction, Sept. 18, 1997, 2056 U.N.T.S. 211. 
307. See Conventional Weapons Convention, supra note 164, Protocol II art. 1, as 
amended, May 3, 1996, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 105-1 (1997), 35 I.L.M. 1206 [hereinafter 
Amended Protocol II to the Conventional Weapons Convention]. 
308. See Amended Protocol II to the Conventional Weapons Convention, supra 
note 164, art. 3. 
309. See id. art. 3, Technical Annex ¶ 2. 
310. See id. art. 5, Technical Annex ¶ 1. 
311. See id. 
312. See id. art. 5(2). 
313. Id. art. 2(1), (4) (emphasis added). 
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rather compelling. Article 3 of Amended Protocol II, which 
prohibits deployment against civilians or in an indiscriminate 
fashion, bolsters this argument.314 
It would be ironic if a nanomachine were specifically 
designed to avoid coverage as a chemical weapon and 
incidentally fell within the coverage of another international ban. 
It is, however, a good point to keep in mind, for upon such 
ironies may the law be built. 
4. Doctrinal Violations 
Interestingly, the preamble of the 1925 Geneva Protocol 
states that “the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other 
gases, and of all analogous liquids materials or devices, has been 
 
314. Article 3 of Amended Protocol II articulates general restrictions on the use of 
mines, booby-traps, and other devices: 
1. This Article applies to: 
. . . 
(b) booby-traps; and  
(c) other devices. 
. . . 
3. It is prohibited in all circumstances to use any mine, booby-trap or other 
device which is designed or of a nature to cause superfluous injury or 
unnecessary suffering. 
. . . 
7. It is prohibited in all circumstances to direct weapons to which this Article 
applies, either in offence, defense or by way of reprisals, against the civilian 
population as such or against individual civilians or civilian objects. 
8. The indiscriminate use of weapons to which this Article applies is 
prohibited. Indiscriminate use is any placement of such weapons:  
(a) which is not on, or directed against, a military objective. In case of 
doubt as to whether an object which is normally dedicated to civilian 
purposes, such as a place of worship, a house or other dwelling or a 
school, is being used to make an effective contribution to military action, 
it shall be presumed not to be so used; or  
(b) which employs a method or means of delivery which cannot be 
directed at a specific military objective; or  
(c) which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury 
to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which 
would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military 
advantage anticipated. 
9. Several clearly separated and distinct military objectives located in a city, 
town, village or other area containing a similar concentration of civilians or 
civilian objects are not to be treated as a single military objective. 
Id. art 3. It bears mention that “other devices,” defined as manually-placed munitions 
and devices including improvised explosive devices designed to kill, injure, or damage 
and which are actuated manually, by remote control, or automatically after a lapse of 
time, probably does not include nanoweapons. 
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justly condemned by the general opinion of the civilized 
world,”315 and preamble of the CWC affirms that CWC signatories 
are “determined for the sake of all mankind, to exclude 
completely the possibility of the use of chemical weapons, 
through the implementation of the provisions of this 
Convention, thereby complementing the obligations assumed 
under the Geneva Protocol of 1925 . . . .”316 Those statements 
encapsulate the core of the humanitarian argument against gas 
weapons from their inception. The reader should be familiar 
with the basic doctrines of military necessity,317 proportionality,318 
unnecessary suffering,319 chivalry,320 general war crimes,321 
treachery,322 and general “humanitarian law”323 against which all 
new weapons are weighed. They are all relevant to any analysis. 
 
315. Geneva Protocol, supra note 23, pmbl. 
316. Chemical Weapons Convention, supra note 10, pmbl.  
317. See MYRES MCDOUGAL & FLORENTINO FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD 
PUBLIC ORDER 72 (1961) (defining military necessity as “such destruction, and only such 
destruction, as is necessary, relevant and proportionate to the prompt realization of 
legitimate military objectives”). According to the U.S.M.C. Law of War Deskbook, its 
elements include that the force used is (a) capable of being regulated; (b) necessary to 
achieve enemy submission as soon as possible, and consistent with military security 
requirements; (c) not greater than needed to achieve enemy submission (in terms of the 
overall conflict); and (d) is not otherwise prohibited. U.S.M.C. LAW OF WAR DESKBOOK 
(1992). 
318. See generally E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & RICHARD S. FRASE, PROPORTIONALITY 
PRINCIPLES IN AMERICAN LAW (2009). 
319. See, e.g., St. Petersburg Declaration, supra note 252 (prohibiting in certain 
instances “the employment of arms which uselessly aggravate the sufferings of disabled 
men, or render their death inevitable”). 
320. See U.S. DEP'T OF THE ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 27-10: THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE 
¶3 A (1956) (requiring that belligerents “conduct hostilities with regard for the 
principles of humanity and chivalry”). Sir Hersch Lauterpacht comments in Manual of 
Military Law, Part III, The Law of War on Land, that chivalry “demands a certain amount 
of fairness in offense and defense, and certain mutual respect between the opposing 
forces.” MANUAL OF MILITARY LAW, PART III: THE LAW OF WAR ON LAND 2 (1958). 
321. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2241 (2006) (defining war crimes). 
322. See, e.g., ERIC CASTREN, THE PRESENT LAW OF WAR AND NEUTRALITY 194 
(1954) (arguing that:“the use of [easily detectable] gas in warfare has had . . . not [yet] 
been treacherous, [b]ut when and if, as is likely, entirely odorless and invisible 
poisonous gases are invented, there will be no legal difference between the use of them 
and other poison.”). But see Kelly, supra note 139 (showing that Castren’s position was 
rejected by state practice). 
323. International humanitarian law is “the body of rules applicable in armed 
conflict which protect those not or no longer taking active part in hostilities [and] 
regulate permissible means and methods of warfare.” ICRC, Humanitarian Law, Human 
Rights and Refugee Law—Three Pillars (April 23, 2005), available at http://www.icrc.org/
web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/6T7G86. 
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They have also all been more than adequately discussed in the 
context of chemical warfare.324  
III. GOOD FAITH PRINCIPLE OF TREATY INTERPRETATION 
This Part is not intended to be a general treatise on treaty 
interpretation, or on any particular state’s treatment of treaty 
interpretation law.325 Rather, it is simply intended to articulate 
certain agreed-upon principles of good faith interpretation 
which should inform the application of current treaties to new 
and developing nanomaterials.326  
Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
provides that “a treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in 
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms 
of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and 
purpose.”327 The United States signed the Vienna Convention in 
1970328 and voluntarily follows many of its provisions, but it is yet 
to gain the advice and consent necessary for ratification within 
the U.S. Senate.329 Professor Evan Criddle contends that the 
United States is reluctant to ratify the Vienna Convention 
because the Supreme Court relies on domestic ratification 
materials,330 defers to Executive Branch interpretation, and U.S. 
 
324. See Kelly, supra note 139, at 47–52. 
325. See, e.g., JOHN NORTON MOORE, TREATY INTERPRETATION, THE CONSTITUTION 
AND THE RULE OF LAW (2001) (theorizing about treaty interpretation); RICHARD 
GARDINER, TREATY INTERPRETATION 147–48 (2008) (same); DEVELOPMENTS IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN TREATY MAKING (Rüdiger Wolfrum & Volker Röben eds., 2005) 
(same). 
326. Hanspeter Neuhold lists four requirements for a treaty to create an effective 
legal regime: (1) speed; (2) clarity and uniformity; (3) universality of participation; and 
(4) flexibility and adaptability. See Hanspeter Neuhold, The Inadequacy of Law-Making by 
International Treaties, in DEVELOPMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN TREATY MAKING, 
supra note 325, at 43. Regarding clarity and uniformity, Neuhold notes that a treaty may 
be ineffective “because its provisions are ambiguous, or because the obligations it 
imposes are not identical for all parties.” Id. 
327. Vienna Convention, supra note 24, art. 31. 
328. See Status of the VCLT, http://treaties.un.org/pages/viewdetailsiii.aspx?&src=
treaty&mtdsg_no=xxiii~1&chapter=23&lang=en (last visited Apr. 3, 2010). 
329. See Evan J. Criddle, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties in U.S. Treaty 
Interpretation, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 431, 434 (2004). 
330. The Vienna Convention rejects limiting reliance to traveaux preparatoires. See 
Vienna Convention, supra note 24, art. 32. 
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courts more broadly tend to construe treaties in light of domestic 
interests.331 
While U.S. courts are less likely than courts in many other 
states to rely solely on international source materials, they still 
espouse the underlying requirement of good faith treaty 
interpretation. In Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, the U.S. Supreme 
Court specifically relied on the good faith requirement: “[T]he 
United States ratified the [Vienna Convention on Consular 
Relations] with the expectation that it would be interpreted 
according to its terms.”332 The Court has also recognized the 
good faith requirement in treaties signed with Native American 
tribes. The Court in McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission, 
for instance, wrote, “It is circumstances such as these which have 
led this Court in interpreting Indian treaties, to adopt the 
general rule that ‘[d]oubtful expressions are to be resolved in 
favor of the weak and defenseless people who are the wards of 
 
331. See Criddle, supra note 329, at 454. Criddle specifically mentions the good 
faith requirement when discussing United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992): 
[A]lthough both the majority and dissent apparently accepted that the 
Extradition Treaty should be interpreted “in accordance with the ordinary 
meaning to be given the terms” and consistent with the treaty’s overarching 
“object and purpose,” neither seriously considered the Convention’s 
instruction to construe treaties “in good faith.” Informing this assessment of 
“good faith” is Article 31(3)(c)’s additional instruction, which enjoins courts 
to “take into account . . . [a]ny relevant rules of international law applicable to 
the relations between the parties.” Thus, a “good faith” treaty interpretation 
would account for “the general principle of international law,” discussed in 
Justice Rehnquist’s majority opinion, i.e., “that one government may not 
‘exercise its police power in the territory of another state.” The Vienna 
Convention incorporates this “general principle” into the Extradition Treaty 
by implication. Of course, the Vienna Convention’s interpretive framework 
does not operate mechanically, eliminating the need for courts to exercise 
“good faith” and sound judgment. Instead, the Vienna Convention’s function 
is primarily heuristic [i.e. a “rule of thumb” based on trial and error], 
channeling courts’ reasoning toward a circumscribed range of internationally 
acceptable treaty constructions. 
Criddle, supra note 329, at 494–95. 
332. Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 347 (2006) (quoting section 325 
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States  as stating that “An 
international agreement is to be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the 
ordinary meaning to be given to its terms in their context and in the light of its object 
and purpose”). Note that section 325 of the Restatement specifically follows article 31 of 
the Vienna Convention. Compare RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF 
THE UNITED STATES § 325 (1986), with Vienna Convention, supra note 24, art. 31. 
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the nation, dependent upon its protection and good faith.’”333 
The most recent word on treaty interpretation by the U.S. 
Supreme Court is found in Medellin v. Texas, where the Court 
held that an International Court of Justice ruling that a foreign 
national had not been informed of his rights under the Vienna 
Convention on Consular Relations did not preempt Texas 
limitations on filing excessive petitions for habeas corpus.334 That 
opinion has occasioned critical commentary relating to treaty 
interpretation by the Supreme Court.335 
It is fair to say that the principle of good faith interpretation, 
and the language of Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of 
the United States, is relevant in applying the Geneva Protocol and 
its progeny to nanoweapons. However, in light of past arguments 
over the meaning of words in chemical-related treaties,336 the 
content of the good faith requirement may be a matter of at least 
some controversy. This very concern informs a cautious approach 
to any possible ambiguities in international treaties, especially 
those regulating armed conflict. It is to the possible ambiguities 
and their application to nanoweapons that this analysis now 
turns. 
 
333. 411 U.S. 164 (1973) (quoting Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U.S. 363(1930)). Also, 
“courts in the United States are generally more willing than those of other states to look 
outside the instrument to determine its meaning. In most cases, the United States 
approach would lead to the same result.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS 
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 325 cmt. G (1986); cf. United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 
353, 368 (1989). 
334. 552 U.S. 491 (2008). 
335. See, e.g., David J.Bederman, Medellin’s New Paradigm for Treaty Interpretation, 
102 AM. J. INT’L L. 529, 539 (2008).(“Perhaps what is most notable about the Medellín 
majority’s approach to treaty interpretation is the extent to which it eschews formalism. 
Despite the occasional invocation of “general principles of interpretation,” and the 
broad canon that “‘interpretation . . . must, of course, begin with the language of the 
[t]reaty itself,” . . . [n]owhere in the Medellín opinions are the most difficult aspects of 
contemporary treaty interpretation grappled with: When is it appropriate to break from 
the treaty text? How high should an interpreter’s tolerance for ambiguity be? Are all 
extratextual sources of construction to be treated equally? What intentions matter in 
treaty interpretation (those of the original treaty drafters or those generated by 
subsequent practice)? What role is there for a supervening canon of good faith in treaty 
interpretation so as to ensure that a selected construction does not result in a material breach of the 
agreement?” (emphasis added)). Professor John Moore discusses U.S. Supreme Court 
jurisprudence on treaty law and makes a compelling argument for rule of law in 
application of treaties. See generally JOHN NORTON MOORE, TREATY INTERPRETATION, 
THE CONSTITUTION AND THE RULE OF LAW (2001). 
336. See supra Part II.A.1.d.i. 
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IV. GOOD FAITH INTERPRETATION OF CURRENT LAWS 
APPLICABLE TO NANOMIMICS 
A. Application of Current Treaties 
Depending on the circumstances, and the nanomaterials 
involved, it ranges from certain to strongly arguable, but not 
entirely certain, that the principal treaties at issue here—BWC 
and CWC with the incorporated Geneva Protocol—apply.337 The 
principal difficulty in achieving the absolute predictability for 
which all law strives338 is the historic tendency of states to find any 
available loopholes in wartime; these interpretations of law are 
rejected by the vast majority of states but still have a certain 
plausibility. In the last century, there have been two particular 
examples involving use of gas in arguable violation of existing 
 
337. Pinson, supra note 33, argues that because the BWC bans toxins “whatever 
their origin or method of production,” that it therefore “seems to include so-called 
mechanical devices that could result from mature nanotechnology [and so] one can 
argue that [a] nanorobot[] can be treated as a toxin if it causes harm similar to other 
already known toxins.” Id. at 298. He goes on to recognize a counterargument that the 
BWC “seems to deal only with biological organisms” and concludes that “[p]erhaps the 
only way nanotechnology can fall under the BWC’s prohibitions without a doubt as if it 
were used to artificially create exact replicas of known biological weapons or toxins.” Id. 
His examination of CWC applicability is equally jejune. He essentially argues that while 
nanoproducts “may not be chemicals in the sense originally conceived of by the CWC 
drafters, nanotechnology might still be perceived as a functional equivalent and thereby 
covered under the CWC.” Id. at 302. Without any in-depth analysis, he concludes that 
“nano-germs” and “nano-assassins” “could be prohibited as a toxic chemical under the 
CWC, as they would have no purpose other than causing harm or death to humans or 
animals.” Id. Pinson concludes that the BWC and CWC are inapplicable, without 
mentioning the CWC’s applicability to analogous devices under the Geneva Protocol or 
the most likely scenario where existing chemical products are reduced to nanoscale to 
defeat defensive systems, and then proceeds to argue for the creation of a new 
international treaty. Id. at 302–09. He argues that “because of the vagueness of the word 
“chemical,” any country can contend that nanotechnology is not chemical and therefore 
not prohibited.” Id. 
338. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 457 
(1897) (“The object of our study [of law] is prediction, the prediction of the incidence 
of the public force through the instrumentality of the courts. The means of study are a 
body of reports, of treatises, and of statutes . . . [in which] are gathered the scattered 
prophecies of the past . . . . These are what properly have been called the oracles of the 
law. Far the most important and pretty nearly the whole meaning of every new effort of 
legal thought is to make these prophecies more precise, and to generalize them into a 
thoroughly connected system.”). 
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bans: Germany in World War I and the United States in 
Vietnam.339 
Germany’s use of gas on a large scale commencing in 1915, 
the German legal analysis, and the ensuing argument regarding 
violation of the Hague ban, has been discussed above.340 As 
Haber notes, Germany “argued at the time and later, that (i) the 
Conventions did not cover gas blown from cylinders, (ii) the 
Allies had used gas first, (iii) gases were not poison, and (iv) after 
the war, gas shells were implicitly excluded because they were not 
causing needless suffering . . . .”341 There were certainly 
ambiguities in the then-existing treaties and all sides mercilessly 
exploited them.342 However, the German case is not the only 
instance of a technical legal argument exploiting treaty ambiguity 
to justify the use of gas in an armed conflict. The United States 
adopted the same approach with respect to its use of tear gas 
during the Vietnam War.343 
In some ways, the U.S. argument regarding tear gas in 
Vietnam was an even further stretch than Germany’s in World 
War I: First, the treaty drafters’ intent in 1925 seems considerably 
clearer than the general principles espoused at the Hague 
Conventions prior to World War I.344 Second, there was even 
more general agreement among major powers that tear gas was 
 
339. See supra notes 131, 222 and accompanying text. Germany still has a valid 
claim that the Allies used some sorts of gas before 1915. See supra notes 132–35 and 
accompanying text. Whether those gases were toxic or asphyxiating remains open to 
debate. See, e.g., supra note 137 and accompanying text. The Allies certainly used banned 
gases after 1915 in reprisal. 
340. See supra Part II. 
341. HABER, supra note 113, at 19. 
342. Among the interpretative questions were (1) whether “asphyxiating” applied 
to gases that worked through other means such as skin absorption; (2) whether “poison” 
included non-lethal or allegedly non-lethal weapons; (3) whether release of gas from 
cylinders was within the coverage of the ban on “projectiles;” and (4) whether fine 
powders were considered gases if they had the same effect. See supra Part II. 
343. See supra note 222; see also John Norton Moore, Ratification of the Geneva 
Protocol on Gas and Bacteriological Warfare: A Legal and Political Analysis, 58 VA. L. REV. 419, 
444–47 (1972) (discussing the U.S. belief that tear gas and herbicides were acceptable 
under the Geneva Protocol). 
344. See Alice I. Youmans et al., Questions and Answers, 83 LAW LIBR. J. 195, 202 
(1991) (“[T]he 1925 Protocol was more comprehensive than previous agreements.”); see 
also Florencio J. Yuzon, Deliberate Environmental Modification Through the Use of Chemical 
and Biological Weapons: “Greening” the International Laws of Armed Conflict to Establish and 
Environmentally Protective Regime, 11 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 793 (1996) (discussing 
that the Geneva Protocol specifically expanded the prohibitions contained in prior 
agreements). 
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banned as a weapon of war.345 Importantly, however, the United 
States did not ratify the Geneva Protocol until after the end of its 
participation in the Vietnam War,346 and tear gas on its own was 
much less noxious than other chemical weapons.347 Nevertheless, 
given the general U.S. attachment to the English language, there 
is a certain air of unreality in basing its argument on the French 
language version of the Geneva Protocol.348 In any case, both 
examples demonstrate that it is wise to closely read any treaty 
purporting to govern new weapons technology. 
1. Application to Nanoparticles 
Certainly, the treaties are applicable to nano-sized particles 
of substances covered by existing conventions. The CWC by its 
language applies to “toxic chemicals and their precursors, except 
where intended for purposes not prohibited under this 
Convention, as long as the types and quantities are consistent 
with such purposes.”349 A toxic chemical is “any chemical which 
through its chemical action on life processes can cause death, 
temporary incapacitation or permanent harm to humans or 
animals.”350 Most importantly, “[t]his includes all such chemicals, 
regardless of their origin or of their method of production, and 
regardless of whether they are produced in facilities, in 
munitions or elsewhere.”351 
 
345. See Bunn, supra note 222, at 395, 403. 
346. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. The United States ended its combat 
involvement in Vietnam in 1973. See SAMUEL LIPSMAN & STEPHEN WEISS, THE VIETNAM 
EXPERIENCE: THE FALSE PEACE 1972–74 (1985). 
347. See TUCKER, supra note 42, at 4, 11, 195. Though tear gas itself was less 
harmful than other chemical weapons, it was used to drive enemy troop out of protective 
bunkers and caves so they could be captured or killed by lawful means. See id. at 223. 
348. See supra note 167 and accompanying text. 
349. Chemical Weapons Convention, supra note 10, art II(1)(a). 
350. Id. art. II(2) 
351. Id. (emphasis added). The CWC also provides that “a toxic chemical or 
precursor should be included in Schedule 1 [if it] has been developed, produced, 
stockpiled or used as a chemical weapon as defined in Article II.” Id., Annex on 
Chemicals, sec. A(1). The CWC also subjects “chemicals listed in Schedule 1 . . . to the 
prohibitions on production, acquisition, retention, transfer and use as specified in Part 
VI of the Verification Annex.” Id., art. VI. Part VI of the Verification Annex further 
requires that parties to the CWC 
not produce, acquire, retain or use Schedule 1 chemicals outside the 
territories of States Parties and shall not such chemicals outside except to 
another State Party[, and] . . . the types and quantities of chemicals are strictly 
limited to those which can be justified for such purposes; and . . . the 
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It is clear that the CWC bans any existing or future chemical 
weapons, including nano-sized particles, that are asphyxiating, 
vesicant, nerve agents, or lachrymatory, regardless of the physical 
form that they take (i.e. gas, liquid, solid), unless they fall into 
one of the CWC’s enumerated exceptions.352 Although the actual 
physiological effects of nano-sized particles of a banned 
substance might be different and are probably more severe, the 
chemical content remains the same; such material 
unquestionably falls within the relevant schedules.353 The same 
absolute ban also applies to nano-enhanced delivery systems of 
such materials. 
2. Application to Nano Delivery Systems 
Cancer researchers “now use nanoscale devices as drug 
delivery vehicles.”354 That nanoscale devices can deliver toxic 
chemicals to specific cells in such sufficient quantities should 
immediately raise concerns about the use of nanotechnology to 
deliver banned chemical weapons. It is clear, though, that the 
CWC, which covers the toxic content of these carriers, should 
also cover these delivery devices. 
The CWC provides that “‘Chemical Weapons’ means the 
following, together or separately: . . . (b) Munitions and devices, 
specifically designed to cause death or other harm through the 
toxic properties of . . . toxic chemicals . . . which would be 
released as a result of the employment of such munitions and 
 
aggregate amount of such chemicals at any given time for such purposes is 
equal to or less than 1 tonne; and . . . the aggregate amount for such purposes 
acquired by a State Party in any year through production, withdrawal from 
chemical weapons stocks and transfer is equal to or less than 1 ton. 
Id., Annex on Implimentation and Verification, pt. VI(A)(1)–(2). 
352. The CWC drafters defined chemical weapons so broadly in order to prohibit 
possession of all known, unknown, and future toxic chemicals, in types and quantities 
that cannot be justified for permitted purposes. For this reason, the chemical weapons 
definition captures both novel and traditional chemical agents. See Chemical Weapons 
Convention: Hearing on Treaty Doc. 103-21 Before the Comm. on Foreign Relations, 103d 
Cong. 37 (1994) (statement of J. Stephen Ledogar, U.S. Rep. to the Conference on 
Disarmament, U.S. Dep’t of State). 
353. See Chemical Weapons Convention, supra note 10, Annex on Chemicals. 
354. See Press Release, Yale University Office of Public Affairs, Yale University 
Office of Public Affairs Describes Study That Uses Nanoparticle for Delivery of Prostate 
Cancer Treatment (Mar. 27, 2007), available at http://opa.yale.edu/news/
article.aspx?id=2061. 
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devices . . . .”355 Devices designed to cause death or other harm 
through release of toxic chemicals is a clear description of nano 
delivery systems when used to deliver banned substances. That 
coverage is unquestionable when compared and contrasted with 
the 1925 Protocol which is incorporated into the CWC. 
The Geneva Protocol bans “asphyxiating, poisonous or 
other gases and . . . all analogous liquids, materials or devices.”356 
As was demonstrated above, the “analogous device” language in 
the Geneva Protocol springs from the original drafters’ concern 
with asphyxiating and toxic materials other than gas.357 Its 
inclusion in the CWC, along with the specific ban on 
“‘[m]unitions’ and ‘devices’ [that release] toxic chemicals,” 
represents explicit recognition that (1) such devices needed to 
be separately banned and (2) the Geneva Protocol’s prohibition 
on analogous devices dealt with something other than delivery 
systems.358 
The CWC undeniably bans nanodevices designed to cause 
death or other harm through the release of toxic chemicals, 
except in certain limited circumstances. Inevitably, many of these 
devices have the capability of serving both innocent and 
dangerous functions.359 But the CWC indisputably does not ban 
nanodevices that operate within legal parameters.360 
Even in light of the analysis presented thus far in this 
Article, a principal issue remains: do the relevant conventions—
CWC, BWC, and the Geneva Protocol incorporated into both— 
taken together act to absolutly ban the production and use of 
nano-sized devices that can mimic banned chemicals, microbial 
or other biological agents, or toxins? Are “nanomachines  . . .  
 
355. Chemical Weapons Convention, supra note 10, art. II. Note that article 1 of 
the BWC contains a similar ban on “[w]eapons, equipment or means of delivery 
designed to [Microbial or other biological agents, or toxins] use [them] for hostile 
purposes or in armed conflict.” See Biological Weapons Convention supra note 13, art. 
I(2). 
356. Geneva Protocol, supra note 23. 
357. See supra Part II.A. 
358. Chemical Weapons Convention, supra note 10, art. I. 
359. See id., art. II. 
360. See supra note 267 and accompanying text. There is no legitimate argument 
that the exception does not extend to delivery devices like agricultural sprayers, which 
have been used to deliver chemical weapons. See MICHAEL KEANE, DICTIONARY OF 
MODERN STRATEGY AND TACTICS 35 (2005). 
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chemical weapons under the . . . Chemical Weapons 
Convention”?361 
3. Application to Nanomimics 
It is highly likely that the CWC, BWC, and Geneva Protocol 
together apply to nano-sized mechanical mimics. The arguments 
for their coverage are not just persuasive; in the Author’s opinion 
they are so compelling that any attempt to avoid their coverage 
would rise to the level of breaching requirement of good faith 
interpretation. 
The arguments for their coverage consist of the following 
factors: (1)the Geneva Protocol drafters’ intent; (2) the CWC 
and BWC drafters’ intent; (3) textual comparison of the three 
conventions; (4) that all of these weapons cause a chemical or 
biological reaction; and (5) international law’s good faith 
requirement with respect to treaty interpretation. Each argument 
is independently compelling, but taken together they are 
overwhelming. 
a. Drafters’ Intent in the Geneva Protocol 
As discussed above, the language of the Geneva Protocol was 
taken directly from the Treaty of Versailles, and the Washington 
Submarine Treaty was specifically informed by the existence and 
effective use of chemical weapons other than gases in World War 
I.362 It is clear that the drafters were aware of the problems 
caused by fine particles capable of passing through protective 
masks that neutralize gases, recognized the distinction between 
“processes” and “devices” but deliberately chose to describe 
actual toxic weapons as devices, and were fully capable of 
including—and did include—a delivery device as a separate 
banned weapon where they thought it appropriate.363 It therefore 
 
361. MCGUINNESS, supra note 3, at 27. 
362. See BERNAUER, supra note 147. 
363. See supra Part II.A. Hence, we see the inclusion of “flammenwerfer” in several 
of the post-World War I treaties. See supra notes 164–66. Note that a flamethrower is a 
device for delivering burning fuel, Dewar supra note 166, at 47–48, and that a later ban 
of incendiary weapons paints in broad definitional strokes “any weapon or munition 
which is primarily designed to set fire to objects or to cause burn injury to persons 
through the action of flame, heat, or combination thereof, produced by a chemical 
reaction of a substance delivered on the target” (thought it also includes a specific 
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becomes clear that the decision to include and retain “analogous 
devices” alongside the ban on poisonous and asphyxiating gases 
was a deliberate ban on wartime use of any weapon analogous to 
asphyxiating or toxic gases. Nanomimics are precisely analogous 
to poisonous and asphyxiating gases364 and the Geneva Protocol’s 
incorporation into later conventions and treaties—particularly 
the CWC and BWC—strengthens this argument. 
b. Drafters’ Intent in the CWC and BWC 
The CWC negotiations were long and detailed,365 in part 
because the negotiators were specifically concerned with 
avoiding both evasive conduct and outright cheating.366 As a 
result, the CWC contains broad, specific, positive, and negative 
requirements; a mechanism for continued verification of 
compliance; and analysis of possible new violations.367 
Given the high levels of distrust during the Cold War, it was 
probably inevitable that interim confidence building measures 
and bilateral treaty negotiations were necessary to achieve what 
eventually became the CWC.368 The long negotiations and 
interim steps, however, resulted in a treaty providing 
comprehensive coverage, including prohibition of new research 
 
reference to flamethrowers as exemplary of the type). Conventional Weapons 
Convention, supra note 164, Protocol III art. 1(1). 
364. See supra Part I.D. 
365. See Chronology of Chemical Weapons Negotiations at the Conference on 
Disarmament, http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/acda/factshee/wmd/cw/cwcneg.htm (last 
visited Apr. 3, 2010). 
366. See ROBINSON, supra note 228, at 17–36. 
367. See generally Chemical Weapons Convention, supra note 10. 
368. The United States and Russia engaged in diplomatic negotiations prior to 
signing the CWC: 
the Presidents noted that cooperation between the two countries in the 
prohibition of chemical weapons has enabled both countries to enhance 
openness regarding their military chemical potential and to gain experience 
with procedures and measures for verifying compliance with the Chemical 
Weapons Convention. The Parties will continue cooperation between them in 
chemical disarmament 
Russia-United States Joint Statement on Chemical Weapons, 33 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. 
DOC, 391 (Mar. 21, 1997). 
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and development.369 They also created an ongoing international 
body to monitor new developments and means of production.370 
The BWC is considerably less detailed than the CWC but its 
coverage is at least as broad.371 Its core is found in article 1, which 
provides in its entirety: 
Each State Party to this Convention undertakes never in any 
circumstances to develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise 
acquire or retain:  
(1) Microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever 
their origin or method of production, of types and in 
quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, 
protective or other peaceful purposes;  
(2) Weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use 
such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed 
conflict.372 
While there has been some “push back” in later negotiations 
from states concerned that BWC interpretation might interfere 
with legitimate research,373 general consensus has emerged in 
favor of absolute bans on any new biological weapons in whatever 
form they might emerge.374 The negotiating history of the BWC 
 
369. See Chemical Weapons Convention, supra note 10, art. I. (“Each State Party to 
this Convention undertakes never under any circumstances: (a) to develop [or] produce . . . 
chemical weapons.”). 
370. See generally Chemical Weapons Convention, supra note 10, art. VIII(A). 
371. See generally Biological Weapons Convention, supra note 13. In one aspect, the 
BWC is more detailed than the CWC in that it specifically provides that  
nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as in any way limiting or 
detracting from the obligations assumed by any State under the Protocol for 
the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, 
and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on June 17, 1925 
Id. art. XIII. 
372. Id. art. I. (emphasis added). As with the CWC, there is a national 
implementation provision:  
[E]ach State Party to this Convention shall, in accordance with its 
constitutional processes, take any necessary measures to prohibit and prevent 
the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition, or retention of the 
agents, toxins, weapons, equipment and means of delivery specified in article I 
of the Convention, within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction or 
under its control anywhere.  
Id. art. IV. 
373. See, e.g., MALCOLM R. DANDO, PREVENTING BIOLOGICAL WARFARE: THE 
FAILURE OF AMERICAN LEADERSHIP 171–80 (2002) (detailing the Bush administration’s 
rejection of the Verification Protocol at the Fifth Review Conference). 
374. The most recent review conference of the BWC produced a final document 
with the following statements: 
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was considerably less complex than that of the CWC, and in 
essence sprang from a two state consensus between the United 
States and the U.S.S.R. in the 1970s375 and a general recognition 
that biological weapons “presented less intractable problems.”376 
The result was a treaty that paints its coverage in very broad 
strokes, even though it does not contain the rigorous 
 
  1. The Conference reaffirms the importance of Article I, as it defines the 
scope of the Convention. The Conference declares that the Convention is 
comprehensive in its scope and that all naturally or artificially created or 
altered microbial and other biological agents and toxins, as well as their 
components, regardless of their origin and method of production and 
whether they affect humans, animals or plants, of types and in quantities that 
have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes, 
are unequivocally covered by Article I.  
  2. The Conference reaffirms that Article I applies to all scientific and 
technological developments in the life sciences and in other fields of science 
relevant to the Convention.  
  3. The Conference reaffirms that the use by the States Parties, in any way 
and under any circumstances, of microbial or other biological agents or toxins, 
that is not consistent with prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes, 
is effectively a violation of Article I. The Conference reaffirms the undertaking 
in Article I never in any circumstances to develop, produce, stockpile or 
otherwise acquire or retain weapons, equipment, or means of delivery 
designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict 
in order to exclude completely and forever the possibility of their use. The 
Conference affirms the determination of States Parties to condemn any use of 
biological agents or toxins for other than peaceful purposes, by anyone at any 
time. 
Sixth Review Conference of the States Parties to the BWC, Geneva Switz., Nov. 2–Dec. 8, 
2006, Final Document, at 9, U.N. Doc. BWC/CONF.VI/6 (2006) 
375. See Jenni Rissanen, Issue Brief: The Biological Weapons Convention, NUCLEAR 
THREAT INITIATIVE, Mar. 2003, http://www.nti.org/e_research/e3_28a.html (outlining 
the history leading up to the drafting of the BWC). 
376. U.S. Dep’t of State, Narrative on the BWC (n.d.), reprinted in THOMAS GRAHAM, 
JR. & DAMIEN J. LAVERA, CORNERSTONES OF SECURITY: ARMS CONTROL TREATIES IN THE 
NUCLEAR ERA 192 (2003) (“An issue that long hindered progress was whether chemical 
and biological weapons should continue to be linked. A British draft convention . . . 
concentrated on the elimination of biological weapons only . . . . The United States 
supported the British position and stressed the difference between the two kinds of 
weapons. Unlike biological weapons, chemical weapons had actually been used in 
modern warfare. Many states maintained chemical weapons in their arsenals to deter the 
use of this type of weapon against them, and to provide a retaliatory capability if 
deterrence failed. Many of these nations, the United States pointed out, would be 
reluctant to give up this capability without reliable assurance that other nations were not 
developing, producing, and stockpiling chemical weapons. While the United States did 
not consider prohibition of one of these classes of weapons less urgent or important 
than the other, it held that biological weapons presented less intractable problems, and 
an agreement on banning them should not be delayed until agreement on a reliable 
prohibition of chemical weapons could be reached.”). 
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enforcement mechanisms of the CWC. The ban on “microbial or 
other biological agents, or toxins,”377 together with their means 
of delivery, covers all new genetic development and manipulation 
of potential living weapons and their products.378 Taken together 
with the CWC, this regime was certainly intended to broadly 
cover the development of new chemical and biological weapons. 
That is even more apparent when their text is compared and 
contrasted. 
c. Textual Comparison of the Three Treaties 
A brief comparison of the treaty texts among the Geneva 
Protocol, BWC, and CWC supports the argument for a very wide 
breadth of coverage. Among the contracting parties the Geneva 
Protocol constitutes a “prohibition of . . . the use in war of 
asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of all analogous 
liquids materials or devices [and] use of bacteriological methods 
of warfare.”379 The BWC’s major leap was, of course, banning 
development, production, or possession of an entire class of 
weapons, not just limiting its prohibition to uses in war.380 Of key 
import here is the agreement “never to develop [biological weapons] 
whatever their origin or method of production,”381 nor to develop 
“equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or 
toxins.”382 Taken together, the language of the Geneva Protocol 
and BWC cover a multitude of weapons and situations in 
wartime. It took another twenty years, however, for the CWC to 
close the circle on possession and development of chemical 
weapons. 
In addition to incorporating the Geneva Protocol,383 the 
CWC covers three key areas relating to this Article’s analysis: (1) 
banning development, production, and possession of chemical 
weapons;384 (2) defining chemical weapons to include delivery 
 
377. Biological Weapons Convention, supra note 13, art. I. 
378. See id. art. VI. 
379. Geneva Protocol, supra note 23. 
380. Biological Weapons Convention, supra note 13, art. I. 
381. Id. 
382. Id. art. IV. 
383. See supra notes 22, 112. 
384. See supra note 266. Each state party also agrees to destroy such weapons and 
their production facilities. See supra note 266. 
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systems;385 and (3) clarifying that peaceful development of, inter 
alia, pharmaceutical, medical, and agricultural chemicals, is not 
impacted.386 Of key importance here is the definition of “Toxic 
Chemical:” 
any chemical which through its chemical action on life 
processes can cause death, temporary incapacitation or 
permanent harm to humans or animals. This includes all 
such chemicals, regardless of their origin or of their method 
of production, and regardless of whether they are produced 
in facilities, in munitions or elsewhere.387 
This definition certainly covers any toxic chemical, whatever 
its dosage, as long as it “can cause” any of the effects listed.388 
Taken together with the ban on “. . .devices, specifically designed 
to cause death or other harm through the toxic properties of 
those toxic chemicals[,]”389 there can be no honest argument 
that the CWC on its face does not cover banned chemicals in 
nano dosages, and nano sized delivery systems of such chemicals. 
The only possible open question is the coverage of 
speculative nanobots. And yet, both the BWC and CWC 
incorporate the Geneva Protocol and its ban on the use of 
“analogous devices” in war.390 Must one fall back on that 
language as prohibiting use but not possession? There are two 
arguments which may take this question past that point to a 
complete ban. The first is that a common factor of all the 
nanoweapons discussed here is their effects on the human target. 
d. Commonality of Chemical and/or Biological Reactions 
All of the nanoscale weapons discussed in this Article 
eventually directly affect a human target through biological or 
chemical processes.391 At the nanoscale, there is considerable 
 
385. See supra note 355 
386. See supra note 267. 
387. Chemical Weapons Convention, supra note 10, art. II(2). 
388. Id. 
389. Id. art. II(1)(b) 
390. See Geneva Protocol, supra note 23, pmbl. 
391. It is, of course, possible to posit nanoscale weapons which only indirectly affect 
humans by, for example, damaging other animals, machines or plants. For example, 
using emergence technology, simple nanoscale bots could swarm onto all ball bearings 
in a specified geographic area, effectively shutting down most mechanical systems. Such 
weapons are simply beyond the scope of this Article. 
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cross-over among chemistry, biology, and physics.392 To the 
extent that the hypothetical nanobot in the AEPI’s scenario393 
interacts in the human body at a cellular level in a way designed 
to mimic a toxic chemical, biological weapon, or toxin,394 it 
seems functionally indistinguishable from the substances and 
materials banned in the treaties discussed above. 
The real question is whether such functional equivalence is 
sufficient as a matter of international law395 to ban states party to 
the treaties from developing, possessing, or using nanomimics. 
That is largely a matter of good faith. 
e. Good Faith Requirement for Treaty Interpretation 
A good faith requirement in interpretation of treaties is 
central to international law.396 The Vienna Convention’s 
requirement of interpretation “in good faith in accordance with 
the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in 
their context and in the light of its object and purpose”397 seems 
particularly relevant to attempts to avoid weapons bans by 
building a device to mimic a banned chemical or toxin. Even the 
following problematic approaches that states have taken to avoid 
treaty bans do not represent the actual creation of a killing 
device to function identically to an admittedly banned weapon: 
Germany’s arguments that the Hague Convention banned the 
release of asphyxiating gases from artillery shells but not from 
cylinders, and the U.S. argument that the French language 
version of the Geneva Protocol and its predecessor trumped the 
 
392. See supra notes 13–14 and accompanying text. 
393. See supra note 3. 
394. Several informed persons have argued to the Author that for the foreseeable 
future, only engineered viruses would be able to behave in this way. Viruses are not, of 
course, living things, and yet the BWC clearly covers their development, possession or 
and use as weapons. If engineered viruses are, in fact, the only entities capable of 
behaving this way, it is indisputable that the BWC applies to these nanobots. If other 
forms of nanobots become feasible or foreseeable, a different analysis will apply. 
395. In some instances international law recognizes the doctrine of functional 
equivalence. See, e.g., David Marcus, Famine Crimes in International Law, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 
245, 262–64 (2003) (arguing that international law should extend to man-made famines 
since “famines are often functionally equivalent to genocide”). 
396. See supra Part III. 
397. Vienna Convention, supra note 24, art. 31. 
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English language version to create an ambiguity that allowed for 
use of tear gas in war.398 
If the good faith requirement is to have any validity at all in 
international law, it must apply to ban the use of nanomimics as 
weapons. Given states’ past attempts to evade existing bans, it is 
still appropriate at least to consider pursuing past proposals for 
new treaties implementing new bans, and to considering 
clarifying the pertinent treaties through minor modification. 
B. Is There A Need For A New Convention? 
Several authors have discussed drafting new conventions or 
modifying the CWC and BWC.399 In an interesting article that 
unfortunately ignores some of the fundamental approaches to 
understanding the law of armed conflict, Sean Howard suggests 
that there are only “two basic options for designing a possible 
arms control approach to the mass-destructive potential of 
nanotechnology:” (1) to create a “regime of control and 
restraint” over the technology; or (2) to totally ban the 
technology.400 Howard suggests “a rough transposition of the 
Outer Space Treaty [to seek] peaceful exploitation . . . of the 
nanosphere.”401 But Howard seems to ignore possible alternative 
arms control and technology models—most obviously the CWC—
and the possibility of simply modifying existing conventions. 
Indeed, simply modifying the BWC and CWC might be the 
easiest course of action. 
Jurgen Altmann suggests that while changing the wording of 
the CWC might be difficult, it would be useful to clarify that 
“[t]oxic substances that are not of biological origin or are not 
produced by biological systems would not count as toxins, but 
would fall under the CWC, i.e. be prohibited if directed against 
humans or animals.”402 Altman also suggests “preventive arms 
control” in the form of technology limits.403 This approach seems 
flawed, given general resistance to absolute technology limits,404 
 
398. See supra notes 131, 222. 
399. E.g., Pinson, supra note 33, at 302–09 (advocating the need for a new treaty); 
Trapp, supra note 11, at 2 (noting that modifications to the CWC may be necessary). 
400. See Howard, supra note 59. 
401. See id. 
402. Altmann, supra note 36, at 171–72. 
403. Id. at 123–24. 
404. See, e.g., Chemical Weapons Convention, supra note 10, art. VI. 
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and the United States’ specific opposition to limits on potential 
nanotechnology developments.405 
In his discussion of a regulatory approach, Reynolds suggests 
a number of useful approaches, including building “inherent 
safety” into any living nanotech product through “genome 
encryption.”406 Many of his suggestions closely follow the 
Foresight Guidelines articulated by the Foresight Institute, which 
studies and discusses nanotech issues.407 While the Foresight 
Institute makes certain leaps of scientific faith408 about the 
potential problems, from an academic view, their solutions are 
well-conceived on a national basis. They do not, however, 
approach the weapons regulation problem in a way the Author 
considers viable in the current international legal system; they 
will not limit willing proliferators. The Foresight Institute 
recognizes that possibility: 
 Adding particular weapons related applications of MNT 
[molecular nanotechnology] to the list of technologies 
covered in Chemical, Biological and Nuclear Weapons 
treaties may be appropriate in certain cases. It should be 
remembered, however, that the capabilities of productive 
nanosystems will be extensions of general manufacturing 
technology. The military applications of MNT will include 
the manufacture of high performance aerospace vehicles 
and precision munitions at low cost. The high value and dual 
use of MNT for civilian and defense purposes will require 
making distinctions between the enabling technology and its 
specific applications, balancing health and economic 
benefits against security concerns. Since nanotechnology 
research is now global, the security challenges will be 
present, with or without the ability to capture the wide 
variety of benefits. 
 
405. See generally OFFICE OF SCI. & TECH. POLICY, DOMESTIC POLICY COUNCIL, 
AMERICAN COMPETITIVENESS INITIATIVE: LEADING THE WORLD IN INNOVATION (2006). 
Indeed, given the speed with which technology is changing, it seems best to make 
limiting language as broad as possible which the drafters of the original conventions 
certainly did intentionally. 
406. See Reynolds, supra note 59, at 203. 
407. See Neil Jacobstein & Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Foresight Inst., Foresight 
Guidelines 4.0: Self Assessment Scorecards for Safer Development of Nanotechnology (Oct. 2004), 
available at http://www.foresight.org/guidelines/2004oct.html. 
408. See, e.g., Smalley, supra note 46, at 1. 
  
954 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 33:858 
 Overly restrictive treaties or regulatory regimes applied to 
core MNT technologies could lead to the unintended 
consequence that only the rule-following nations would be at 
a competitive disadvantage technologically, economically, 
and militarily. While most nations, companies, and 
individuals are likely to adhere to reasonable safety 
restrictions, guidelines that are viewed as too restrictive will 
simply be ignored, paradoxically increasing risk. In addition, 
not all guidelines and laws will be followed, and enforcement 
is rarely perfect. Non-state actors could become quite 
significant, particularly when the relevant knowledge and 
raw materials are available globally. They may well not be 
signatories to any agreement. While a 100% effective ban 
could, in theory, avoid the potential risks of certain forms of 
molecular nanotechnology, a 99.99% effective ban could 
result in development and deployment by the 0.01% that 
evaded and ignored the ban. For example, the international 
Biological Weapons Treaty was being violated on a massive 
scale even before the ink was dry.409 
The Foresight Institute and others miss the essential point—
that the BWC and CWC, taken together and in light of their 
incorporating the Geneva Protocol, almost certainly do cover the 
sorts of nanodevices with which the Foresight Institute is most 
concerned.410 Drafting an entirely new treaty is unnecessary, and 
would waste time and effort. Nevertheless, these concerns are 
legitimate and worth considering. 
There is no real need for specific language changes to the 
BWC and CWC. However, if history serves as any guide, the 
CWC’s section of definitions could clarify the intent to include 
nanomimics or other nanobots; the BWC would not require 
more than one or two additional words in its prescriptions to 
clarify its intent. As long as the intent is made clear enough to 
avoid evasion of already existing coverage of nanomimics, the 
wording can be flexible. 
Under one possible approach, article 2 of the CWC could be 
modified. The revised CWC would read as follows: 
 
409. See Neil Jacobstein, Foresight Inst., Foresight Guidelines for Responsible 
Nanotechnology Development (Apr. 2006), available at http://foresight.org/guidelines/
currentguidelines/current.html. 
410. See supra Part II. 
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1. “Chemical Weapons” means the following, together or 
separately: (a) Toxic chemicals or their equivalents including 
any analogous devices and their precursors or their equivalents 
including any analogous devices, except where intended for 
purposes not prohibited under this Convention, as long as 
the types and quantities are consistent with such purposes.411 
Under a similar approach, article 1 of the BWC could be 
modified. The revised BWC would the read: 
[E]ach State Party to this Convention undertakes never in 
any circumstances to develop, produce, stockpile or 
otherwise acquire or retain: (1) Microbial or other biological 
agents, or toxins, or their equivalents including any analogous 
devices whatever their origin or method of production, of 
types and in quantities that have no justification for 
prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes.412 
Such changes are superfluous given the Geneva Protocol’s 
incorporation into both the BWC and CWC. Accordingly, the 
actual wording and placement of any changes are largely 
immaterial; more important is that any new language clarify that 
the intent of the states party is to prevent any evasion of the 
prohibition on devices and materials analogous to banned 
weapons, and that their use in war remain forbidden regardless 
of their shape and form. 
CONCLUSION 
The Great War changed the world in ways unparalleled 
before 1918. Although some earlier wars had global reach, three 
factors at play in World War I created a new reality of mass-
involvement: (1) advances in science and communications;413 (2) 
global participation;414 and (3) total mobilization.415 The 
concomitant result of that mass mobilization, however, was 
almost universal war weariness when the guns were silenced.416 
The revulsion caused by war, especially by the chemical warfare 
 
411. Cf. Chemical Weapons Convention, supra note 10, art II. 
412. Cf. Biological Weapons Convention, supra note 13, art. I. 
413. See JOHN W. OLIVER, HISTORY OF AMERICAN TECHNOLOGY (1956). 
414. See generally THE GREAT EVENTS OF THE GREAT WAR (Charles Horne ed., 1920). 
415. See H.P. WILLMOTT, WORLD WAR I 131 (Dorling Kindersley ed., 2003). 
416. See generally ROBERT ELSON, PRELUDE TO WAR (1977); STANLEY WEINTRAUB, A 
STILLNESS HEARD ROUND THE WORLD: THE END OF THE GREAT WAR: NOVEMBER 1918 
(1985). 
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that was utilized, translated almost inexorably into state policy 
and international law.417 Much of the following decade’s 
lawmaking was lost in the economic devastation and cultural 
insanity of the 1930’s, but the absolute ban on use of chemical 
weapons essentially held its own.418 
The foresight of those who drafted the initial ban on 
“analogous devices” at Versailles now seems almost accidental 
and providential, but, in fact, the language was created by hard-
headed men based on hard experiences and hard science.419 The 
development of the ban, its culmination in the Geneva Protocol, 
and its incorporation into the BWC and CWC, leave no genuine 
room for play in any sort of legitimate, good faith argument 
about nanomimics, and none whatsoever for any other type of 
chemical or biological nanoweapons.  
As a matter of practical science and governing international 
law, there is really no justifiable argument that any of these 
potential nanoweapons are uncovered by existing law; but it 
would certainly do no harm to modify both the BWC and CWC to 
include supplementary language making clear that the states 
parties intend to cover all new forms of analogous weapons. In 
fact, that just might do the world some good. 
 
417. See supra Part II. 
418. See supra Part II. 
419. See supra Part II.A. Victor Lefebure commented in 1921 that “if sub-atomic 
forces can eventually be harnessed for war they must be subjected to the same control 
and attempts at suppression during their development stages.” Lefebure, supra note 195. 
Although Lefebure made this comment in the context of nuclear weapons, it still 
represents the sort of amazingly broad thinking in which chemical warfare experts were 
engaged at the end of World War I. 
